Beyond security: current US Army capabilities for post-conflict stability and reconstruction missions. [electronic resource]. Shatzer, George R. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The attacks of 11 September 2001 taught the United States that weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. With this lesson still fresh in the minds of policy makers, and the mixed results of several humanitarian and nation-building missions in the 1990s, considerable interest in redefining US responsibility and capability to rebuild post-conflict nations has arisen. The current struggle to constitute stable governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq has intensified the calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. It is essential that US government policy making bodies, such as the Department of State?s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), understand the US Army?s current capability to perform stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) missions. This monograph examines what principal activities and roles inherent in SRO, beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. A secondary question is whether the US Army, as an institution, is suited to govern an occupied territory. The current body of theory, analysis, and commentary on SRO from foreign policy research and analysis institutions, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that the US needs to improve its standing SRO capability, but differs significantly with regards to which particular aspects of SRO are the most critical to mission success. Using a modified case study approach, profiles of the Army?s planning and performance of SRO in post-World War II Japan and in early Operation Iraqi Freedom are compared. Though the two profiles share many important similarities (e.g. both are instances in which the US decided for various national security reasons to affect fundamental governmental, economic, and societal changes in a foreign country), the differences are striking. These contrasts show that conditions for the peaceful occupation, demilitarization, and democratization of Japan were far more favorable than in Iraq. Likewise, unity of effort in planning and execution of SRO in Japan was superior to that of SRO in Iraq. The SRO profiles also provide context and support to an analysis of past, current, and emerging Joint and Army SRO doctrine that concludes the Army?s traditional preference for warfighting missions still heavily influences the way it plans and conducts SRO. In conjunction with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, the SRO profiles further inform an analysis of the Army?s SRO capabilities and capacities. Though the Army has significant shortfalls in all aspects of SRO, including providing security, it remains the US government?s most viable and effective SRO capable entity. Finally, the Army must improve its ability to perform the strategically vital role of governing occupied territories, given that it will likely be called upon to do so in the future. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The attacks of 11 September 2001 taught the United States that weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. With this lesson still fresh in the minds of policy makers, and the mixed results of several humanitarian and nation-building missions in the 1990s, considerable interest in redefining US responsibility and capability to rebuild post-conflict nations has arisen. The current struggle to constitute stable governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq has intensified the calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. It is essential that US government policy making bodies, such as the Department of State?s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), understand the US Army?s current capability to perform stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) missions. This monograph examines what principal activities and roles inherent in SRO, beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. A secondary question is whether the US Army, as an institution, is suited to govern an occupied territory. The current body of theory, analysis, and commentary on SRO from foreign policy research and analysis institutions, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that the US needs to improve its standing SRO capability, but differs significantly with regards to which particular aspects of SRO are the most critical to mission success. Using a modified case study approach, profiles of the Army?s planning and performance of SRO in post-World War II Japan and in early Operation Iraqi Freedom are compared. Though the two profiles share many important similarities (e.g. both are instances in which the US decided for various national security reasons to affect fundamental governmental, economic, and societal changes in a foreign country), the differences are striking. These contrasts show that conditions for the peaceful occupation, demilitarization, and democratization of Japan were far more favorable than in Iraq. Likewise, unity of effort in planning and execution of SRO in Japan was superior to that of SRO in Iraq. The SRO profiles also provide context and support to an analysis of past, current, and emerging Joint and Army SRO doctrine that concludes the Army?s traditional preference for warfighting missions still heavily influences the way it plans and conducts SRO. In conjunction with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, the SRO profiles further inform an analysis of the Army?s SRO capabilities and capacities. Though the Army has significant shortfalls in all aspects of SRO, including providing security, it remains the US government?s most viable and effective SRO capable entity. Finally, the Army must improve its ability to perform the strategically vital role of governing occupied territories, given that it will likely be called upon to do so in the future. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 70 p.; 654 KB. Post-conflict reconstruction Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) Nation building United States Army Military capabilities Military occupation Military government Japan Post-World War II Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Iraq Foreign policy Military planning SRO doctrine SRO theory Security operations Stability operations and support operations (SASO) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,760 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. MARSOC: a way ahead. [electronic resource]. Simmons, Todd P. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The Global War on Terror and the Department of Defense have thrust change upon the Marine Corps and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Because the Secretary of Defense mandated that the Marine Corps would create a component in USSOCOM, the window for revolutionary change is open. USSOCOM needs a force with the capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)). When the United States Marine Corps joins USSOCOM, it should not create a force that duplicates what already exists within that organization and is anathema to the Marine?s organizational culture. If the Marine Corps must provide a component to USSOCOM then it should provide a capability that is distinctly, ?Marine.? The Marine Corps should offer, and USSOCOM should accept placement of all MEU (SOC)?s under the combatant command authority of USSOCOM. In the current war, the MEU (SOC) is the ideal force to provide the power, resilience, and ensure the unity of command for the special operations commander of all forces involved in a special operation. Additionally the Marine Corps Special Operations Command should have the typical service responsibilities of training and equipping forces, but it should also have an operational responsibility of forming the core of a Joint Task Force for service in ?small wars.? These changes can create more capability for USSOCOM and place the Marine Corps in the forefront of the Global War on Terror. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The Global War on Terror and the Department of Defense have thrust change upon the Marine Corps and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Because the Secretary of Defense mandated that the Marine Corps would create a component in USSOCOM, the window for revolutionary change is open. USSOCOM needs a force with the capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)). When the United States Marine Corps joins USSOCOM, it should not create a force that duplicates what already exists within that organization and is anathema to the Marine?s organizational culture. If the Marine Corps must provide a component to USSOCOM then it should provide a capability that is distinctly, ?Marine.? The Marine Corps should offer, and USSOCOM should accept placement of all MEU (SOC)?s under the combatant command authority of USSOCOM. In the current war, the MEU (SOC) is the ideal force to provide the power, resilience, and ensure the unity of command for the special operations commander of all forces involved in a special operation. Additionally the Marine Corps Special Operations Command should have the typical service responsibilities of training and equipping forces, but it should also have an operational responsibility of forming the core of a Joint Task Force for service in ?small wars.? These changes can create more capability for USSOCOM and place the Marine Corps in the forefront of the Global War on Terror. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 66 p.; 761 KB. United States Marine Corps United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Military capabilities Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) Organizational structure Marine Corps organization Components Special operations Special operations doctrine Special operations theory Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Somalia Afghanistan Northern Iraq Global War on Terror (GWOT) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,761 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Intelligence transformation: using threat characteristics to define division capabilities. [electronic resource]. Smith, Frank A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The Army's fielding of military intelligence companies to the modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) as part of the Army Transformation has created a loss of intelligence capability for the modular division commander. Furthermore, the global design of the modular brigade and division focus on providing generalist capabilities employable against a wide array of threats and do not favor designing systems that focus on the unique aspects of individual threats. Because predictable intelligence is intent based, it requires a system with capabilities that specialize in the unique aspects of the target adversary. This monograph explores the intelligence requirements of a modular division conducting operations during the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). It assesses the nature of the emerging security environment by comparing the U.S. government?s strategic and operational threat models with the characteristics of evidentiary threats in the current environment. It poses the question: does the intelligence system of a modular division have the capability to provide a focused and detailed understanding of a networked irregular threat? The conceptual model of this study is a modular division operating on a non-contiguous battlefield against an irregular, networked threat. By comparing the characteristics of evidentiary and emerging irregular threats to the intelligence system capabilities of a modular division, this study identifies existing intelligence capabilities gaps commanders and planners will need to consider when tailoring force packages for operations in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The purpose of this monograph is to recommend concepts that can mitigate the identified intelligence gaps. The results of this analysis provide three observations. First, the theoretical threat model the Army is using in its capabilities based approach to force design may be based on a false premise. Second, the capabilities based approach to force design may be insufficient for developing an intelligence organization because intelligence operations are inherently threat specific. Third, the Army must use a mix of matrix, multi-divisional, and functional organizational structures across the intelligence enterprise in order to provide a capability both flexible and knowledgeable. The diffusion of threats across the globe requires the Army to develop a globally deployable force supported by an intelligence capability with problem specific knowledge. Success with new organizational concepts in the GWOT suggests that commanders must tailor the specialties required to counter the threat to their specific tactical problem. Organizational structure changes within the division and the use of matrix organizations can provide the flexibility the Army needs to tailor its divisional intelligence capability to the characteristics of specific threats. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The Army's fielding of military intelligence companies to the modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) as part of the Army Transformation has created a loss of intelligence capability for the modular division commander. Furthermore, the global design of the modular brigade and division focus on providing generalist capabilities employable against a wide array of threats and do not favor designing systems that focus on the unique aspects of individual threats. Because predictable intelligence is intent based, it requires a system with capabilities that specialize in the unique aspects of the target adversary. This monograph explores the intelligence requirements of a modular division conducting operations during the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). It assesses the nature of the emerging security environment by comparing the U.S. government?s strategic and operational threat models with the characteristics of evidentiary threats in the current environment. It poses the question: does the intelligence system of a modular division have the capability to provide a focused and detailed understanding of a networked irregular threat? The conceptual model of this study is a modular division operating on a non-contiguous battlefield against an irregular, networked threat. By comparing the characteristics of evidentiary and emerging irregular threats to the intelligence system capabilities of a modular division, this study identifies existing intelligence capabilities gaps commanders and planners will need to consider when tailoring force packages for operations in the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The purpose of this monograph is to recommend concepts that can mitigate the identified intelligence gaps. The results of this analysis provide three observations. First, the theoretical threat model the Army is using in its capabilities based approach to force design may be based on a false premise. Second, the capabilities based approach to force design may be insufficient for developing an intelligence organization because intelligence operations are inherently threat specific. Third, the Army must use a mix of matrix, multi-divisional, and functional organizational structures across the intelligence enterprise in order to provide a capability both flexible and knowledgeable. The diffusion of threats across the globe requires the Army to develop a globally deployable force supported by an intelligence capability with problem specific knowledge. Success with new organizational concepts in the GWOT suggests that commanders must tailor the specialties required to counter the threat to their specific tactical problem. Organizational structure changes within the division and the use of matrix organizations can provide the flexibility the Army needs to tailor its divisional intelligence capability to the characteristics of specific threats. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 84 p.; 1.04 MB. Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) Military intelligence (MI) Modularity Brigade combat teams (BCTs) Threats Threat models Intelligence systems Intelligence capabilities Intelligence threats Force design Organization theory Global War on Terror (GWOT) Intelligence transformation Global insurgency Al Qaeda Terrorism http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,762 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Global War on Terrorism - the propensity for blacks to serve in the U.S. Army. [electronic resource]. Smith, James M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The U.S. Army has experienced a disproportionate decline in Black recruitment. Blacks, who once represented 23 percent of annual recruits, now only represent less than 14 percent. What factors have caused the disproportionate decline in Black recruits? Does the decline in Black recruits impact U.S. Army diversity initiatives? The answers to these questions provide insights to measures the U.S Army must take to reverse this trend. This monograph explores the critical question: Has the Global War on Terrorism caused the disproportionate decline in Black recruits for the U.S. Army? It seeks to answer this critical question using the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII) model as a framework. The Political, Economic and Social domains are deemed most important in the analysis of Black culture. The monograph analyzes these three domains to determine any factors or trends that have caused the decline on Black recruits. Also included is a detailed, historical analysis of the propensity for Blacks to serve in the U.S. Army since the Revolutionary War. The historical section presents a foundation of patriotism and willingness to serve despite racial prejudices. The political section suggests partisan politics play a role in the propensity of Blacks to serve in the U.S. Army. The section explores the original migration of Blacks to the Democratic Party, the impact of the 2000 elections, and the powerful influence of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the Black community. The monograph then explores the Economic domain. This section disproves the common misconception that a booming economy currently dissuades Blacks from joining the military. The section examined such economic factors as U.S. labor markets, median household incomes, and the perception amongst many Blacks that government funding for the GWOT directly impacts much needed funding in the urban community. The Social section examines the Black culture through such filters as religion, civic organizations, family (parents), and the hip hop culture. The forces of powerful, prominent Black leaders along with the hip hop culture and Black influencers combine to create an overwhelming anti-war sentiment in the Black community. This major anti-war theme has worked to decrease the enlistment rates of Blacks joining the U.S. Army. The monograph includes results from a high school survey that reinforces the notion that political and social aspects of Black American culture have caused a disproportionate decline in Black recruitment and may jeopardize diversity efforts in the U.S. Army. Many businesses attest to the goodness espoused from a diverse workforce. For the U.S. Army, a diverse force enhances readiness. The disproportionate decline of Black recruits, if not reversed, will indirectly erode diversity initiatives due to the decrease in population of future Black non-commissioned officers. The decline hinders the U.S. Army?s ability to provide a diverse NCO Corps in the future, thus threatening its ability to effectively function and fulfill its mission, potentially impacting readiness. In order to reverse the decline, the monograph suggests the answer lies beyond traditional high school recruiting efforts and television commercials. The great, professional Black officers, NCOs and soldiers of the U.S. Army must themselves reach back to Black communities. The diminution of Black recruits ostensibly reverses the contributions of their Black military ancestors. One cannot effect change in an organization of which they are not a part. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The U.S. Army has experienced a disproportionate decline in Black recruitment. Blacks, who once represented 23 percent of annual recruits, now only represent less than 14 percent. What factors have caused the disproportionate decline in Black recruits? Does the decline in Black recruits impact U.S. Army diversity initiatives? The answers to these questions provide insights to measures the U.S Army must take to reverse this trend. This monograph explores the critical question: Has the Global War on Terrorism caused the disproportionate decline in Black recruits for the U.S. Army? It seeks to answer this critical question using the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure (PMESII) model as a framework. The Political, Economic and Social domains are deemed most important in the analysis of Black culture. The monograph analyzes these three domains to determine any factors or trends that have caused the decline on Black recruits. Also included is a detailed, historical analysis of the propensity for Blacks to serve in the U.S. Army since the Revolutionary War. The historical section presents a foundation of patriotism and willingness to serve despite racial prejudices. The political section suggests partisan politics play a role in the propensity of Blacks to serve in the U.S. Army. The section explores the original migration of Blacks to the Democratic Party, the impact of the 2000 elections, and the powerful influence of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the Black community. The monograph then explores the Economic domain. This section disproves the common misconception that a booming economy currently dissuades Blacks from joining the military. The section examined such economic factors as U.S. labor markets, median household incomes, and the perception amongst many Blacks that government funding for the GWOT directly impacts much needed funding in the urban community. The Social section examines the Black culture through such filters as religion, civic organizations, family (parents), and the hip hop culture. The forces of powerful, prominent Black leaders along with the hip hop culture and Black influencers combine to create an overwhelming anti-war sentiment in the Black community. This major anti-war theme has worked to decrease the enlistment rates of Blacks joining the U.S. Army. The monograph includes results from a high school survey that reinforces the notion that political and social aspects of Black American culture have caused a disproportionate decline in Black recruitment and may jeopardize diversity efforts in the U.S. Army. Many businesses attest to the goodness espoused from a diverse workforce. For the U.S. Army, a diverse force enhances readiness. The disproportionate decline of Black recruits, if not reversed, will indirectly erode diversity initiatives due to the decrease in population of future Black non-commissioned officers. The decline hinders the U.S. Army?s ability to provide a diverse NCO Corps in the future, thus threatening its ability to effectively function and fulfill its mission, potentially impacting readiness. In order to reverse the decline, the monograph suggests the answer lies beyond traditional high school recruiting efforts and television commercials. The great, professional Black officers, NCOs and soldiers of the U.S. Army must themselves reach back to Black communities. The diminution of Black recruits ostensibly reverses the contributions of their Black military ancestors. One cannot effect change in an organization of which they are not a part. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 71 p.; 453 KB. Recruitment United States Army Blacks Black American culture Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII) Black military history Trends Diversity Army diversity Surveys Global War on Terror (GWOT) Black non-commissioned officers Readiness African-Americans http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,763 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Surrogate warfare for the 21st century. [electronic resource]. Smith, Kelly H. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng This monograph seeks to determine the adequacy of national security strategies, policies, and doctrine for the use of surrogate forces in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives. The insufficiency in the current guidance for waging warfare by, with, and through surrogate forces requires development of an updated approach to maximize the strategic options available to the United States. The methodology of this paper is to review the role of strategy, policy, and doctrine in light of the existing definitions relevant to the use of foreign forces in U.S. operations. This leads to a more detailed review of foreign internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine. This doctrinal guidance is compared to the contemporary operations involving surrogate forces. A comprehensive concept for surrogate warfare is proposed as a more effective way to conduct operations with foreign partners of all types. The current tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or conventional versus unconventional is of little value in developing guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. operations that involve non-U.S. forces. This framework also provides an analysis of the surrogate warfare environment to determine the appropriate role of both conventional and special operations forces in conducting surrogate warfare operations. The 21st Century operating environment will present diverse threats and increasingly complex strategic situations. A more effective use of surrogate forces greatly enhances both the capability and the capacity of the United States to protect its interests in this demanding environment. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph seeks to determine the adequacy of national security strategies, policies, and doctrine for the use of surrogate forces in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives. The insufficiency in the current guidance for waging warfare by, with, and through surrogate forces requires development of an updated approach to maximize the strategic options available to the United States. The methodology of this paper is to review the role of strategy, policy, and doctrine in light of the existing definitions relevant to the use of foreign forces in U.S. operations. This leads to a more detailed review of foreign internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine. This doctrinal guidance is compared to the contemporary operations involving surrogate forces. A comprehensive concept for surrogate warfare is proposed as a more effective way to conduct operations with foreign partners of all types. The current tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or conventional versus unconventional is of little value in developing guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. operations that involve non-U.S. forces. This framework also provides an analysis of the surrogate warfare environment to determine the appropriate role of both conventional and special operations forces in conducting surrogate warfare operations. The 21st Century operating environment will present diverse threats and increasingly complex strategic situations. A more effective use of surrogate forces greatly enhances both the capability and the capacity of the United States to protect its interests in this demanding environment. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 51 p.; 639 KB. Surrogate forces Special Operations Forces (SOF) National Security Strategy (NSS) Foreign forces Foreign internal defense (FID) Unconventional warfare (UW) Irregular warfare Irregular warfare doctrine Military operations Surrogate warfare Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom (ODF) Republic of Georgia Iraq Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,764 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Contemporary ?blueprint? for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan? [electronic resource]. Roe, Andrew M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The coalition and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face a complex and difficult challenge in their search for solutions to the Afghan conundrum. The establishment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represents a revolutionary step in meeting this challenge. The PRT program combines security and civil action to facilitate regional development. PRTs afford an important interface and make possible information sharing among the local population and government, non-government and international aid organizations. Despite their diminutive size, PRTs possess an innate ability to influence a significant proportion of Afghanistan?s rural population, thereby reinforcing regional stability. Notwithstanding common agendas, significant variances exist between coalition and NATO PRTs. Inconsistencies in modus operandi, perceived mandates, roles and responsibilities, national caveats and operational structures have all faced criticism. With international pressure mounting for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take the lead throughout Afghanistan, this study of existing PRTs is not only timely, but provides a constructive insight for those nations contemplating supporting the reconstruction effort. This investigation is also useful to those nations who staff existing PRTs in the north and northwest and who may be considering transferring their efforts to the southern or southeastern regions; the most insecure and challenging areas of Afghanistan. This monograph provides a historical overview of Afghanistan?s recent history, reviews the contemporary causes of internal instability, illustrates the international response, and analyses three existing approaches to PRTs: those of the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. It also identifies and evaluates a number of PRT tactical and operational lessons learned. The monograph concludes by combining the pertinent lessons learned into a recommended PRT ?blueprint? to meet the contemporary and evolving challenges of provincial security and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The coalition and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face a complex and difficult challenge in their search for solutions to the Afghan conundrum. The establishment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) represents a revolutionary step in meeting this challenge. The PRT program combines security and civil action to facilitate regional development. PRTs afford an important interface and make possible information sharing among the local population and government, non-government and international aid organizations. Despite their diminutive size, PRTs possess an innate ability to influence a significant proportion of Afghanistan?s rural population, thereby reinforcing regional stability. Notwithstanding common agendas, significant variances exist between coalition and NATO PRTs. Inconsistencies in modus operandi, perceived mandates, roles and responsibilities, national caveats and operational structures have all faced criticism. With international pressure mounting for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take the lead throughout Afghanistan, this study of existing PRTs is not only timely, but provides a constructive insight for those nations contemplating supporting the reconstruction effort. This investigation is also useful to those nations who staff existing PRTs in the north and northwest and who may be considering transferring their efforts to the southern or southeastern regions; the most insecure and challenging areas of Afghanistan. This monograph provides a historical overview of Afghanistan?s recent history, reviews the contemporary causes of internal instability, illustrates the international response, and analyses three existing approaches to PRTs: those of the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. It also identifies and evaluates a number of PRT tactical and operational lessons learned. The monograph concludes by combining the pertinent lessons learned into a recommended PRT ?blueprint? to meet the contemporary and evolving challenges of provincial security and reconstruction in Afghanistan. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 72 p.; 495 KB. Afghanistan North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nation building Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Stability and reconstruction operations Coalitions International Security Assistance force (ISAF) Mazar-e-Sharif Konduz Military-civilian relations Post-conflict reconstruction Cultural awareness National security http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,765 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Increasing effectiveness in training and doctrine command (TRADOC). [electronic resource]. Romagnoli, Paul D. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng TRADOC is a relevant and essential organization in today?s Army. No other organization performs the functions that TRADOC accomplishes. Unfortunately, TRADOC is not operating as effective as it could be. Its process lines, or lines of command and control, are not firmly established. Additionally, TRADOC has a staff structure that is unlike any other structure in the Department of Defense. These seemingly unassuming criticisms hinder effective horizontal and vertical integration within TRADOC and throughout the rest of the Army and Department of Defense. As well as providing recommended solutions, this monograph carries it one-step further by explaining how to implement the recommendations as well. Having a solution without a viable plan to implement them may prove the recommendations as unfeasible. This is accomplished by exploring the history of TRADOC and the challenges in its development, then applying those lessons learned to the recommended solutions. The Parker Panel, Reorganization of 1972, and Operations Steadfast are summarized. Exploring the history of TRADOC also provides an explanation of why TRADOC has the mission and functions that it is charged with today. In establishing depth of analysis, TRADOC?s current mission and functions will be derived from essential federal documents and regulations. The theoretical underpinnings are explained by using Frederick Taylor?s Principles of Scientific Management and TRADOC?s current major subordinate command and staff structures are dissected in order to describe process lines. Analyzing these aspects provides an explanation of the complexity of TRADOC?s mission and functions along with the major subordinate command and staff structures to accomplish those functions and the ineffectiveness that has resulted. To overcome the current ineffectiveness, it is recommended that TRADOC establishes clear lines of command and control and changes the current staff structure to the structure of a G-staff. Establishing clear lines of command and control fulfills the requirements set forth by Taylor?s theory and adheres to the Army?s doctrine of unity of command. Establishing a G-staff standardizes TRADOC to the rest of the Army and Department of Defense by making the staff functions recognizable to those outside of the organization. By tying in the lessons learned from the creation of TRADOC and the recommendations put forth, TRADOC is poised to become more effective. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. TRADOC is a relevant and essential organization in today?s Army. No other organization performs the functions that TRADOC accomplishes. Unfortunately, TRADOC is not operating as effective as it could be. Its process lines, or lines of command and control, are not firmly established. Additionally, TRADOC has a staff structure that is unlike any other structure in the Department of Defense. These seemingly unassuming criticisms hinder effective horizontal and vertical integration within TRADOC and throughout the rest of the Army and Department of Defense. As well as providing recommended solutions, this monograph carries it one-step further by explaining how to implement the recommendations as well. Having a solution without a viable plan to implement them may prove the recommendations as unfeasible. This is accomplished by exploring the history of TRADOC and the challenges in its development, then applying those lessons learned to the recommended solutions. The Parker Panel, Reorganization of 1972, and Operations Steadfast are summarized. Exploring the history of TRADOC also provides an explanation of why TRADOC has the mission and functions that it is charged with today. In establishing depth of analysis, TRADOC?s current mission and functions will be derived from essential federal documents and regulations. The theoretical underpinnings are explained by using Frederick Taylor?s Principles of Scientific Management and TRADOC?s current major subordinate command and staff structures are dissected in order to describe process lines. Analyzing these aspects provides an explanation of the complexity of TRADOC?s mission and functions along with the major subordinate command and staff structures to accomplish those functions and the ineffectiveness that has resulted. To overcome the current ineffectiveness, it is recommended that TRADOC establishes clear lines of command and control and changes the current staff structure to the structure of a G-staff. Establishing clear lines of command and control fulfills the requirements set forth by Taylor?s theory and adheres to the Army?s doctrine of unity of command. Establishing a G-staff standardizes TRADOC to the rest of the Army and Department of Defense by making the staff functions recognizable to those outside of the organization. By tying in the lessons learned from the creation of TRADOC and the recommendations put forth, TRADOC is poised to become more effective. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 61 p.; 392 KB. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC TRADOC organization Organizational structure Organization theory Army organization Department of Defense Parker Panel Operation Steadfast Training and doctrine theory TRADOC history Command and control (C2) Staff structure Reorganization http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,766 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Long war in Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s Caliphate. [electronic resource]. Ruder, Daniel. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng One of the effects from the September 11th terrorist attacks was an intensified United States strategic partnership with the Central Asian states. Geographically, Central Asia is critical to the GWOT. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in neighboring Afghanistan, many of the Central Asian states provided over-flight access, including basing rights at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base and Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base. Partnership with Central Asian states afforded the United States the strategic and operational freedom of action to win in Afghanistan. After more than four years of an intensified U.S.-Central Asian partnership, regional stability in Central Asia is still threatened by Islamic extremism. Central Asian leaders have argued against liberal reforms in fear of Islamic extremist threats to foment more rebellions. Once such threat is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a transnational, radical Islamist political movement that aims to overthrow a Central Asian government and restore the Islamic Caliphate. The problem is that Hizb-ut-Tahrir is gaining popularity in Central Asia. The monograph?s thesis is that the Central Asia region is at risk of devolving into a major front in the GWOT in the long-term if the United States fails to use its influence to counter the Islamic extremist threat presented by Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation). The question this monograph answered was: can the Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s ideology form the basis for a destabilizing collective movement in Central Asia? The answer was yes. To counter the growing threat from Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the following U.S. and Central Asian government responses were proposed: 1. Diminish Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s political space by opening up the political process. 2. Win the strategic communication battle. Employ media resources to disseminate positive values of religious understanding. The United States should incorporate Central Asia into public diplomacy statements on political and socio-economic reform in the Muslim world. 3. Declare the Hizb-ut-Tahrir as an anti-constitutional political party and use political discourse and legal recourse to counter the regional influence of the party. 4. The United States should consider its strategy to transform its military footprint in Central Asia in the broader context of a counter-ideological campaign as opposed only to the level of security achieved in Afghanistan. 5. Diminish the effectiveness of Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s functional space on the Internet by expanding intelligence collection efforts. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. One of the effects from the September 11th terrorist attacks was an intensified United States strategic partnership with the Central Asian states. Geographically, Central Asia is critical to the GWOT. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in neighboring Afghanistan, many of the Central Asian states provided over-flight access, including basing rights at Kyrgyzstan's Manas Air Base and Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base. Partnership with Central Asian states afforded the United States the strategic and operational freedom of action to win in Afghanistan. After more than four years of an intensified U.S.-Central Asian partnership, regional stability in Central Asia is still threatened by Islamic extremism. Central Asian leaders have argued against liberal reforms in fear of Islamic extremist threats to foment more rebellions. Once such threat is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a transnational, radical Islamist political movement that aims to overthrow a Central Asian government and restore the Islamic Caliphate. The problem is that Hizb-ut-Tahrir is gaining popularity in Central Asia. The monograph?s thesis is that the Central Asia region is at risk of devolving into a major front in the GWOT in the long-term if the United States fails to use its influence to counter the Islamic extremist threat presented by Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation). The question this monograph answered was: can the Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s ideology form the basis for a destabilizing collective movement in Central Asia? The answer was yes. To counter the growing threat from Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the following U.S. and Central Asian government responses were proposed: 1. Diminish Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s political space by opening up the political process. 2. Win the strategic communication battle. Employ media resources to disseminate positive values of religious understanding. The United States should incorporate Central Asia into public diplomacy statements on political and socio-economic reform in the Muslim world. 3. Declare the Hizb-ut-Tahrir as an anti-constitutional political party and use political discourse and legal recourse to counter the regional influence of the party. 4. The United States should consider its strategy to transform its military footprint in Central Asia in the broader context of a counter-ideological campaign as opposed only to the level of security achieved in Afghanistan. 5. Diminish the effectiveness of Hizb-ut-Tahrir?s functional space on the Internet by expanding intelligence collection efforts. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 65 p.; 502 KB. Central Asia Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Islam Muslim Islamic extremism Hizb-ut-Tahrir Islamic Caliphate Islamic Party of Liberation Geopolitics United States-Central Asia relations International relations Central Asia strategic interests Central Asian security Social revolution http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,767 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Time for a new master tenet? [electronic resource]. Schaefer, John J., III. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng This monograph addresses the continued relevance of airpower?s master tenet in light of advances in technology. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the doctrinal assumptions used to justify centralized control with decentralized execution. Current Air Force doctrine assumes that this model of employment allows commanders ?to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.? Each of these assertions is explored relative to technological advances in the employment of air and space power and the current trend toward centralized execution. Based on this analysis, this monograph concludes that the location of sufficient understanding of the commander?s intent along the chain of command from the JFACC to the airborne asset determines the appropriate level of centralized execution. Successful future leaders will adapt the degree of centralized execution in their command and control model to fit their circumstances. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph addresses the continued relevance of airpower?s master tenet in light of advances in technology. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the doctrinal assumptions used to justify centralized control with decentralized execution. Current Air Force doctrine assumes that this model of employment allows commanders ?to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.? Each of these assertions is explored relative to technological advances in the employment of air and space power and the current trend toward centralized execution. Based on this analysis, this monograph concludes that the location of sufficient understanding of the commander?s intent along the chain of command from the JFACC to the airborne asset determines the appropriate level of centralized execution. Successful future leaders will adapt the degree of centralized execution in their command and control model to fit their circumstances. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 67 p.; 979 KB. Air power Air and space power Military technology United States Air Force Master tenet Air Force doctrine Command and control (C2) Centralized control Centralized execution Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) Air Operations Center (AOC) Aerial operations Situational responsiveness Air tactics http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,768 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Army, presidential, and corporate strategic transitions: the importance of transition teams and the application of lessons learned. [electronic resource]. Southerland, Grover R. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Strategic leader transitions constitute narrow windows of opportunity marked by high pressure, high expectations and general lack of organization awareness for many new leaders. During the transition period, an incoming leader must effectively utilize the existing time to develop a keen understanding of the organization and its environment while developing strategies for organizational success. If managed properly, transitions can enable organizational improvement in a number of ways. On the other hand, poorly managed leader transitions have significant ramifications. The Army?s transition team methodology is excellent in assisting strategic leader transitions. Without transition teams, it is unlikely that any incoming commander, regardless of experience, could develop an equivalent situational understanding or command strategy. Thus, transition teams are important for the Army because they provide essential assistance to strategic leaders although few are aware of the Army?s transitional methodology. This monograph fills an existing literature gap on military transitions while reinforcing the importance of Army transition teams. Its purpose is to inform readers about Army transition teams to include its general processes and products created. This monograph captures key aspects of the Army?s methodology based upon first-hand experience by the author during the CG TRADOC Transition Team in the fall of 2005. After modeling the CG TRADOC transitional processes and products, the monograph explores the environment and lessons learned from presidential and corporate transitions in order to identify and incorporate relevant lessons into the Army transition process and develop recommendations for improved transition team operations in the future. The methodology traces critical elements of the environment for both presidential and corporate transitions. It captures lessons learned in the form of best practices, critical outcomes and common pitfalls associated with each type of transition. Identification of commonalities enables comparison of the lessons learned and the refinement and improvement of the modeled processes and products. The resulting transition model provides both products and processes based upon an improved understanding of the lessons learned from strategic leader transitions in other environments. The monograph concludes with recommendations for improved future Army transition operations that include codifying the Army?s transitional process and training it in the AMSP program. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Strategic leader transitions constitute narrow windows of opportunity marked by high pressure, high expectations and general lack of organization awareness for many new leaders. During the transition period, an incoming leader must effectively utilize the existing time to develop a keen understanding of the organization and its environment while developing strategies for organizational success. If managed properly, transitions can enable organizational improvement in a number of ways. On the other hand, poorly managed leader transitions have significant ramifications. The Army?s transition team methodology is excellent in assisting strategic leader transitions. Without transition teams, it is unlikely that any incoming commander, regardless of experience, could develop an equivalent situational understanding or command strategy. Thus, transition teams are important for the Army because they provide essential assistance to strategic leaders although few are aware of the Army?s transitional methodology. This monograph fills an existing literature gap on military transitions while reinforcing the importance of Army transition teams. Its purpose is to inform readers about Army transition teams to include its general processes and products created. This monograph captures key aspects of the Army?s methodology based upon first-hand experience by the author during the CG TRADOC Transition Team in the fall of 2005. After modeling the CG TRADOC transitional processes and products, the monograph explores the environment and lessons learned from presidential and corporate transitions in order to identify and incorporate relevant lessons into the Army transition process and develop recommendations for improved transition team operations in the future. The methodology traces critical elements of the environment for both presidential and corporate transitions. It captures lessons learned in the form of best practices, critical outcomes and common pitfalls associated with each type of transition. Identification of commonalities enables comparison of the lessons learned and the refinement and improvement of the modeled processes and products. The resulting transition model provides both products and processes based upon an improved understanding of the lessons learned from strategic leader transitions in other environments. The monograph concludes with recommendations for improved future Army transition operations that include codifying the Army?s transitional process and training it in the AMSP program. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 77 p.; 406 KB. Army transition Leadership transition Transition teams Transition methodology Lessons learned Presidential transition Corporate transition Models CG TRADOC Transition Team, 2005 Organizational change http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,769 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Expanding the United States Army for 21st century roles and missions: Foreign Legion of foreign augmentation? [electronic resource]. Cyrulik, John M. text Textual. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 2004. eng This monograph considers expanding the U.S. Army using non-citizens to man new units. Both the French Foreign Legion and British Brigade of Gurkhas provide useful examples of the types of forces needed by the United States to preserve American hegemony and win the GWOT. This monograph presents models for an American foreign legion and indigenous units using the DTLOMS force development framework. While both concepts presented in this work would provide the U.S. Army with sorely needed additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. In addition, the U.S. Army should actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph considers expanding the U.S. Army using non-citizens to man new units. Both the French Foreign Legion and British Brigade of Gurkhas provide useful examples of the types of forces needed by the United States to preserve American hegemony and win the GWOT. This monograph presents models for an American foreign legion and indigenous units using the DTLOMS force development framework. While both concepts presented in this work would provide the U.S. Army with sorely needed additional manpower, the foreign legion model is the most feasible. In addition, the U.S. Army should actively recruit skilled non-citizens overseas through the promise of American citizenship as a reward for their service. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 60 p; 1.78 MMB. Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Civil-military relations French Foreign Legion British Brigade of Gurkhas. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,77 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Culture the new key terrain: integrating cultural competence into JIPB. [electronic resource]. Strader, O. Kent. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The purpose of this monograph is to provide operational commanders and staff with a glimpse of the potential of non-lethal power of culture. This monograph suggests that it maybe possible to weaponize culture, specifically through the use of cultural intelligence. In order to weaponize culture, commanders and staffs must develop competence culturally to leverage the key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities. Competence is ?the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into current operations.? Finally, the purpose of this monograph is to convince operational leaders that a systems approach to culture is the best method of deduction to achieve cultural competence. The framework this monograph employees includes international relations, history, theory and an analysis of current doctrine. After establishing why culture has become they new key terrain this monograph suggests modification to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and ways to incorporate cultural competence into campaign design using a systems approach to culture. The first half of this monograph makes the case for a ?new world order? that demands operational commanders and staff view the world as a complex, globalized, interconnected place. Second, it defines the three terms that are used extensively, namely, culture, cultural competence and cultural intelligence. Third, it consults military theory to examine how it has dealt with culture. There is a clear conceptual transition at this point from which the author describes how the phenomenon of culture has become a dominant aspect of war in the late twentieth century. Given this fact, and the apparent need to understand US military culture in relation to all the actors, allies, neutrals, adversaries and local population, this monograph suggests a framework for analytically and rationally comparing all the actor?s cultures to one another. It then suggests a systems approach is the best way to deconstruct each actor?s culture to determine the key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities. Finally, this monograph suggests the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is the best place to integrate culture into campaign design and suggests changes to the JIPB framework to incorporate culture. The findings of this monograph suggest that cultures are complex systems that are best deconstructed by employing a systems approach and that a systems approach is the best method of incorporating culture into the current campaign design framework. The most important finding of this monograph is suggested in the title, culture is the new key terrain and to weaponize or integrate it into JIPB commanders and planners must be culturally competent. In conclusion, there is much work that remains to be done in this field. This monograph has suggested areas to expand this topic. Two areas for future research include: Construction of a methodology for unraveling the key leverage points in a culture and practical ways to weaponize cultures? non-lethal advantages. In a world of globalized, up-to-the-minute media, and systemic interconnectedness, it is more vital that ever planners supply commanders non-kinetic options that can leverage cultures? critical factors to coerce, deter, deny and prevent future conflict before servicemen and women are committed into harms way. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this monograph is to provide operational commanders and staff with a glimpse of the potential of non-lethal power of culture. This monograph suggests that it maybe possible to weaponize culture, specifically through the use of cultural intelligence. In order to weaponize culture, commanders and staffs must develop competence culturally to leverage the key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities. Competence is ?the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that allows focused insight into current operations.? Finally, the purpose of this monograph is to convince operational leaders that a systems approach to culture is the best method of deduction to achieve cultural competence. The framework this monograph employees includes international relations, history, theory and an analysis of current doctrine. After establishing why culture has become they new key terrain this monograph suggests modification to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and ways to incorporate cultural competence into campaign design using a systems approach to culture. The first half of this monograph makes the case for a ?new world order? that demands operational commanders and staff view the world as a complex, globalized, interconnected place. Second, it defines the three terms that are used extensively, namely, culture, cultural competence and cultural intelligence. Third, it consults military theory to examine how it has dealt with culture. There is a clear conceptual transition at this point from which the author describes how the phenomenon of culture has become a dominant aspect of war in the late twentieth century. Given this fact, and the apparent need to understand US military culture in relation to all the actors, allies, neutrals, adversaries and local population, this monograph suggests a framework for analytically and rationally comparing all the actor?s cultures to one another. It then suggests a systems approach is the best way to deconstruct each actor?s culture to determine the key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities. Finally, this monograph suggests the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is the best place to integrate culture into campaign design and suggests changes to the JIPB framework to incorporate culture. The findings of this monograph suggest that cultures are complex systems that are best deconstructed by employing a systems approach and that a systems approach is the best method of incorporating culture into the current campaign design framework. The most important finding of this monograph is suggested in the title, culture is the new key terrain and to weaponize or integrate it into JIPB commanders and planners must be culturally competent. In conclusion, there is much work that remains to be done in this field. This monograph has suggested areas to expand this topic. Two areas for future research include: Construction of a methodology for unraveling the key leverage points in a culture and practical ways to weaponize cultures? non-lethal advantages. In a world of globalized, up-to-the-minute media, and systemic interconnectedness, it is more vital that ever planners supply commanders non-kinetic options that can leverage cultures? critical factors to coerce, deter, deny and prevent future conflict before servicemen and women are committed into harms way. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 81 p.; 1.15 MB. Operational art Culture Cultural awareness Cultural competency Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIPB) Cultural intelligence Military intelligence Systems theory Systems approach Campaign design Military planning Culture theory Contemporary operating environment Operational Net Assessment (ONA) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,770 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Empowering interagency capability: a regional approach. [electronic resource]. Sylvia, Brett G. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng In an age predominated by states but rife with non-state actors, failing states, increasingly fluid boundaries, disenfranchised yet interconnected populations, and increasingly self-aware cultures, the United States must develop a foreign policy structure that is adaptive to these circumstances. This foreign policy structure must be able to leverage the unique and varied technical capabilities of the United States and be able to apply them to diverse cultures across the globe. It must be able to win over allies and partners to gain regional influence and appeal. It must be able to leverage relationships with regional partners and entities through prolonged presence built into trust. When action is required, it must be flexible enough to respond across a range of responses from strictly civilian capabilities to military action. Finally, it must be able to act with the full support and confidence of the President and possess the responsibility and accountability to match. This research demonstrates the current foreign policy architecture does not possess the capacity required to meet this challenge. Likewise, the current reforms both within the military and within the interagency are insufficient to the tasks required. As a result, it is necessary to reform the interagency to be able to adequately match the desired ends of the National Security Strategy with more agile and diverse ways and means. This research proposes developing Regional Interagency Consulates with an Ambassador in charge and a military deputy that is dual-hatted as the Regional Combatant Commander. It contains functional Assistant Secretaries with staffs from most Cabinets and many executive agencies and government corporations. It meets the aforementioned challenges by being robust enough to offer the President options, both military and non-military, to prevent crises from occurring and to respond if they occur. It can operate in a state construct just as easily as in a construct of sub-national and transnational actors. At the same time, it benefits from the competencies already residing in the executive branch of the United States government without having to build the capacity from civilian organizations. Lastly, it can tread more lightly in the world by bringing the capabilities needed to meet the needs of a region in a manner that is more amenable to the concepts of maintaining sovereignty, empowering the local leadership and organizations, and demonstrating compassion. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. In an age predominated by states but rife with non-state actors, failing states, increasingly fluid boundaries, disenfranchised yet interconnected populations, and increasingly self-aware cultures, the United States must develop a foreign policy structure that is adaptive to these circumstances. This foreign policy structure must be able to leverage the unique and varied technical capabilities of the United States and be able to apply them to diverse cultures across the globe. It must be able to win over allies and partners to gain regional influence and appeal. It must be able to leverage relationships with regional partners and entities through prolonged presence built into trust. When action is required, it must be flexible enough to respond across a range of responses from strictly civilian capabilities to military action. Finally, it must be able to act with the full support and confidence of the President and possess the responsibility and accountability to match. This research demonstrates the current foreign policy architecture does not possess the capacity required to meet this challenge. Likewise, the current reforms both within the military and within the interagency are insufficient to the tasks required. As a result, it is necessary to reform the interagency to be able to adequately match the desired ends of the National Security Strategy with more agile and diverse ways and means. This research proposes developing Regional Interagency Consulates with an Ambassador in charge and a military deputy that is dual-hatted as the Regional Combatant Commander. It contains functional Assistant Secretaries with staffs from most Cabinets and many executive agencies and government corporations. It meets the aforementioned challenges by being robust enough to offer the President options, both military and non-military, to prevent crises from occurring and to respond if they occur. It can operate in a state construct just as easily as in a construct of sub-national and transnational actors. At the same time, it benefits from the competencies already residing in the executive branch of the United States government without having to build the capacity from civilian organizations. Lastly, it can tread more lightly in the world by bringing the capabilities needed to meet the needs of a region in a manner that is more amenable to the concepts of maintaining sovereignty, empowering the local leadership and organizations, and demonstrating compassion. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 80 p.; 509 KB. Foreign policy Interagency Foreign policy architecture National Security Strategy Security environment Globalization Military-civilian relations Regional Combatant Commander United States government Department of Defense (DoD) Joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) State Department?s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,771 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Concentrating on the enemy, the transformation under-fire of former regime militias into post-conflict guerillas. [electronic resource]. Western, Charles A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng This monograph is an examination of the transition of the Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen militia into a guerilla organization in an attempt to draw out methods that might be used against the Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (Mobilisation Resistance Force) militia in the event of a war with Iran. The examination will utilize Dr. Joe Strange?s method of identifying the center of gravity and consequent critical vulnerabilities overlaying a System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) framework. By evaluating the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of the Saddam Fedayeen along the SoSA political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information construct, and contrasting this framework with Iran and the Basij militia, operational planners can potentially identify successful and unsuccessful patterns and methods to prevent the Basij from transitioning into a guerrilla force. Military means alone will not suffice to isolate the Basij from the people. As larger force embedded throughout Iranian society, the Basij present a much more complex problem than the Saddam Fedayeen. However, the Basij was similar to the Saddam Fedayeen in its participation in repressive acts at the behest of the government and is viewed with caution by many Iranians. It was preparing for guerilla warfare and inculcated successful strategies into its training that were employed in the guerilla war in Iraq, including suicide attacks. There are some similarities along the PMESII spectrum between Iraq and Iran. Both sets of infrastructure were old and in need of repair and modernization. Both regimes strictly controlled the information flow in society. Both regimes knew that a conventional defense against U.S. conventional power is limited and have turned to asymmetrical means of defense, WMD and guerilla war primarily. The primary difference between the Saddam Fedayeen and the Iranian Basij was the ideological commitment of the members of the organization. The Saddam Fedayeen, a secular force that was personally and viciously attached to Saddam Hussein, fell apart over time after the death of Saddam?s sons and the capture of Saddam Hussein. The members of the Saddam Fedayeen turned their loyalties towards Islamic guerilla organizations that were more successful because of their cultural affinity with the Iraqi, specifically Sunni, people. The ideology of the Basij was religious and therefore presented a much stronger link to the Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran than the Saddam Fedayeen?s loyalty to an individual. This religious orientation makes some of the actions, such as deBa?athification, taken in Iraq to be impractical even counter-productive in Iran. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph is an examination of the transition of the Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen militia into a guerilla organization in an attempt to draw out methods that might be used against the Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (Mobilisation Resistance Force) militia in the event of a war with Iran. The examination will utilize Dr. Joe Strange?s method of identifying the center of gravity and consequent critical vulnerabilities overlaying a System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) framework. By evaluating the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of the Saddam Fedayeen along the SoSA political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information construct, and contrasting this framework with Iran and the Basij militia, operational planners can potentially identify successful and unsuccessful patterns and methods to prevent the Basij from transitioning into a guerrilla force. Military means alone will not suffice to isolate the Basij from the people. As larger force embedded throughout Iranian society, the Basij present a much more complex problem than the Saddam Fedayeen. However, the Basij was similar to the Saddam Fedayeen in its participation in repressive acts at the behest of the government and is viewed with caution by many Iranians. It was preparing for guerilla warfare and inculcated successful strategies into its training that were employed in the guerilla war in Iraq, including suicide attacks. There are some similarities along the PMESII spectrum between Iraq and Iran. Both sets of infrastructure were old and in need of repair and modernization. Both regimes strictly controlled the information flow in society. Both regimes knew that a conventional defense against U.S. conventional power is limited and have turned to asymmetrical means of defense, WMD and guerilla war primarily. The primary difference between the Saddam Fedayeen and the Iranian Basij was the ideological commitment of the members of the organization. The Saddam Fedayeen, a secular force that was personally and viciously attached to Saddam Hussein, fell apart over time after the death of Saddam?s sons and the capture of Saddam Hussein. The members of the Saddam Fedayeen turned their loyalties towards Islamic guerilla organizations that were more successful because of their cultural affinity with the Iraqi, specifically Sunni, people. The ideology of the Basij was religious and therefore presented a much stronger link to the Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran than the Saddam Fedayeen?s loyalty to an individual. This religious orientation makes some of the actions, such as deBa?athification, taken in Iraq to be impractical even counter-productive in Iran. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 93 p.; 513 KB. Guerilla warfare Guerillas Iraq Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (Mobilisation resistance force) Iran Strange, Joe Center of gravity (COG) System of systems analysis (SoSA) Operational planning Asymmetrical warfare Militia Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Sunni Arabs Iran-Iraq War http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,772 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. U.S. policy towards an emerging Iranian-Shia hegemon. [electronic resource]. Wiens, Mark G. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Iran is pursuing a public nuclear policy, which will lead it into regional power status. The Persian Gulf is a vital region for its natural resources that America and its trading powers require to maintain their economies. A disruption of Persian Gulf petroleum production and export will have a global economic impact. The United States has provided security in the Persian Gulf in the past. In order to avoid a conflict with a burgeoning nuclear power in this vital region, the United States must engage Iran immediately and if required, unilaterally. Iran is a complex nation with aspirations to become a respected power in the region. Its threats directed at Israel draw on the popular Muslim target in order to deflect internal criticism and unify Arab Muslim hatred towards the Jewish state. Iran?s leaders employ scare tactics on their own population in order to consolidate power against foreign threats. Iran?s penchant for nuclear power and eventually a nuclear weapon can bring this bustling Persian Gulf state a greater stake in the geopolitical game. Iran is a proud state with a desire to regain its ancient glory and become a regional hegemon again, thus gaining international respect. Iran is also a pragmatic power on the rise. It is pursuing greater economic and diplomatic relations with foreign states and corporations; this follows a long period of extreme isolation and tragic warfare. Iranian leaders, including moderates and conservatives, use policies to increase the investment within and the exportation of natural resources, thus creating the co-dependant relationship of oil producer and user. Iran is a rational actor that uses some uncommon methods of foreign policy and communicating its policy objectives. There are five recommended actions along the lines of the elements of national power within a United States engagement policy towards an emerging Iranian hegemon. First, the United States should normalize diplomatic relations with Iran in order to dialogue directly. Second, American information operations should accentuate the positive steps made by Iran. American messages directed towards the Iranian people should focus on cooperation in collective security interests of both nations. Third, the United States must remain and stabilize Iraq in order that a fully functioning Iraq can balance Iran?s power in the region. Beyond the stabilization of Iraq, America must maintain a military presence in the Persian Gulf in order to demonstrate commitment to security and react to threats in the region. Fourth, America should initiate economic revival with Iran by incrementally decreasing sanctions against American business in Iran and lifting American boycott of Iranian products sold to the United States. This policy element should be gradually implemented with improving relations based on the reactions of Iran; however the initiative lies with the United States. Fifth, the United States must work with coalition partners multilaterally to maintain pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear program through international organizations and direct dialog. An American engagement policy must be a synchronized effort employing all the elements of power. America should not lead with its military power; however its military presence in the Persian Gulf does demonstrate American resolve for security and stability. The United States must engage Iran diplomatically in order to reduce tension, and modify sanctions in order to draw Iran into an economic relationship that comes with the prosperity that has accompanied globalization. America?s message to the people of Iran must be engaging rather than threatening in order to facilitate a reciprocal response from Iranian leaders. The resolution of a potential crisis, between Iran bent on achieving nuclear power and America bent on keeping Iran isolated, is more about post modern American leadership and values. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Iran is pursuing a public nuclear policy, which will lead it into regional power status. The Persian Gulf is a vital region for its natural resources that America and its trading powers require to maintain their economies. A disruption of Persian Gulf petroleum production and export will have a global economic impact. The United States has provided security in the Persian Gulf in the past. In order to avoid a conflict with a burgeoning nuclear power in this vital region, the United States must engage Iran immediately and if required, unilaterally. Iran is a complex nation with aspirations to become a respected power in the region. Its threats directed at Israel draw on the popular Muslim target in order to deflect internal criticism and unify Arab Muslim hatred towards the Jewish state. Iran?s leaders employ scare tactics on their own population in order to consolidate power against foreign threats. Iran?s penchant for nuclear power and eventually a nuclear weapon can bring this bustling Persian Gulf state a greater stake in the geopolitical game. Iran is a proud state with a desire to regain its ancient glory and become a regional hegemon again, thus gaining international respect. Iran is also a pragmatic power on the rise. It is pursuing greater economic and diplomatic relations with foreign states and corporations; this follows a long period of extreme isolation and tragic warfare. Iranian leaders, including moderates and conservatives, use policies to increase the investment within and the exportation of natural resources, thus creating the co-dependant relationship of oil producer and user. Iran is a rational actor that uses some uncommon methods of foreign policy and communicating its policy objectives. There are five recommended actions along the lines of the elements of national power within a United States engagement policy towards an emerging Iranian hegemon. First, the United States should normalize diplomatic relations with Iran in order to dialogue directly. Second, American information operations should accentuate the positive steps made by Iran. American messages directed towards the Iranian people should focus on cooperation in collective security interests of both nations. Third, the United States must remain and stabilize Iraq in order that a fully functioning Iraq can balance Iran?s power in the region. Beyond the stabilization of Iraq, America must maintain a military presence in the Persian Gulf in order to demonstrate commitment to security and react to threats in the region. Fourth, America should initiate economic revival with Iran by incrementally decreasing sanctions against American business in Iran and lifting American boycott of Iranian products sold to the United States. This policy element should be gradually implemented with improving relations based on the reactions of Iran; however the initiative lies with the United States. Fifth, the United States must work with coalition partners multilaterally to maintain pressure on Iran to abandon its nuclear program through international organizations and direct dialog. An American engagement policy must be a synchronized effort employing all the elements of power. America should not lead with its military power; however its military presence in the Persian Gulf does demonstrate American resolve for security and stability. The United States must engage Iran diplomatically in order to reduce tension, and modify sanctions in order to draw Iran into an economic relationship that comes with the prosperity that has accompanied globalization. America?s message to the people of Iran must be engaging rather than threatening in order to facilitate a reciprocal response from Iranian leaders. The resolution of a potential crisis, between Iran bent on achieving nuclear power and America bent on keeping Iran isolated, is more about post modern American leadership and values. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 58 p.; 287 KB. Iran Iraq Persian Gulf Middle East Foreign policy Nuclear proliferation Policy of engagement Shia Nuclear weapons of mass destruction Iranian capabilities Persian Gulf security Diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) Elements of national power United States-Iran relations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,773 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Military diplomacy: an essential tool of foreign policy at the theater strategic level. [electronic resource]. Willard, James E. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The driving concept behind this monograph is the thesis that not only does the military conduct diplomacy, but military diplomacy, at the combatant command level, provides a theater strategic capability essential to the effective implementation of United States foreign policy. The monograph demonstrates that this capability arises from several organizational advantages. First, the authority vested in the combatant commander facilitates the development, resourcing and execution of military diplomacy programs within a unified chain of command. Second, the combatant command contains a highly capable staff founded on historically proven structures and doctrine. Third, an extensive network of personnel and organizations positioned to coordinate and liaise across multiple levels of authority facilitates the implementation of military diplomacy activities. Finally, an unmatched pool of resources, from which to execute military diplomacy, allows for great flexibility and responsiveness when adjusting to a complex environment. The intended end-state of the monograph is to elicit two primary responses from the reader. First, that indeed the military does conduct diplomacy as part of its day-to day mission set. Second, that military diplomacy is an essential tool in facilitating the achievement of United States strategic foreign policy aims and theater strategic objectives. The analytical methodology required to examine this topic is through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary source information. The theoretical, rather than technical, nature of the topic limits the ability to conduct a purely quantitative analysis. Theoretical and historical references provide the foundation of legitimacy for the monograph. The study of national strategic guidance, United States Pacific Command initiatives and doctrinal information establish the foreign policy development and implementation process of the United States. The examination of expert testimony and contemporary publications establish the necessity of addressing this topic in relation to current world dynamics. Finally, participation in and observation of numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and international officer exchanges provide the author personal insight to the power of military diplomacy. Combining the insights garnered from this study, the monograph establishes a factual base in support of the monograph thesis. Additionally, the monograph identifies potential point(s) of friction that must be mitigated in order to effectively implement diplomatic programs, essential to influencing the contemporary environment. Based on this study, the monograph finds that not only does United States Pacific Command conduct diplomacy, but also that military diplomacy plays an essential role in U.S. diplomatic efforts at the theater strategic level. Currying tremendous international influence, controlling enormous resources, and capable of quickly executing a wide variety of missions, the combatant command provides an invaluable means of exporting United States foreign policy, through the use of force in times war and the use of military diplomacy in times of peace. As a foreign policy tool, the combatant command possesses expertise, resources and capabilities that no other department or agency within the United States government can bring to bear. Aligned and organized specifically for a designated geographic region, the combatant command structure is unparalleled in its capability to develop, orchestrate and execute a comprehensive, theater strategic level diplomacy program. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The driving concept behind this monograph is the thesis that not only does the military conduct diplomacy, but military diplomacy, at the combatant command level, provides a theater strategic capability essential to the effective implementation of United States foreign policy. The monograph demonstrates that this capability arises from several organizational advantages. First, the authority vested in the combatant commander facilitates the development, resourcing and execution of military diplomacy programs within a unified chain of command. Second, the combatant command contains a highly capable staff founded on historically proven structures and doctrine. Third, an extensive network of personnel and organizations positioned to coordinate and liaise across multiple levels of authority facilitates the implementation of military diplomacy activities. Finally, an unmatched pool of resources, from which to execute military diplomacy, allows for great flexibility and responsiveness when adjusting to a complex environment. The intended end-state of the monograph is to elicit two primary responses from the reader. First, that indeed the military does conduct diplomacy as part of its day-to day mission set. Second, that military diplomacy is an essential tool in facilitating the achievement of United States strategic foreign policy aims and theater strategic objectives. The analytical methodology required to examine this topic is through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary source information. The theoretical, rather than technical, nature of the topic limits the ability to conduct a purely quantitative analysis. Theoretical and historical references provide the foundation of legitimacy for the monograph. The study of national strategic guidance, United States Pacific Command initiatives and doctrinal information establish the foreign policy development and implementation process of the United States. The examination of expert testimony and contemporary publications establish the necessity of addressing this topic in relation to current world dynamics. Finally, participation in and observation of numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and international officer exchanges provide the author personal insight to the power of military diplomacy. Combining the insights garnered from this study, the monograph establishes a factual base in support of the monograph thesis. Additionally, the monograph identifies potential point(s) of friction that must be mitigated in order to effectively implement diplomatic programs, essential to influencing the contemporary environment. Based on this study, the monograph finds that not only does United States Pacific Command conduct diplomacy, but also that military diplomacy plays an essential role in U.S. diplomatic efforts at the theater strategic level. Currying tremendous international influence, controlling enormous resources, and capable of quickly executing a wide variety of missions, the combatant command provides an invaluable means of exporting United States foreign policy, through the use of force in times war and the use of military diplomacy in times of peace. As a foreign policy tool, the combatant command possesses expertise, resources and capabilities that no other department or agency within the United States government can bring to bear. Aligned and organized specifically for a designated geographic region, the combatant command structure is unparalleled in its capability to develop, orchestrate and execute a comprehensive, theater strategic level diplomacy program. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 71 p.; 456 KB. Diplomacy Military diplomacy Military theory Theater strategic level Combatant command United States Pacific Command Foreign policy Military doctrine United States military history World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Korean War, 1950-1953 National Security Strategy (NSS) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,774 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Military pundits: retired but still serving? [electronic resource]. Taylor, Christopher P. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng In September of 2001, 90% of America received most of their news on the terrorist attacks against the United States from television; a number that would hold steady at 89% throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In April of 2003 while the United States led the coalition of the willing in OIF, many retired officers stated on television that the Department of Defense had not planned and resourced the war properly, resulting in an operation that would proceed longer than expected. Unsecured supply lines and a shortage of troops involved in the campaign were the largest criticisms, earning these pundits a sharp response from the Secretary of Defense, members of Congress and other general officers, both retired and serving. As America fights her first war of the twenty-first century, one that has exceeded the length of World War II, Americans will continue to turn to the television for news, and along with the news, they will continue to hear commentaries and opinions from retired military leaders. With public opinion so important in America?s Global War on Terrorism, are these pundits shaping opinion to the extent that they are affecting policy within the executive branch of the government? Is this effect positive or negative and should these pundits be banned, encouraged or coached? With such disparate opinions, there is bound to be debate, and in the absence of a constitutional amendment, the experts are here to stay. This monograph will explore both sides of the issue and attempt to answer the question: Through appearances on television, do military pundits influence public opinion and how does that affect military policy during times of conflict within the executive branch of the government? To prove that pundits do not influence policy within the executive branch of the government, but rather echo and support public opinion and add to the friction of war, the monograph will use Clausewitz? ?paradoxical trinity? as a framework and use three case studies, Desert Storm, Allied Force and OIF, to show the role and relevance of pundits during times of conflict. The comments alluding to the utility and professionalism of punditry made by Secretary Rumsfeld, Senator Warner and General Myers deserve a closer look, so the monograph will next briefly explore the professional ramifications of punditry. Finally, the findings and recommendations will address the impact of pundits and discuss ways they can be used to America?s advantage in the future. Throughout the three case studies of Desert Storm, Allied Force and OIF, one can find numerous examples of how pundits opined, but there is very little evidence that their discourse had any direct effect on policy or public opinion. In each case however, their commentaries accomplished three things: They informed the public, spurred debate, and added to the war?s friction in the executive branch. Informing the public was a constant, whether in triumph or adversity, the public could count on military analysts to explain what was happening and why. However, the nature of each war dictated the amount of criticism and debate the pundits spurred, and the three factors that influenced this was public support, the tactics employed and the clarity of the political strategy. While their commentaries may have shaped existing public opinion, there is no evidence that supports pundits creating public opinion. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. In September of 2001, 90% of America received most of their news on the terrorist attacks against the United States from television; a number that would hold steady at 89% throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In April of 2003 while the United States led the coalition of the willing in OIF, many retired officers stated on television that the Department of Defense had not planned and resourced the war properly, resulting in an operation that would proceed longer than expected. Unsecured supply lines and a shortage of troops involved in the campaign were the largest criticisms, earning these pundits a sharp response from the Secretary of Defense, members of Congress and other general officers, both retired and serving. As America fights her first war of the twenty-first century, one that has exceeded the length of World War II, Americans will continue to turn to the television for news, and along with the news, they will continue to hear commentaries and opinions from retired military leaders. With public opinion so important in America?s Global War on Terrorism, are these pundits shaping opinion to the extent that they are affecting policy within the executive branch of the government? Is this effect positive or negative and should these pundits be banned, encouraged or coached? With such disparate opinions, there is bound to be debate, and in the absence of a constitutional amendment, the experts are here to stay. This monograph will explore both sides of the issue and attempt to answer the question: Through appearances on television, do military pundits influence public opinion and how does that affect military policy during times of conflict within the executive branch of the government? To prove that pundits do not influence policy within the executive branch of the government, but rather echo and support public opinion and add to the friction of war, the monograph will use Clausewitz? ?paradoxical trinity? as a framework and use three case studies, Desert Storm, Allied Force and OIF, to show the role and relevance of pundits during times of conflict. The comments alluding to the utility and professionalism of punditry made by Secretary Rumsfeld, Senator Warner and General Myers deserve a closer look, so the monograph will next briefly explore the professional ramifications of punditry. Finally, the findings and recommendations will address the impact of pundits and discuss ways they can be used to America?s advantage in the future. Throughout the three case studies of Desert Storm, Allied Force and OIF, one can find numerous examples of how pundits opined, but there is very little evidence that their discourse had any direct effect on policy or public opinion. In each case however, their commentaries accomplished three things: They informed the public, spurred debate, and added to the war?s friction in the executive branch. Informing the public was a constant, whether in triumph or adversity, the public could count on military analysts to explain what was happening and why. However, the nature of each war dictated the amount of criticism and debate the pundits spurred, and the three factors that influenced this was public support, the tactics employed and the clarity of the political strategy. While their commentaries may have shaped existing public opinion, there is no evidence that supports pundits creating public opinion. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 69 p.; 375 KB. Military pundits Retired officers Public opinion Military analysts News media Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operation Desert Storm Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Operation Allied Force, 1999 National policy Policy making Military theory Clausewitz, Carl von War on Terrorism, 2001 - http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,775 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Continuing utility of phasing constructs in operational planning. [electronic resource]. Taylor, Scott L. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Recent assertions have been made that the nature of warfare in our current operating environment has changed in such a way that phasing in military operations has outlasted its utility and become problematic, requiring it to be eliminated or replaced in military planning. The problem this monograph attempts to evaluate and solve is whether or not phasing in U.S. Military doctrine and operational design still has utility in planning military operations, or if it should be eliminated or replaced by some other means of visualizing plans and arranging forces for military operations. Phasing has been utilized to assist U.S. Military commanders and planners to visualize plans and how forces should be arranged to conduct military operations and campaigns since the creation of operational design in the 1920?s. Phasing has been applied in planning conventional as well as non-conventional military operations. Recent criticisms of phasing have surfaced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom?s failure to rapidly stabilize Iraq in Phase IV of the operation. This paper analyzes phasing through theoretical and historical influences to trace how it has become a part of operational design and planning. Phasing is described and defined in U.S. Military doctrine from its first appearance as a method to assist in planning in the 1920?s to the present and historical examples are provided as examples of its use. Mao Tse Tung?s use of phasing to visualize the strategy for conducting his Protracted War against Japan is analyzed to determine what influence it may have had on U.S. Military doctrine. Criticism of phasing and proposed alternatives are presented and scrutinized through Systems Theory, Complexity Theory, logic, and doctrine to evaluate the rationality for criticism and applicability of alternative methods for visualizing plans and arranging forces. Recent changes and modifications to phasing in U.S. Military doctrine are analyzed to understand the logic behind the changes. Emerging concepts such as Operational Net Assessment, Effects Based Operations, and Net-Centric Warfare are described and analyzed through a ?system of systems? approach to understand both the positive and negative influences they are having on U.S. Military doctrine and phasing. A concept for ?red teaming? is proposed as a method for establishing a foundation for understanding strategic and operational problems, synchronizing efforts, and coordinating between the U.S. Military, other government agencies, and non-government agencies to improve problem solving capabilities and integration of elements of national power. The influence emerging concepts are having on doctrine and their military applications are analyzed to determine how they can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of arranging forces through phasing in operational design. The principle findings and conclusions are that warfare in our current operating environment has not changed in such a way that has made it necessary to eliminate or replace phasing in military planning. Phasing is not a method for solving problems. Military operations or campaigns to solve problems should be visualized from start to finish in order create an understanding of what must be accomplished to achieve the desired end-state. Phasing should be utilized within the visualization of the plan to arrange forces in terms of resources, time, space and purpose to accomplish objectives that cannot be accomplished concurrently or require transition of efforts or forces within the plan. The phases of a plan should be analyzed holistically in order to understand the relationships between the phases and how actions in each phase will effect the others. Misuse, misunderstanding, and misapplication of phasing in military planning can lead to plans that fail to achieve strategic and operational end-states. Emerging concepts and problem solving methods cannot replace phasing because their purpose is to solve problems, not arrange forces within plans to solve problems. Emerging concepts can improve planning by increasing the clarity of visualizing plans and result in increased efficiency of phasing and arranging forces in terms of resources, time, space, and purpose. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Recent assertions have been made that the nature of warfare in our current operating environment has changed in such a way that phasing in military operations has outlasted its utility and become problematic, requiring it to be eliminated or replaced in military planning. The problem this monograph attempts to evaluate and solve is whether or not phasing in U.S. Military doctrine and operational design still has utility in planning military operations, or if it should be eliminated or replaced by some other means of visualizing plans and arranging forces for military operations. Phasing has been utilized to assist U.S. Military commanders and planners to visualize plans and how forces should be arranged to conduct military operations and campaigns since the creation of operational design in the 1920?s. Phasing has been applied in planning conventional as well as non-conventional military operations. Recent criticisms of phasing have surfaced in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom?s failure to rapidly stabilize Iraq in Phase IV of the operation. This paper analyzes phasing through theoretical and historical influences to trace how it has become a part of operational design and planning. Phasing is described and defined in U.S. Military doctrine from its first appearance as a method to assist in planning in the 1920?s to the present and historical examples are provided as examples of its use. Mao Tse Tung?s use of phasing to visualize the strategy for conducting his Protracted War against Japan is analyzed to determine what influence it may have had on U.S. Military doctrine. Criticism of phasing and proposed alternatives are presented and scrutinized through Systems Theory, Complexity Theory, logic, and doctrine to evaluate the rationality for criticism and applicability of alternative methods for visualizing plans and arranging forces. Recent changes and modifications to phasing in U.S. Military doctrine are analyzed to understand the logic behind the changes. Emerging concepts such as Operational Net Assessment, Effects Based Operations, and Net-Centric Warfare are described and analyzed through a ?system of systems? approach to understand both the positive and negative influences they are having on U.S. Military doctrine and phasing. A concept for ?red teaming? is proposed as a method for establishing a foundation for understanding strategic and operational problems, synchronizing efforts, and coordinating between the U.S. Military, other government agencies, and non-government agencies to improve problem solving capabilities and integration of elements of national power. The influence emerging concepts are having on doctrine and their military applications are analyzed to determine how they can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of arranging forces through phasing in operational design. The principle findings and conclusions are that warfare in our current operating environment has not changed in such a way that has made it necessary to eliminate or replace phasing in military planning. Phasing is not a method for solving problems. Military operations or campaigns to solve problems should be visualized from start to finish in order create an understanding of what must be accomplished to achieve the desired end-state. Phasing should be utilized within the visualization of the plan to arrange forces in terms of resources, time, space and purpose to accomplish objectives that cannot be accomplished concurrently or require transition of efforts or forces within the plan. The phases of a plan should be analyzed holistically in order to understand the relationships between the phases and how actions in each phase will effect the others. Misuse, misunderstanding, and misapplication of phasing in military planning can lead to plans that fail to achieve strategic and operational end-states. Emerging concepts and problem solving methods cannot replace phasing because their purpose is to solve problems, not arrange forces within plans to solve problems. Emerging concepts can improve planning by increasing the clarity of visualizing plans and result in increased efficiency of phasing and arranging forces in terms of resources, time, space, and purpose. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 66 p.; 313 KB. Operational planning Operational design Military planning Phasing United States Army Army doctrine Military doctrine Military operations Systems theory Complexity theory Visualization Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Effects Based Operations (EBO) Net-Centric Warfare http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,776 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Westernization or modernization: the political, economic and social attitudes and desires of the post-Khomeini generation in Iran. [electronic resource]. Updegraff, J.Jay. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The purpose of this paper is to answer the following question: Does the generation of Iranians born after the 1979 revolution wish to continue living under the system established by Ayatollah Khomeini, or do they wish to modernize (or perhaps westernize) their current political, social, and economic systems? This group is significant because 70% of the population of Iran is under the age of 30, and an amazing 50% is under the age of 21. Research for this paper to consisted of published material, including Internet sources and Iranian Web log sites, all written in English. This paper uses three broad frameworks to examine the attitudes and desires of the post-Khomeini generation in Iran. The three frameworks used are political, economic and social policies. To distinguish between attitudes and desires, the following definitions are used. Attitude defines how the young Iranians feel and desire describes what the young Iranians want. Iran?s history, its political structure and the importance of the clerical class in Iran are also examined as background information, necessary to critically examine the issue of attitudes and desires. This paper has four major conclusions. The first is that young Iranians have subordinated their immediate desire for political change for changes in the economic and social policies of Iran. The second conclusion is that any eventual change in the Iranian political system will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The third conclusion is that the United States government has little ability to directly influence the attitudes and desires of these young Iranians directly. However, the last conclusion proposes that the United States government can effectively influence these groups indirectly, through the use of three identified leverage points. The leverage points fall into the general groupings of media, economics, and education. Finally, the paper assesses as low the probability that the under-30 generation in Iran will attempt to effect political change in the near term. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this paper is to answer the following question: Does the generation of Iranians born after the 1979 revolution wish to continue living under the system established by Ayatollah Khomeini, or do they wish to modernize (or perhaps westernize) their current political, social, and economic systems? This group is significant because 70% of the population of Iran is under the age of 30, and an amazing 50% is under the age of 21. Research for this paper to consisted of published material, including Internet sources and Iranian Web log sites, all written in English. This paper uses three broad frameworks to examine the attitudes and desires of the post-Khomeini generation in Iran. The three frameworks used are political, economic and social policies. To distinguish between attitudes and desires, the following definitions are used. Attitude defines how the young Iranians feel and desire describes what the young Iranians want. Iran?s history, its political structure and the importance of the clerical class in Iran are also examined as background information, necessary to critically examine the issue of attitudes and desires. This paper has four major conclusions. The first is that young Iranians have subordinated their immediate desire for political change for changes in the economic and social policies of Iran. The second conclusion is that any eventual change in the Iranian political system will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The third conclusion is that the United States government has little ability to directly influence the attitudes and desires of these young Iranians directly. However, the last conclusion proposes that the United States government can effectively influence these groups indirectly, through the use of three identified leverage points. The leverage points fall into the general groupings of media, economics, and education. Finally, the paper assesses as low the probability that the under-30 generation in Iran will attempt to effect political change in the near term. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 64 p.; 313 KB. Islamic Republic of Iran Iran Ayatollah Khomeini Western culture Islamic culture Cultural awareness Social structure Social revolution Iranian politics Iranian economics Iranian society Westernization Attitudes Desires Youth http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,777 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Italian Army and effects-based operations: a new concept for an army of use. [electronic resource]. Viglietta, Roberto. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The purpose of this monograph is to explore what part of the emerging concept of Effects-Based Operations is relevant to the way the Italian Army is heading towards the future. Specifically, given the experience of the Italian Army in stability and reconstruction operations, its organizational structure and the peculiar capabilities expressed by its soldiers, this monograph searches for a viable translation of the effects-based operations construct to facilitate ongoing and future operations. Interest in, and contribution to, the development of the effects-based operations concept has great importance for the Italian military because in its adaptation process it might provide a framework that could drive further changes. Moreover, there is a constant necessity for the Italian Armed Forces, and the army in particular, to maintain a common doctrinal understanding with its allies and partners with which they combine to conduct operations, and who are also looking with interest at effects-based operations. The method chosen is to compare the evidence on Italian experience in past and ongoing operations with the effects-based approach in order to derive a functional application of the latter in future operations. The monograph will analyze the recent history of the Italian Army and the modifications and adaptations that it went through, with specific regard to the last 15 years. Particular focus has been given to describing the operations in which the army participated in order to collect enough evidence to discern a pattern that could lead to a generalization on the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations. Successively, the monograph will investigate the distinctive elements of effects-based operations, the problems related to the concept and the refined definitions that are available. Finally, the theory and practice will be merged, to see if Italian experience on operations can provide a nationally adapted form of effects-based operations. The findings of the monograph, while chiefly prompting further research and investigation, argue that the Italian Army has conducted stability and reconstruction operations in a way that generally follows the effects-based approach. Therefore Italian established practice can serve as a model for effects-based operations conducted in the lower (non-war fighting) range of the operational spectrum. Moreover, Italian units can better achieve desired effects because they are modularly structured, based on a ?pool of capabilities? model. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this monograph is to explore what part of the emerging concept of Effects-Based Operations is relevant to the way the Italian Army is heading towards the future. Specifically, given the experience of the Italian Army in stability and reconstruction operations, its organizational structure and the peculiar capabilities expressed by its soldiers, this monograph searches for a viable translation of the effects-based operations construct to facilitate ongoing and future operations. Interest in, and contribution to, the development of the effects-based operations concept has great importance for the Italian military because in its adaptation process it might provide a framework that could drive further changes. Moreover, there is a constant necessity for the Italian Armed Forces, and the army in particular, to maintain a common doctrinal understanding with its allies and partners with which they combine to conduct operations, and who are also looking with interest at effects-based operations. The method chosen is to compare the evidence on Italian experience in past and ongoing operations with the effects-based approach in order to derive a functional application of the latter in future operations. The monograph will analyze the recent history of the Italian Army and the modifications and adaptations that it went through, with specific regard to the last 15 years. Particular focus has been given to describing the operations in which the army participated in order to collect enough evidence to discern a pattern that could lead to a generalization on the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations. Successively, the monograph will investigate the distinctive elements of effects-based operations, the problems related to the concept and the refined definitions that are available. Finally, the theory and practice will be merged, to see if Italian experience on operations can provide a nationally adapted form of effects-based operations. The findings of the monograph, while chiefly prompting further research and investigation, argue that the Italian Army has conducted stability and reconstruction operations in a way that generally follows the effects-based approach. Therefore Italian established practice can serve as a model for effects-based operations conducted in the lower (non-war fighting) range of the operational spectrum. Moreover, Italian units can better achieve desired effects because they are modularly structured, based on a ?pool of capabilities? model. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 72 p.; 357 KB. Effects-based operations (EBO) Military operations Italian Armed Forces Italy Italian Army Foreign forces Allies Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) Operations theory Expeditionary operations Military capabilities Italian military history Army adaptation Operational planning http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,778 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Preparing for response to a nuclear weapon of mass destruction, are we ready? [electronic resource]. Visser, Vance P. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng In the wake of the untimely execution of an ill-coordinated response at all levels to the Hurricane Katrina devastation and destruction that rocked the Gulf Coast, it is important to examine how the United States government is organized and resourced to confront future catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Katrina, an anticipated natural disaster, clearly demonstrates the enormous complexity associated with the extensive coordination required to synchronize the efforts of local, State, and Federal governmental agencies faced with a significant crisis. In the event the crisis is an unexpected terrorist attack employing a nuclear or radiological weapon of mass destruction, the complexity of synchronizing the response effort increases exponentially. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist?s attacks, the threat that a terrorist group might detonate a dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device in a major United States metropolitan area has received increased attention. If a radiological or improvised nuclear device attack is considered to be an imminent threat to our populace, the federal government should give increased priority to consequence management preparedness efforts and make a concerted, sustained effort to engage the public in response planning. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges that nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. Although extremist groups and terrorists have a wide variety of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack, this study focuses specifically on response capability to a radiological or nuclear WMD attack against the United States. This paper determined we must adequately prepare to overcome the complex command, control and management challenges associated with synchronizing the requisite expertise provided by numerous diverse groups of government, emergency response, law enforcement, military, medical, disaster relief, public health, mental health, and public affairs personnel. It also proposes recommendations to ensure we are prepared to provide immediate, organized, and well-synchronized response to terrorist attack employing nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against the WMD terrorist threat. Together the recommendations presented in this work may enhance our level of consequence management preparedness for dealing with the terrorist employment of nuclear WMD. Since counterproliferation and nonproliferation efforts are increasingly less effective, we must convincingly demonstrate that we are ready to respond to an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersion device attack and that such an attack will not achieve the adversarial objective of terror. Therefore, we must prepare now; we have no other alternative. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. In the wake of the untimely execution of an ill-coordinated response at all levels to the Hurricane Katrina devastation and destruction that rocked the Gulf Coast, it is important to examine how the United States government is organized and resourced to confront future catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Katrina, an anticipated natural disaster, clearly demonstrates the enormous complexity associated with the extensive coordination required to synchronize the efforts of local, State, and Federal governmental agencies faced with a significant crisis. In the event the crisis is an unexpected terrorist attack employing a nuclear or radiological weapon of mass destruction, the complexity of synchronizing the response effort increases exponentially. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist?s attacks, the threat that a terrorist group might detonate a dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device in a major United States metropolitan area has received increased attention. If a radiological or improvised nuclear device attack is considered to be an imminent threat to our populace, the federal government should give increased priority to consequence management preparedness efforts and make a concerted, sustained effort to engage the public in response planning. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges that nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. Although extremist groups and terrorists have a wide variety of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack, this study focuses specifically on response capability to a radiological or nuclear WMD attack against the United States. This paper determined we must adequately prepare to overcome the complex command, control and management challenges associated with synchronizing the requisite expertise provided by numerous diverse groups of government, emergency response, law enforcement, military, medical, disaster relief, public health, mental health, and public affairs personnel. It also proposes recommendations to ensure we are prepared to provide immediate, organized, and well-synchronized response to terrorist attack employing nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against the WMD terrorist threat. Together the recommendations presented in this work may enhance our level of consequence management preparedness for dealing with the terrorist employment of nuclear WMD. Since counterproliferation and nonproliferation efforts are increasingly less effective, we must convincingly demonstrate that we are ready to respond to an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersion device attack and that such an attack will not achieve the adversarial objective of terror. Therefore, we must prepare now; we have no other alternative. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 54 p.; 264 KB. Disaster response Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threats Terrorism Nuclear weapons Military civilian relations Civil Affairs Disaster planning Consequence management Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) Homeland security Homeland defense National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency cooperation http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,779 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Army National Guard and transformation: relevance for ongoing and future missions. [electronic resource]. Tierney, Charles B. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Increasingly, since the end of Desert Storm, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has conducted more overseas missions with fewer resources. In operations since the events of 9/11, mobilizations are at their highest levels since World War II. The ARNG has done this using a ?Cold War? force structure and mobilization process to ?call-up? units and individuals ?as needed? while simultaneously supporting domestic missions. Most agree that the ARNG must change in order to meet the expectation that it is now required as an operational force vice a strategic reserve. The primary question this monograph seeks to answer is how should the ARNG change to meet this new role? Some advocate a return to a strategic reserve role or specializing portions of the ARNG to meet specific needs in Stability and Civil Support Operations. The Army is suggesting transforming the ARNG through three initiatives that will provide capabilities based solution vice specializing force structure for specific missions. The ARNG transformation approach appears to provide the best solution for operating in the new environment. However, in order for this transformation to be functional the Army and the ARNG must overcome traditional issues based on their relationship that dates back to the early 20th Century. The ARNG fills a dual role and has an expectation to respond to domestic as well as foreign contingencies. The operational nature of the ARNG now requires that domestic mission planning receive the priority that overseas contingencies receive to allow alignment of resources with tasks across the spectrum of operations. Further, that the Army must resource the ARNG to its full level of requirements vice the previous method of tiered funding. Addressing these two issues allows the transforming ARNG to function properly as an operational force as required for national security. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Increasingly, since the end of Desert Storm, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has conducted more overseas missions with fewer resources. In operations since the events of 9/11, mobilizations are at their highest levels since World War II. The ARNG has done this using a ?Cold War? force structure and mobilization process to ?call-up? units and individuals ?as needed? while simultaneously supporting domestic missions. Most agree that the ARNG must change in order to meet the expectation that it is now required as an operational force vice a strategic reserve. The primary question this monograph seeks to answer is how should the ARNG change to meet this new role? Some advocate a return to a strategic reserve role or specializing portions of the ARNG to meet specific needs in Stability and Civil Support Operations. The Army is suggesting transforming the ARNG through three initiatives that will provide capabilities based solution vice specializing force structure for specific missions. The ARNG transformation approach appears to provide the best solution for operating in the new environment. However, in order for this transformation to be functional the Army and the ARNG must overcome traditional issues based on their relationship that dates back to the early 20th Century. The ARNG fills a dual role and has an expectation to respond to domestic as well as foreign contingencies. The operational nature of the ARNG now requires that domestic mission planning receive the priority that overseas contingencies receive to allow alignment of resources with tasks across the spectrum of operations. Further, that the Army must resource the ARNG to its full level of requirements vice the previous method of tiered funding. Addressing these two issues allows the transforming ARNG to function properly as an operational force as required for national security. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 58 p.; 480 KB. Army National Guard (ARNG) Reserve Corps Deployment Mobilization Modularity Force structure Transformation Domestic missions Military operations Stability operations Civil Support Operations Contemporary operating environment Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Reorganization http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,780 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Exercise of control by Joint Force commanders. [electronic resource]. Trabucchi, Robert N., Jr. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Certain characteristics of the Information Age both pressure and tempt commanders, in powerful ways, to exert greater control over military forces during the execution of operations. As examples, real-time communications with political leaders and the impact of global media pressure while battlespace awareness, intelligence collection and communications capabilities tempt. These increased capabilities seem to present us with a command option not available for over two centuries: centralized control. As stated in joint and army doctrine as well as in the majority of literature on the subject, commanders will have a greater ability to exercise control over their forces than at any time since Napoleon?s. Therefore, one pressing question that faces today?s military is how to use the information age capabilities now becoming available. Whereas US Army doctrine is clear on its preference for the method known as mission command, our joint doctrine is less clear. Commanders of US and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJFCs of CJTFs) should use the increased capabilities provided by the technological advancements of the information age to cope with increasing complexity, distribution and specialization in the environment of their military operations. They should not to use them to attempt to reduce the fog of war by increasing control over the execution of land-based military operations. This thesis is supported by scholarly work of military historians, military officers and researchers of RAND and the DoD Command and Control Research Project, among others. The monograph argues that throughout the Industrial Age and the Information Age so far, technology has increased the challenges to military commanders at least apace with the increases in command and control capabilities. Centralized control at the CJTF level therefore remains an unattainable goal. Furthermore, efforts to achieve it are shown to be a distraction from the CJFCs responsibility to integrate and synchronize his operations with agencies and organizations whose cooperation he most probably needs in order to achieve unity of effort and accomplish his missions in the joint operating environment. The monograph therefore finds that in the face of Information Age pressures and temptations towards centralized control, we must institutionalize decentralized control at the Joint Task Force level. To that end, it offers recommendations for rewriting and reorganizing elements of joint doctrine covering command and control. It offers recommendations for organizations and procedures which will foster decentralized control. The arguments draw strongly from theory but also use recent examples including Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force. Specific recommendations are offered ? in the areas of joint doctrine, organizations and procedures ? for institutionalizing the further decentralization of control. The conclusions and recommendations are designed to be applied to joint and Service doctrine, to the organization, manning, training and operating procedures of Combined Joint Task Force and Combatant Command headquarters. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Certain characteristics of the Information Age both pressure and tempt commanders, in powerful ways, to exert greater control over military forces during the execution of operations. As examples, real-time communications with political leaders and the impact of global media pressure while battlespace awareness, intelligence collection and communications capabilities tempt. These increased capabilities seem to present us with a command option not available for over two centuries: centralized control. As stated in joint and army doctrine as well as in the majority of literature on the subject, commanders will have a greater ability to exercise control over their forces than at any time since Napoleon?s. Therefore, one pressing question that faces today?s military is how to use the information age capabilities now becoming available. Whereas US Army doctrine is clear on its preference for the method known as mission command, our joint doctrine is less clear. Commanders of US and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJFCs of CJTFs) should use the increased capabilities provided by the technological advancements of the information age to cope with increasing complexity, distribution and specialization in the environment of their military operations. They should not to use them to attempt to reduce the fog of war by increasing control over the execution of land-based military operations. This thesis is supported by scholarly work of military historians, military officers and researchers of RAND and the DoD Command and Control Research Project, among others. The monograph argues that throughout the Industrial Age and the Information Age so far, technology has increased the challenges to military commanders at least apace with the increases in command and control capabilities. Centralized control at the CJTF level therefore remains an unattainable goal. Furthermore, efforts to achieve it are shown to be a distraction from the CJFCs responsibility to integrate and synchronize his operations with agencies and organizations whose cooperation he most probably needs in order to achieve unity of effort and accomplish his missions in the joint operating environment. The monograph therefore finds that in the face of Information Age pressures and temptations towards centralized control, we must institutionalize decentralized control at the Joint Task Force level. To that end, it offers recommendations for rewriting and reorganizing elements of joint doctrine covering command and control. It offers recommendations for organizations and procedures which will foster decentralized control. The arguments draw strongly from theory but also use recent examples including Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force. Specific recommendations are offered ? in the areas of joint doctrine, organizations and procedures ? for institutionalizing the further decentralization of control. The conclusions and recommendations are designed to be applied to joint and Service doctrine, to the organization, manning, training and operating procedures of Combined Joint Task Force and Combatant Command headquarters. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 62 p.; 348 KB. Information age Information technology Command and control (C2) Centralized command Decentralized command Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Army doctrine Joint doctrine Control theory Military commanders Operation Desert Storm Operation Allied Force Combatant Command Mission command Combined Joint Force Commander (CJFC) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,781 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Keeping your friends close and your enemies closer: operational design for a nuclear-armed Iran. [electronic resource]. Umstead, Robert K. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has pursued a nuclear program since 1985. In February 2006, with the last round of international negotiations having failed and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) having reported the dossier to the United Nations Security Council, Tehran is on the precipice of being able to field a nuclear weapon at a time convenient to the IRI. A nuclear-armed Iran will change the strategic calculus in the Middle East and Central Asia and present new risks to US interests in the region. This monograph will address the issue of a nuclear-armed Iran from four perspectives; historical patterns of Iranian behavior with respect to foreign influence, a western perspective of these patterns, a technical review of Iran?s nuclear program, and a methodology called systemic operational design (SOD). SOD is an application of systems theory to operational art that focuses on the relationships between the entities within a system to translate strategic direction and policy into an operational design. This systemic approach, synthesizes the Iranian historical pattern of balancing one foreign power with another while simultaneously seeking to limit foreign influence with the Western perspectives of international politics and the technical realities of Iran?s nuclear program. A design that seeks to ?keep our friends close and our enemies closer? by simultaneously pursuing economic growth and regional stability through reopening of the US embassy in Iran while disrupting the foreign networks that support the proliferation of nuclear technology along with those that finance and support the foreign activities of Iran?s IRGC and Hezbollah provides an initial frame and direction for action to manage the risks posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has pursued a nuclear program since 1985. In February 2006, with the last round of international negotiations having failed and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) having reported the dossier to the United Nations Security Council, Tehran is on the precipice of being able to field a nuclear weapon at a time convenient to the IRI. A nuclear-armed Iran will change the strategic calculus in the Middle East and Central Asia and present new risks to US interests in the region. This monograph will address the issue of a nuclear-armed Iran from four perspectives; historical patterns of Iranian behavior with respect to foreign influence, a western perspective of these patterns, a technical review of Iran?s nuclear program, and a methodology called systemic operational design (SOD). SOD is an application of systems theory to operational art that focuses on the relationships between the entities within a system to translate strategic direction and policy into an operational design. This systemic approach, synthesizes the Iranian historical pattern of balancing one foreign power with another while simultaneously seeking to limit foreign influence with the Western perspectives of international politics and the technical realities of Iran?s nuclear program. A design that seeks to ?keep our friends close and our enemies closer? by simultaneously pursuing economic growth and regional stability through reopening of the US embassy in Iran while disrupting the foreign networks that support the proliferation of nuclear technology along with those that finance and support the foreign activities of Iran?s IRGC and Hezbollah provides an initial frame and direction for action to manage the risks posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 68 p.; 526 KB. Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Iran Nuclear arms Proliferation Nuclear technology Nuclear weapons Operational design Operational art Systemic operational design (SOD) Systems theory Foreign policy Terrorism Hezbollah Middle East Central Asia Global security Strategic interests Threats Regional security http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,782 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Systemic operational design: epistomological bumpf or a way ahead for contemporary operational design? [electronic resource]. Dalton, L. Craig. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Operational design is an intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for development of detailed operation plans. Recently, a number of authors have questioned the continued relevance of the classic elements of operational design (CEOD) approach in the contemporary operating environment (COE) suggesting that we may be facing a ?crisis in operational design?. This monograph explores this potential crisis in operational design from a Canadian Forces (CF) perspective and examines the CF CEOD methodology with a particular focus on theoretical underpinnings. Subsequently, this paper examines an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) operational design methodology, Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and compares it to the CF CEOD methodology to determine whether it might offer useful insights for practitioners of operational design in the COE. This monograph concludes that SOD is based on theoretical underpinnings that more accurately reflect the COE and a clearer and more functional conception of operational design. Finally, this monograph recommends that the CF explore SOD with a view to adopting an operational design methodology better suited to the COE. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Operational design is an intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for development of detailed operation plans. Recently, a number of authors have questioned the continued relevance of the classic elements of operational design (CEOD) approach in the contemporary operating environment (COE) suggesting that we may be facing a ?crisis in operational design?. This monograph explores this potential crisis in operational design from a Canadian Forces (CF) perspective and examines the CF CEOD methodology with a particular focus on theoretical underpinnings. Subsequently, this paper examines an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) operational design methodology, Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and compares it to the CF CEOD methodology to determine whether it might offer useful insights for practitioners of operational design in the COE. This monograph concludes that SOD is based on theoretical underpinnings that more accurately reflect the COE and a clearer and more functional conception of operational design. Finally, this monograph recommends that the CF explore SOD with a view to adopting an operational design methodology better suited to the COE. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 61 p.; 854 KB. Operational art Systemic Operational Design (SOD) Contemporary operating environment (COE) Classic element of operational design (CEOD) Canadian operational design (COD) Canadian Forces (CF) Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Operational design theory Operational planning Systems theory http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,783 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Beyond Westphalia: the emergent globalization paradigm. [electronic resource]. Armstrong, Charles S. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng This monograph analyzes the effects of globalization on the international system as reflected in the changing nature of war. The difficulties that the United States leadership is having with creating and communicating a strategy for the Global War on Terror is indicative of inadequacies within the Westphalian Paradigm for conducting analysis and research of the international system. The driving force behind the shifting paradigm is globalization which is integrating and interconnecting people, thoughts, ideas, and technology around the world despite national boundaries. The United States Military?s efforts to transform to meet emergent threats continues to use Westphalian Paradigm to conduct analysis and research despite indications that a paradigm shift, fueled by globalization, has occurred. While there are numerous similarities between the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the attacks of 11 September 2001, the differences are more critical to understanding the drastic changes that have occurred over the past fifty years. An analysis of the differences between the two attacks highlights the differences between World War II and the Global War on Terror and the changes that globalization has caused on the international system in general. Analyzing the traditional American concept of war shows that three aspects of war have undergone significant changes within the past fifty years. State-on-state war has become the anomaly with United States military forces conducting operations other than war more frequently than they have in the past. Further the rise of non-state actors in the form of terrorists continues to pose an enormous threat to United States interests around the globe. The increase in technology in the form of the internet and satellite news has allowed individuals from all over the world to become more connected, sharing ideas and information at a pace that is unrivaled in history while being able to influence perception and policy of other states. Finally, the objective of war has changed to include the security of global markets and humanitarian operations. The military continues to be deployed around the world to conduct operations that fall well short of full scale warfare. This trend is accompanied by a desire to decrease collateral damage to minimal levels and exclude the population from the effects of war. The future of war is closely tied to globalization and the military will continue to conduct operations that are very different from wars against other nation-states. It is becoming more evident that the military is no longer able to protect the security of the nation from external threats. Rather it is the synergistic effect of the combined elements of national power that are required to win the nation?s wars. The Global War on Terror is a new form of war that must be carefully analyzed and understood in order for the United States to successfully prosecute it. The Westphalian Paradigm is no longer capable of providing the mental model necessary to guide analysis and research. A closer examination of the emergent Globalization Paradigm is required to ensure that the United States is fully capable of transforming every element of national power to meet the threats. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph analyzes the effects of globalization on the international system as reflected in the changing nature of war. The difficulties that the United States leadership is having with creating and communicating a strategy for the Global War on Terror is indicative of inadequacies within the Westphalian Paradigm for conducting analysis and research of the international system. The driving force behind the shifting paradigm is globalization which is integrating and interconnecting people, thoughts, ideas, and technology around the world despite national boundaries. The United States Military?s efforts to transform to meet emergent threats continues to use Westphalian Paradigm to conduct analysis and research despite indications that a paradigm shift, fueled by globalization, has occurred. While there are numerous similarities between the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the attacks of 11 September 2001, the differences are more critical to understanding the drastic changes that have occurred over the past fifty years. An analysis of the differences between the two attacks highlights the differences between World War II and the Global War on Terror and the changes that globalization has caused on the international system in general. Analyzing the traditional American concept of war shows that three aspects of war have undergone significant changes within the past fifty years. State-on-state war has become the anomaly with United States military forces conducting operations other than war more frequently than they have in the past. Further the rise of non-state actors in the form of terrorists continues to pose an enormous threat to United States interests around the globe. The increase in technology in the form of the internet and satellite news has allowed individuals from all over the world to become more connected, sharing ideas and information at a pace that is unrivaled in history while being able to influence perception and policy of other states. Finally, the objective of war has changed to include the security of global markets and humanitarian operations. The military continues to be deployed around the world to conduct operations that fall well short of full scale warfare. This trend is accompanied by a desire to decrease collateral damage to minimal levels and exclude the population from the effects of war. The future of war is closely tied to globalization and the military will continue to conduct operations that are very different from wars against other nation-states. It is becoming more evident that the military is no longer able to protect the security of the nation from external threats. Rather it is the synergistic effect of the combined elements of national power that are required to win the nation?s wars. The Global War on Terror is a new form of war that must be carefully analyzed and understood in order for the United States to successfully prosecute it. The Westphalian Paradigm is no longer capable of providing the mental model necessary to guide analysis and research. A closer examination of the emergent Globalization Paradigm is required to ensure that the United States is fully capable of transforming every element of national power to meet the threats. PDF; Adobe Acrobat required; 57 p.; 270 KB. Westphalian Paradigm Globalization Global War on Terror Nature of war Terrorism Military theory Military revolution Paradigms Future war Pearl Harbor, 1941 September 11 Terrorist Attack, 2001 World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Military operations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,784 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Closing the discovery learning gap: a leader development training strategy for company grade officers for the conduct of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. [electronic resource]. Anderson, Erik N. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng Failed or failing states present a significant challenge to United States security in the early years of the 21st Century. Army units increasingly find themselves deploying to far-flung regions of the globe to conduct a variety of missions under the umbrella of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO). However, current Institutional Domain education and training methods for company grade officers fail to adequately address the variety of challenges these officers face during operational deployments. As such, the officers embark on discovery learning during the deployment in order to accomplish the unfamiliar tasks and missions set before them. The U.S. military cannot afford such a haphazard approach in the context of the Contemporary Operating Environment, as it prosecutes the Global War on Terror, or as it seeks to alter perceptions and beliefs about American interests abroad and protect our citizens at home. Division Commanders must take a more active role in the development of company grade officers within their organizations. The change comes as a result of the significant role these young officers play in the conduct of SRO. Three areas within the existing Army division require change in order to better prepare company grade officers for operational deployments involving SRO. These areas include the role the division commander plays regarding company grade officer development, the content and context of existing leader development and training programs, and an overarching systems and cultural change within the division. Incorporating these changes increases individual and organizational learning and knowledge, provides a division-wide common level of understanding, instills a culture embracing SRO as a core mission set, and better utilizes scarce resources. This monograph examines the nature of the COE and the increased role company grade officers play during the conduct of SRO. Further, it identifies the learning gaps that exist in current leader development programs. Finally, it recommends methods to address identified deficiencies in three areas: senior leader involvement, changing the content and context of organizational learning, and instilling a cultural shift embracing SRO and the fundamentals of transparent leadership. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Failed or failing states present a significant challenge to United States security in the early years of the 21st Century. Army units increasingly find themselves deploying to far-flung regions of the globe to conduct a variety of missions under the umbrella of Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO). However, current Institutional Domain education and training methods for company grade officers fail to adequately address the variety of challenges these officers face during operational deployments. As such, the officers embark on discovery learning during the deployment in order to accomplish the unfamiliar tasks and missions set before them. The U.S. military cannot afford such a haphazard approach in the context of the Contemporary Operating Environment, as it prosecutes the Global War on Terror, or as it seeks to alter perceptions and beliefs about American interests abroad and protect our citizens at home. Division Commanders must take a more active role in the development of company grade officers within their organizations. The change comes as a result of the significant role these young officers play in the conduct of SRO. Three areas within the existing Army division require change in order to better prepare company grade officers for operational deployments involving SRO. These areas include the role the division commander plays regarding company grade officer development, the content and context of existing leader development and training programs, and an overarching systems and cultural change within the division. Incorporating these changes increases individual and organizational learning and knowledge, provides a division-wide common level of understanding, instills a culture embracing SRO as a core mission set, and better utilizes scarce resources. This monograph examines the nature of the COE and the increased role company grade officers play during the conduct of SRO. Further, it identifies the learning gaps that exist in current leader development programs. Finally, it recommends methods to address identified deficiencies in three areas: senior leader involvement, changing the content and context of organizational learning, and instilling a cultural shift embracing SRO and the fundamentals of transparent leadership. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 89 p.; 642 KB. Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) Military training Officer development Company grade officers Deployment Military leadership Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) Organizational learning Leader development Division level organization United States Army http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,785 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Where should I be? The operational commander in 2010: effective positioning in conflict and planning. [electronic resource]. Buche, Joseph P. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This monograph examines the most effective theater positioning of a US Forces operational commander in a conflict conducted in 2O1O. The monograph first defines who it is who practices operational command (differentiating between operational level and operational function). It then offers a test of utility of operation commander behavior to determine if a commander's positioning assists or detracts from the effectiveness of his or her command. Next, the monograph offers five historical vignettes that explore how the operational commander's therein exercised command. From this study the author presents a historical model that describes the effective methods of these historical commanders. After describing general environmental and technological changes likely to be in place twelve years from now, the monograph deduces modifications to the historical model which yield a model for the future. The monograph concludes that technological improvements and environmental changes may produce a command post that offers a panacea of gadgets, information, and multi-dimensional illustrations. Effective operational commanders in 2010 will sometimes position themselves there to utilize these capabilities, but will avoid gluing themselves to this Schlieffen envisioned utopia. Instead, effective operational commanders will use technology to facilitate movement throughout their area of operations, normally using personal contact-and sometimes virtual contact-to ascertain truths and impart their intent. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph examines the most effective theater positioning of a US Forces operational commander in a conflict conducted in 2O1O. The monograph first defines who it is who practices operational command (differentiating between operational level and operational function). It then offers a test of utility of operation commander behavior to determine if a commander's positioning assists or detracts from the effectiveness of his or her command. Next, the monograph offers five historical vignettes that explore how the operational commander's therein exercised command. From this study the author presents a historical model that describes the effective methods of these historical commanders. After describing general environmental and technological changes likely to be in place twelve years from now, the monograph deduces modifications to the historical model which yield a model for the future. The monograph concludes that technological improvements and environmental changes may produce a command post that offers a panacea of gadgets, information, and multi-dimensional illustrations. Effective operational commanders in 2010 will sometimes position themselves there to utilize these capabilities, but will avoid gluing themselves to this Schlieffen envisioned utopia. Instead, effective operational commanders will use technology to facilitate movement throughout their area of operations, normally using personal contact-and sometimes virtual contact-to ascertain truths and impart their intent. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 76 p.; 4.85 MB. Operational commander Army leadership Military command Combat command Conflict Models Military planning Future force Operational art Case studies Strategic level of operations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,786 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Force XXI logistics: bonanza or bust for the maneuver commander. [electronic resource]. Bird, Carl D., III. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng As the army organizes to fight in the 21st Century, logisticians will need the capabilities to keep pace with the high technology weapons of the modem battlefield. The maneuver forces will be smaller, more lethal, more dispersed and highly mobile. The support structures of this future division will integrate the logistic capabilities of the combat battalions, consolidating the functions of supply, maintenance, and medical support into the structure of the brigade's Forward Support Battalion. The consolidation of assets will allow increased capability while realizing the benefits of reduction in redundant functions. This, coupled with technology enhancements, will make the logistic structure more capable, forward looking, and give it an ability to keep pace with the mobility of the combat units. This monograph examines the question of the implications of Force XXI logistics on the maneuver commander. The monograph accomplishes this assessment by comparing future doctrine to current doctrine. This allows us to develop a useful framework in which to apply technologies to increase the functions and characteristics of logistical operations. It also permits evaluation of the differences in the current versus future doctrines to analyze the impact of these changes on the brigade. Next the monograph compares the current logistic structure at brigade level to the future brigade logistic structure. This permits observation of the differences and assessment of the impact on the brigade. The paper then assesses capabilities of the two organizations in order to identify the shortfalls in logistic support and the increased benefits of technology on those shortfalls. Finally, the monograph comes to a conclusion on the impacts of Force XXI logistic technology on the maneuver brigade. The monograph shows that the benefits for the brigade are manifested in the form of increased asset visibility, greater anticipation of supply requirements, logistic tailorability, modularity, support further forward on the battlefield, faster synchronization of logistic assets, greater protection of logistic assets, increased response time, and enhanced command and control for CSS units. These advantages, despite the reduced capabilities of the Forward Support Battalion, make Force XXI logistics a bonanza for the maneuver commander. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. As the army organizes to fight in the 21st Century, logisticians will need the capabilities to keep pace with the high technology weapons of the modem battlefield. The maneuver forces will be smaller, more lethal, more dispersed and highly mobile. The support structures of this future division will integrate the logistic capabilities of the combat battalions, consolidating the functions of supply, maintenance, and medical support into the structure of the brigade's Forward Support Battalion. The consolidation of assets will allow increased capability while realizing the benefits of reduction in redundant functions. This, coupled with technology enhancements, will make the logistic structure more capable, forward looking, and give it an ability to keep pace with the mobility of the combat units. This monograph examines the question of the implications of Force XXI logistics on the maneuver commander. The monograph accomplishes this assessment by comparing future doctrine to current doctrine. This allows us to develop a useful framework in which to apply technologies to increase the functions and characteristics of logistical operations. It also permits evaluation of the differences in the current versus future doctrines to analyze the impact of these changes on the brigade. Next the monograph compares the current logistic structure at brigade level to the future brigade logistic structure. This permits observation of the differences and assessment of the impact on the brigade. The paper then assesses capabilities of the two organizations in order to identify the shortfalls in logistic support and the increased benefits of technology on those shortfalls. Finally, the monograph comes to a conclusion on the impacts of Force XXI logistic technology on the maneuver brigade. The monograph shows that the benefits for the brigade are manifested in the form of increased asset visibility, greater anticipation of supply requirements, logistic tailorability, modularity, support further forward on the battlefield, faster synchronization of logistic assets, greater protection of logistic assets, increased response time, and enhanced command and control for CSS units. These advantages, despite the reduced capabilities of the Forward Support Battalion, make Force XXI logistics a bonanza for the maneuver commander. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 67 p.; 2.07 MB. Force XXI Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Maneuver commander Logistics Supply Mobility Logistic capabilities Military doctrine Battlefield logistics Combat Service Support (CSS) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,787 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Changing the U.S. national and defense strategies and other initiatives to combat competitive intelligence operations against the U.S. [electronic resource]. Bolick, Joseph A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng Changes in the world situation since the end of the cold war has resulted in national interest worldwide no longer concentrating on military might and competition. The focus has turned to economic prosperity, competitiveness and its resulting security. To compete in this new era, nation states are resorting to the use of their nation's intelligence organizations through competitive intelligence operations to improve their economic position. The loss to America's economic development and security is resulting in the erosion of not only our industrial base, but more importantly, our relative military superiority. Since all DOD activities are a result of the US National and Defense Strategies, this monograph first examines these. It finds that they are focused on deterring and defeating threats based on military power equating to the ability of a nation state to influence by force the outcome of political choices. They fail to recognize the importance of economic power, the evolution to a global economy, and their resulting threats. The reasons why these changes have not been recognized is then discussed. The reasons included are the inability to think outside the normal military comfort zone; an inability to model and analysis the complex effects of economic power; focusing on partial or interim goals; and the inability to absorb and understand the far greater interdependency of accelerated change. Economic power and its relationship to political power continues to be a basic reason for world wide conflict. To help understand this, the importance of economic power, and how it determines a nation state's military power first economic power is defined. Economic power is then evaluated from a theoretical and historical perspective. Considering today's environment of dynamic complexity controlled by a nations economy it is determined that economic power should be added to Clausewitz's trinity of Army, People and Government. Also discussed are the changing relationships among military capabilities, political actions and economic processes for nation states It determined that in the future, economic process as a means will have a greater impact vice political and military actions and capabilities. The cost to the US as a result of competitive intelligence operations in terms of our national security is enormous. To understand the scope of this problem, economic intelligence is defined; then the who, what and how is discussed. The final section recommends changes to the National and Defense Strategies, changes to the national security structure, development of Competitive Analysis Groups, competitive intelligence networks and greater involvement by government in protecting US business. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Changes in the world situation since the end of the cold war has resulted in national interest worldwide no longer concentrating on military might and competition. The focus has turned to economic prosperity, competitiveness and its resulting security. To compete in this new era, nation states are resorting to the use of their nation's intelligence organizations through competitive intelligence operations to improve their economic position. The loss to America's economic development and security is resulting in the erosion of not only our industrial base, but more importantly, our relative military superiority. Since all DOD activities are a result of the US National and Defense Strategies, this monograph first examines these. It finds that they are focused on deterring and defeating threats based on military power equating to the ability of a nation state to influence by force the outcome of political choices. They fail to recognize the importance of economic power, the evolution to a global economy, and their resulting threats. The reasons why these changes have not been recognized is then discussed. The reasons included are the inability to think outside the normal military comfort zone; an inability to model and analysis the complex effects of economic power; focusing on partial or interim goals; and the inability to absorb and understand the far greater interdependency of accelerated change. Economic power and its relationship to political power continues to be a basic reason for world wide conflict. To help understand this, the importance of economic power, and how it determines a nation state's military power first economic power is defined. Economic power is then evaluated from a theoretical and historical perspective. Considering today's environment of dynamic complexity controlled by a nations economy it is determined that economic power should be added to Clausewitz's trinity of Army, People and Government. Also discussed are the changing relationships among military capabilities, political actions and economic processes for nation states It determined that in the future, economic process as a means will have a greater impact vice political and military actions and capabilities. The cost to the US as a result of competitive intelligence operations in terms of our national security is enormous. To understand the scope of this problem, economic intelligence is defined; then the who, what and how is discussed. The final section recommends changes to the National and Defense Strategies, changes to the national security structure, development of Competitive Analysis Groups, competitive intelligence networks and greater involvement by government in protecting US business. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 59 p.; 1.80 MB. National Defense Strategy National Security Strategy Military intelligence Intelligence operations Counterintelligence Economic power Threats Economic espionage http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,788 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Stuff that binds: on the nature and role of information in military operations. [electronic resource]. Brendler, Joseph A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This study assesses the validity and general utility of metaphors used in military theory and doctrine to describe the nature and role of information in military operations. The monograph is an extension of the author's earlier work (Physical Metaphor in Military Theory and Doctrine: Force, Friction, or Folly?). The analytical framework is built upon the curriculum of the Advanced Military Studies Program, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The advice of experts is integrated through a review of scholarly works on human communication, cognition, organization, decision, and complexity. A critical review of these theoretical foundations is provided as appendices and summarized in the basic document. Finding no single "best" metaphor, the author presents a revision of the US doctrinal cognitive hierarchy and an extension of J.F.C. Fuller's Foundations of the Science of War. This provides a unified system of thought in which the correspondence between the various metaphors is apparent. The extension of Fuller's work results in the generation of core functions which reconcile the different perspectives on information and other more familiar aspects of military activity as well. The study has shown that "Information Superiority" is currently a bad metaphor because it considers only the informative nature of information, ignoring the affective nature; it promotes inappropriate aggregation of functional proponents in an "10 cell;" and it promotes a "bit count" mentality. "Commodity" is a good metaphor whose most useful feature is perhaps the good correspondence it enjoys with the newer, more complex metaphors, thus making it a good tool for explaining them. "Social Glue' is a good metaphor that is somewhat abstract and cannot completely describe the nature and causes of moral bonding, but it corresponds well with other metaphors. "Catalyst" is a pretty good metaphor that is somewhat superficial, but it helps to describe the dynamic nature of organizations that the "social glue" metaphor cannot. "Medium as Message" is a good metaphor, but it is relatively abstract and complicated, is not well known and understood, and as a result, it is unlikely to be of direct utility for communicating with the average layperson. "Core Function" is an excellent metaphor-set that corresponds well with each of the other metaphors described, but it also uniquely adds a correspondence to other aspects of military operations and to the principles of military operations that other metaphors do not. Some of the other metaphors are better at describing specific perspectives, but these core functions are the basis of a coherent system of thought. As such, they provide a uniform perspective from which to enable the reconciliation of apparent differences between the other models of the nature and role of information in military operations. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This study assesses the validity and general utility of metaphors used in military theory and doctrine to describe the nature and role of information in military operations. The monograph is an extension of the author's earlier work (Physical Metaphor in Military Theory and Doctrine: Force, Friction, or Folly?). The analytical framework is built upon the curriculum of the Advanced Military Studies Program, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The advice of experts is integrated through a review of scholarly works on human communication, cognition, organization, decision, and complexity. A critical review of these theoretical foundations is provided as appendices and summarized in the basic document. Finding no single "best" metaphor, the author presents a revision of the US doctrinal cognitive hierarchy and an extension of J.F.C. Fuller's Foundations of the Science of War. This provides a unified system of thought in which the correspondence between the various metaphors is apparent. The extension of Fuller's work results in the generation of core functions which reconcile the different perspectives on information and other more familiar aspects of military activity as well. The study has shown that "Information Superiority" is currently a bad metaphor because it considers only the informative nature of information, ignoring the affective nature; it promotes inappropriate aggregation of functional proponents in an "10 cell;" and it promotes a "bit count" mentality. "Commodity" is a good metaphor whose most useful feature is perhaps the good correspondence it enjoys with the newer, more complex metaphors, thus making it a good tool for explaining them. "Social Glue' is a good metaphor that is somewhat abstract and cannot completely describe the nature and causes of moral bonding, but it corresponds well with other metaphors. "Catalyst" is a pretty good metaphor that is somewhat superficial, but it helps to describe the dynamic nature of organizations that the "social glue" metaphor cannot. "Medium as Message" is a good metaphor, but it is relatively abstract and complicated, is not well known and understood, and as a result, it is unlikely to be of direct utility for communicating with the average layperson. "Core Function" is an excellent metaphor-set that corresponds well with each of the other metaphors described, but it also uniquely adds a correspondence to other aspects of military operations and to the principles of military operations that other metaphors do not. Some of the other metaphors are better at describing specific perspectives, but these core functions are the basis of a coherent system of thought. As such, they provide a uniform perspective from which to enable the reconciliation of apparent differences between the other models of the nature and role of information in military operations. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 157 p.; 5.89 MB. Information operations Military theory Military doctrine Information Fuller, J.F.C. Military operations Command and control (C2) systems Cognition Metaphors Core function Information warfare Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Curriculum http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,789 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Back to the future: the British Southern Campaign, 1780-1781. [electronic resource]. Brinkley, William D. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This monograph analyzes the British campaign in the Carolinas during the War for Independence from December 1779 through March 1781. The monograph also examines British use of force and the ramifications of the use of force against the southern people and the southern Continental Army. Finally it investigates British attempts to control and mitigate the unconventional threat posed by American partisans and the British attempts to restore civil order and control. The British campaign's complex environment displays marked similarities with several U.S. Army operations conducted since 1990, particularly operations in Panama, Haiti, Northern Iraq and Somalia. As the United States conducts more complex operations, the British campaign in the Carolinas can provide perspectives for today's U.S. Army campaign planner. Current U.S. policy and Army doctrine provide a framework for planning and executing civil-military operations and understanding this complex environment is crucial to their successful execution. Given the complex nature of military operations in the late 20th Century, ignorance of the environment could potentially lead to a future American military disaster. The British achieved several stunning military successes in the southern campaign, but their inability to stop the civil war and reestablish a functioning government for the people of the South proved their ultimate undoing. For these reasons, the British experience in the Carolinas from 1780-81 provides a useful case-study of complicated and complex military operations. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph analyzes the British campaign in the Carolinas during the War for Independence from December 1779 through March 1781. The monograph also examines British use of force and the ramifications of the use of force against the southern people and the southern Continental Army. Finally it investigates British attempts to control and mitigate the unconventional threat posed by American partisans and the British attempts to restore civil order and control. The British campaign's complex environment displays marked similarities with several U.S. Army operations conducted since 1990, particularly operations in Panama, Haiti, Northern Iraq and Somalia. As the United States conducts more complex operations, the British campaign in the Carolinas can provide perspectives for today's U.S. Army campaign planner. Current U.S. policy and Army doctrine provide a framework for planning and executing civil-military operations and understanding this complex environment is crucial to their successful execution. Given the complex nature of military operations in the late 20th Century, ignorance of the environment could potentially lead to a future American military disaster. The British achieved several stunning military successes in the southern campaign, but their inability to stop the civil war and reestablish a functioning government for the people of the South proved their ultimate undoing. For these reasons, the British experience in the Carolinas from 1780-81 provides a useful case-study of complicated and complex military operations. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 65 p.; 2.10 MB. American Revolutionary War War for American Independence British Army British Southern Campaign Continental Army Carolinas Campaign planning Military doctrine Military civilian relations Military operations Lessons learned http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,790 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Physical metaphor in military theory and doctrine: force, friction, or folly. [electronic resource]. Brendler, Joseph A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng This study assesses the validity and general utility of selected instances of physical metaphor in tactical military theory and doctrine. An analytical framework is built upon the curriculum of the Advanced Military Studies Program, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The advice of expense is integrated through a review of scholarly works on human communication, cognition, and complexity. A review of four historical cases is used to help scope and provide insight for the analysis. The resulting framework allows the separation of instances of metaphor, and their associated theories, into categories according to the level of complexity of the phenomena they represent. Specific evaluation criteria are developed to enable objective judgement of the justifiability and general utility of the metaphor in a 1997 military context. Individual instances of the use of physical metaphor in military theory and doctrine are treated as data. A representative sample of forty-four (44) primary sources of military theory and doctrine yields hundreds of such ""data points." These are grouped by metaphor, and four of the metaphors are selected for evaluation. The selected metaphors are "center of gravity," "tempo," "phase transition," and "friction?. The study has shown that "center of gravity" is a bad metaphor because it is a degenerated term, "tempo" is a very good metaphor, "friction" is a good metaphor that has been inappropriately applied in some cases but can be saved, and "phase transition" is promising but will depend on the successfull integration of complexity theory into US military doctrine. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This study assesses the validity and general utility of selected instances of physical metaphor in tactical military theory and doctrine. An analytical framework is built upon the curriculum of the Advanced Military Studies Program, US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The advice of expense is integrated through a review of scholarly works on human communication, cognition, and complexity. A review of four historical cases is used to help scope and provide insight for the analysis. The resulting framework allows the separation of instances of metaphor, and their associated theories, into categories according to the level of complexity of the phenomena they represent. Specific evaluation criteria are developed to enable objective judgement of the justifiability and general utility of the metaphor in a 1997 military context. Individual instances of the use of physical metaphor in military theory and doctrine are treated as data. A representative sample of forty-four (44) primary sources of military theory and doctrine yields hundreds of such ""data points." These are grouped by metaphor, and four of the metaphors are selected for evaluation. The selected metaphors are "center of gravity," "tempo," "phase transition," and "friction?. The study has shown that "center of gravity" is a bad metaphor because it is a degenerated term, "tempo" is a very good metaphor, "friction" is a good metaphor that has been inappropriately applied in some cases but can be saved, and "phase transition" is promising but will depend on the successfull integration of complexity theory into US military doctrine. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 136 p.; 5.40 MB. Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Curriculum Physical metaphor Military doctrine Military theory Physics Human communication Cognition Complexity Tempo Center of gravity Phase transition Friction http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,791 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Pegasus, the dragon and air power: winged myths? [electronic resource]. Arnold, Henry A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This monograph addresses the concept that air power can win a war alone. It reviews key air power theorists who have had a significant impact on U.S. air power thought in order to understand the theoretical basis for the idea that air power can win a war alone. The monograph then reviews several air campaigns from World War II to the present to determine if there is any evidence to support the theory that a war can be won solely through air power. The monograph argues that air power is not capable of delivering decision alone. It also argues that air power is not the preeminent arm of the U.S. military, but is a system within a system that is the U.S. military. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph addresses the concept that air power can win a war alone. It reviews key air power theorists who have had a significant impact on U.S. air power thought in order to understand the theoretical basis for the idea that air power can win a war alone. The monograph then reviews several air campaigns from World War II to the present to determine if there is any evidence to support the theory that a war can be won solely through air power. The monograph argues that air power is not capable of delivering decision alone. It also argues that air power is not the preeminent arm of the U.S. military, but is a system within a system that is the U.S. military. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 66 p.; 2.04 MB. Air power United States Armed Forces Military theory Aerial operations Air power theory Air campaigns Battle of Britain World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Germany Japan Operation Desert Storm Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1974 Korean War, 1950-1953 http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,792 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. School of Advanced Military Studies in the 21st century. [electronic resource]. Baggott, Christopher L. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng In 1981, then Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege published an article that examined the conventional military education system of mid-career field grade officers. This paper not only created significant debate regarding the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum, it became the genesis for the formation of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). SAMS officially began in 1984 at Fort Leavenworth under the operational control of CGSC and was planned as a rigorous year-long academic program for selected officers. By conceptual design SAMS would provide a broad military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels beyond the CGSC course in terms of theoretical depth and application. Since the time of Wass de Czege's initial study in 1981 the environment of potential global conflict and the personnel and professional demands placed upon the army as an institution have changed. In 1983 most military analysts predicted that any crisis that would require the significant employment of U.S. military forces would be conducted against a Soviet adversary on the plains of Northern Germany. Yet, in the past 15 years the Department of Defense has been engaged in eleven major military operations and only one (the Gulf War) resembled the type of conflict anticipated in 1983. Additionally, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) in 1987 and the army adopted the Officer Professional Military System (OPMS) XXI in 1997, army officer career rules have significantly changed. Combined, joint and reserve component duty requirements have severely restricted the amount of time that most mid-career army officers will be able to spend in either branch or service assignments. As assignment guidance has changed, so has the resource pool of available field grade officers who can afford an additional year of study after CGSC at SAMS. Despite the implementation of the OPMS XXI and the joint duty requirements of the GNA, the SAMS curriculum, selection process, and post-SAMS assignment policies have remained virtually unchanged from the 1989, Cold War levels. The purpose of this monograph is to determine the influence of the GNA and OPMS XXI on the School of Advanced Military Studies. It will attempt to answer the question regarding the impact of both the GNA and OPMS XXI on the army officer assignment policies and the SAMS progam. The monograph will conclude with possible SAMS curriculum changes and will provide assignment policy alternatives. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. In 1981, then Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege published an article that examined the conventional military education system of mid-career field grade officers. This paper not only created significant debate regarding the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) curriculum, it became the genesis for the formation of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). SAMS officially began in 1984 at Fort Leavenworth under the operational control of CGSC and was planned as a rigorous year-long academic program for selected officers. By conceptual design SAMS would provide a broad military education in the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels beyond the CGSC course in terms of theoretical depth and application. Since the time of Wass de Czege's initial study in 1981 the environment of potential global conflict and the personnel and professional demands placed upon the army as an institution have changed. In 1983 most military analysts predicted that any crisis that would require the significant employment of U.S. military forces would be conducted against a Soviet adversary on the plains of Northern Germany. Yet, in the past 15 years the Department of Defense has been engaged in eleven major military operations and only one (the Gulf War) resembled the type of conflict anticipated in 1983. Additionally, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) in 1987 and the army adopted the Officer Professional Military System (OPMS) XXI in 1997, army officer career rules have significantly changed. Combined, joint and reserve component duty requirements have severely restricted the amount of time that most mid-career army officers will be able to spend in either branch or service assignments. As assignment guidance has changed, so has the resource pool of available field grade officers who can afford an additional year of study after CGSC at SAMS. Despite the implementation of the OPMS XXI and the joint duty requirements of the GNA, the SAMS curriculum, selection process, and post-SAMS assignment policies have remained virtually unchanged from the 1989, Cold War levels. The purpose of this monograph is to determine the influence of the GNA and OPMS XXI on the School of Advanced Military Studies. It will attempt to answer the question regarding the impact of both the GNA and OPMS XXI on the army officer assignment policies and the SAMS progam. The monograph will conclude with possible SAMS curriculum changes and will provide assignment policy alternatives. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 57 p.; 1.90 MB. Officer education Officer Professional Military System (OPMS) XXI Command and General Staff College (CGSC) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Military career Field grade officers Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act (GNA) Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Wass de Czege, Huba Curriculum Military training Leavenworth, Kansas http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,793 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Intifada and the blood of Abraham. "Lessons in asymmetrical warfare-- written in stone". [electronic resource]. Brown, David A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian "Intifada" or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13, 1993. Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios. Areas of analysis include: (1) Background, nature and growth of the Intifada Palestinian uprising; (2) The Israeli civil-military relationship; (3) The effectiveness of tactical coercion methods employed by the IDF in its efforts to use conventional military force in an unconventional manner (including the linkage, or lack of it, between strategic ends, operational level army planning and tactical training/execution within an asymmetrical environment); and (4) Applicable lessons that might be drawn from the IDF experience. Specific conclusions include: (1) Recognition of the difficulty of fighting a protracted asymmetrical conflict, (2) Likelihood of American forces facing a similar threat in the future, (3) Limitations of military coercion ? particularly in representative democracies, (4) Military force superiority can be offset by protracted commitment and nationalistic sentiment, (5) Successful campaign strategies depend on inclusion of all instruments of power available to the nation ? particularly the use of diplomatic leverage, (6) Point of diminishing returns on technological solutions in an unconventional or asymmetrical environment, and (7) Need for operational planning and integration for operations other than war. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian "Intifada" or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13, 1993. Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios. Areas of analysis include: (1) Background, nature and growth of the Intifada Palestinian uprising; (2) The Israeli civil-military relationship; (3) The effectiveness of tactical coercion methods employed by the IDF in its efforts to use conventional military force in an unconventional manner (including the linkage, or lack of it, between strategic ends, operational level army planning and tactical training/execution within an asymmetrical environment); and (4) Applicable lessons that might be drawn from the IDF experience. Specific conclusions include: (1) Recognition of the difficulty of fighting a protracted asymmetrical conflict, (2) Likelihood of American forces facing a similar threat in the future, (3) Limitations of military coercion ? particularly in representative democracies, (4) Military force superiority can be offset by protracted commitment and nationalistic sentiment, (5) Successful campaign strategies depend on inclusion of all instruments of power available to the nation ? particularly the use of diplomatic leverage, (6) Point of diminishing returns on technological solutions in an unconventional or asymmetrical environment, and (7) Need for operational planning and integration for operations other than war. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 100 p.; 3.09 MB. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Palestine Israel Intifada Middle East Arab-Israeli conflict Asymmetrical warfare Unconventional warfare Asymmetrical threats Security environment Operational art Palestinian uprising Lessons learned Army planning International relations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,794 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Proposed Force XXI engineer designs: viable combat multipliers? [electronic resource]. Brinkley, William D. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng This monograph analyzes the ability of two proposed engineer organizations to adequately support the future Force XXI Division. Examinations of four historical case studies determine engineer support requirements for division operations. The U.S. Army's participation in Vietnam and Bosnia define engineer support analysis criteria for stability operations. Combat engineer support in World War II and the Persian Gulf define analysis criteria for major theater war. The key criteria are tactical bridging capability, breaching and countermine capability, combat construction capability, and engineer command and control capability. The monograph deems both proposed engineer designs inadequate to support the Force XXI division. Design One has inadequate amounts of tactical bridging and an insufficient number of engineer company headquarters to adequately conduct countermine/breaching missions. However, Design One's division-level headquarters is flexible and rapidly expandable, and should easily integrate additional engineer forces. Design One can plan and execute major division river crossings. With the addition of one additional corps combat engineer battalion, Design One will provide adequate divisional support. Design two will adequately support brigade operations but lacks division-level flexibility. The lack of a divisional engineer headquarters will preclude adequate integration of additional engineer forces without engineer headquarters augmentation. Design Two cannot adequately plan and execute division-level engineer mission such as major river crossings without significant augmentation. The monograph recommends a third design that incorporates a three-battalion, divisional engineer brigade organized along the current ERI division engineer organization. However, this third design uses the Force XXI engineer company as its foundation. The recommended design will have 30% fewer soldiers than the ERI Brigade, but should provide better support to the future division. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph analyzes the ability of two proposed engineer organizations to adequately support the future Force XXI Division. Examinations of four historical case studies determine engineer support requirements for division operations. The U.S. Army's participation in Vietnam and Bosnia define engineer support analysis criteria for stability operations. Combat engineer support in World War II and the Persian Gulf define analysis criteria for major theater war. The key criteria are tactical bridging capability, breaching and countermine capability, combat construction capability, and engineer command and control capability. The monograph deems both proposed engineer designs inadequate to support the Force XXI division. Design One has inadequate amounts of tactical bridging and an insufficient number of engineer company headquarters to adequately conduct countermine/breaching missions. However, Design One's division-level headquarters is flexible and rapidly expandable, and should easily integrate additional engineer forces. Design One can plan and execute major division river crossings. With the addition of one additional corps combat engineer battalion, Design One will provide adequate divisional support. Design two will adequately support brigade operations but lacks division-level flexibility. The lack of a divisional engineer headquarters will preclude adequate integration of additional engineer forces without engineer headquarters augmentation. Design Two cannot adequately plan and execute division-level engineer mission such as major river crossings without significant augmentation. The monograph recommends a third design that incorporates a three-battalion, divisional engineer brigade organized along the current ERI division engineer organization. However, this third design uses the Force XXI engineer company as its foundation. The recommended design will have 30% fewer soldiers than the ERI Brigade, but should provide better support to the future division. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 76 p.; 2.44 MB. Force XXI Division Engineer units Engineer combat support Case studies Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 Bosnia Persian Gulf War, 1991 Operation Desert Storm World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Division operations Future force Bridging capability River crossing Countermining Combat construction United States Army http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,795 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Medusa's mirror: stepping forward to look back: "Future UAV design implications from the 21st century battlefield". [electronic resource]. Brown, David A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Will general purpose unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAVs), best meet the requirements of the twenty-first century battlefield? Although much of the information is speculative of future progress in this emerging field, this paper attempts to link available data to anticipated trends in both the international security environment and doctrinal directions embodied in Joint Vision 2010, as well as other Army initiatives. The argument for future UAV design is captured in the conceptual framework of JV 2010, a growing scarcity of UAV resources at the tactical level, and an increase in the proliferation of UAV technology both internationally and commercially. This leads into a discussion of the likely link to increased functional uses of UAV technology for military application. Validity for future speculation concerning UAV technology and its use is also based on, adaptability and projections of feasibility in terms of likelihood, cost, training, logistical support, and the near future availability of discussed technology. "Mission specific functionality" in UAV design is inevitable. International and commercial proliferation and the vast expansion of unmanned flight will ultimately result in an army of UAV usage much too large to place on any one platform. As UAVs proliferate, acceptance will go up, technological gains will be made, cost and size will go down, and functionality will almost assuredly increase. How this technology is developed today will have a direct impact on our ability to effectively leverage the promises of its possible capabilities tomorrow. A recommendation is that the U.S. shift developmental efforts soon enough to meet future needs before confronted with them. Specific recommendations include continued funding UAV development efforts for the promises it holds. Secondly, continue to make current initiatives as modular as possible by diversifying capabilities through payload sensor flexibility. Thirdly, continue to fund UAV acquisition of initiatives such as Outrider UAV so as to give additional UAV capability to the tactical level. Finally, carefully research the possibility of distinct functional UAV designs, particularly in the areas of battlefield supply, and lethal UAV platforms for a variety of uses. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Will general purpose unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAVs), best meet the requirements of the twenty-first century battlefield? Although much of the information is speculative of future progress in this emerging field, this paper attempts to link available data to anticipated trends in both the international security environment and doctrinal directions embodied in Joint Vision 2010, as well as other Army initiatives. The argument for future UAV design is captured in the conceptual framework of JV 2010, a growing scarcity of UAV resources at the tactical level, and an increase in the proliferation of UAV technology both internationally and commercially. This leads into a discussion of the likely link to increased functional uses of UAV technology for military application. Validity for future speculation concerning UAV technology and its use is also based on, adaptability and projections of feasibility in terms of likelihood, cost, training, logistical support, and the near future availability of discussed technology. "Mission specific functionality" in UAV design is inevitable. International and commercial proliferation and the vast expansion of unmanned flight will ultimately result in an army of UAV usage much too large to place on any one platform. As UAVs proliferate, acceptance will go up, technological gains will be made, cost and size will go down, and functionality will almost assuredly increase. How this technology is developed today will have a direct impact on our ability to effectively leverage the promises of its possible capabilities tomorrow. A recommendation is that the U.S. shift developmental efforts soon enough to meet future needs before confronted with them. Specific recommendations include continued funding UAV development efforts for the promises it holds. Secondly, continue to make current initiatives as modular as possible by diversifying capabilities through payload sensor flexibility. Thirdly, continue to fund UAV acquisition of initiatives such as Outrider UAV so as to give additional UAV capability to the tactical level. Finally, carefully research the possibility of distinct functional UAV designs, particularly in the areas of battlefield supply, and lethal UAV platforms for a variety of uses. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 67 p.; 2.28 MB. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) Joint Vision 2010 Military technology Military applications Security environment Military capabilities Military tactics Battlefield tactics Future warfare http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,796 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Formula for how to screw up the Army: take no risks and make no mistakes. [electronic resource]. Buche, Joseph P. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng This monograph is attempted provocation an intellectual dare from the author to the reader to think about how the Army views risk taking by its tactical leaders. More specifically, this monograph attempts to answer whether the Army's capstone leadership, operational, and risk doctrine encourage leaders at brigade level and below to productively take risk. The author finds the answer to the research question to be a resounding NO and offers suggestions which might change the answer to the affirmative. Our Army's doctrinal and cultural views of risk are hypocritical. Both offer platitudes that ask military professionals to accept risk, to realize its necessity, and to leverage it confidently on the field of battle. In the next doctrinal breath we encourage adversity to risk by embracing principles that seek certainty and attempt to see the future with perfect acuity. The culture of the Army itself what its members do, say, and think and the way the Army organizes itself only reinforce this adversity. If productive risk taking really exists, the conceptual underpinnings of a model to achieve it must likely come partially from a look outside the profession. The monograph seeks insight into the research question's answer by surveying civilian risk theory and developing a taxonomy of the same. The work then considers distinctions between civilian and military environments to assist in identifying the transferable insights from civilian risk theory to assist in the creation of a model for military risk taking in the leadership domain. Taking this distillation and additionally considering a mix of some selected military risk theory, the monograph presents a military risk taking model. After comparing the elements of the model to Army doctrine, a chapter recommends doctrinal changes. The successful resolution of the answer to the research question, no matter how well supported, no matter how well written and organized, and no matter how easily approving signatures are obtained, only represents the start of the process. This monograph attempts to contribute to the profession's body of knowledge in a dynamic rather than static sense. The unfamiliar style, the inclusion of various alternative views, occasional conceptual attacks on some of the sacred cows of our professional culture, and other techniques all hope to result in interest, and therefore readership and consideration of the views expressed herein. More than only this, the author hopes to induce second order contributions to the profession's body of knowledge in the form of tangible concern, not mere future citation; further consideration, not simple acknowledgment; and even informed disagreement, not just vague, apathetic disappointment with the monograph's conclusions. The arrogant and brash assertions above do not come from the author's absolute confidence in the sufficiency of the monograph's analysis and recommendations; they have another aim. If the topic and these assertions don't provoke the professional military reader into a willingness to expend some mental energy, perhaps nothing will. The playground for the lazy and simple minded is on the next shelf, CD, or web site. The author hopes the catalyst for improvement in the profession's efforts in this area start, or at least continue, on the next few pages. The John Plarrens, Willie Campbells, and Mary Ann Carrols of the future deserve-and require--no less. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph is attempted provocation an intellectual dare from the author to the reader to think about how the Army views risk taking by its tactical leaders. More specifically, this monograph attempts to answer whether the Army's capstone leadership, operational, and risk doctrine encourage leaders at brigade level and below to productively take risk. The author finds the answer to the research question to be a resounding NO and offers suggestions which might change the answer to the affirmative. Our Army's doctrinal and cultural views of risk are hypocritical. Both offer platitudes that ask military professionals to accept risk, to realize its necessity, and to leverage it confidently on the field of battle. In the next doctrinal breath we encourage adversity to risk by embracing principles that seek certainty and attempt to see the future with perfect acuity. The culture of the Army itself what its members do, say, and think and the way the Army organizes itself only reinforce this adversity. If productive risk taking really exists, the conceptual underpinnings of a model to achieve it must likely come partially from a look outside the profession. The monograph seeks insight into the research question's answer by surveying civilian risk theory and developing a taxonomy of the same. The work then considers distinctions between civilian and military environments to assist in identifying the transferable insights from civilian risk theory to assist in the creation of a model for military risk taking in the leadership domain. Taking this distillation and additionally considering a mix of some selected military risk theory, the monograph presents a military risk taking model. After comparing the elements of the model to Army doctrine, a chapter recommends doctrinal changes. The successful resolution of the answer to the research question, no matter how well supported, no matter how well written and organized, and no matter how easily approving signatures are obtained, only represents the start of the process. This monograph attempts to contribute to the profession's body of knowledge in a dynamic rather than static sense. The unfamiliar style, the inclusion of various alternative views, occasional conceptual attacks on some of the sacred cows of our professional culture, and other techniques all hope to result in interest, and therefore readership and consideration of the views expressed herein. More than only this, the author hopes to induce second order contributions to the profession's body of knowledge in the form of tangible concern, not mere future citation; further consideration, not simple acknowledgment; and even informed disagreement, not just vague, apathetic disappointment with the monograph's conclusions. The arrogant and brash assertions above do not come from the author's absolute confidence in the sufficiency of the monograph's analysis and recommendations; they have another aim. If the topic and these assertions don't provoke the professional military reader into a willingness to expend some mental energy, perhaps nothing will. The playground for the lazy and simple minded is on the next shelf, CD, or web site. The author hopes the catalyst for improvement in the profession's efforts in this area start, or at least continue, on the next few pages. The John Plarrens, Willie Campbells, and Mary Ann Carrols of the future deserve-and require--no less. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 68 p.; 3.98 MB. Risk taking Risk theory Risk models Risk management Army leadership Army doctrine Civilian culture Military culture Decision making process Army training http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,797 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Bosnia: does Force XXI technology solve the operational logistic problems in Operations Other Than War? [electronic resource]. Bird, Carl D., III. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The army's charter is to fight and win the nation's wars, however, history has shown that the most frequent operations the armed forces will be involved in fall into the realm of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Further, as the army develops the concepts, procedures, and technologies to fight future wars we must not forget that these advances in technologies, concepts, and procedures must serve as a catalyst to enhance our ability to conduct OOTW. For the logistician, OOTW means extended lines of communication, dispersion of supported units, and force protection of equipment and personnel in an environment that is austere in nature. These characteristics of OOTW require that the future advances in Force XXI enable the logistician to have situational awareness of supplies and equipment while enabling him to protect support forces from the numerous threats, sometimes ambiguous in nature, that are prevalent in OOTW. The monograph accomplishes this assessment by using Bosnia as a case study to apply the conceived logistic technologies in Force XXI. The monograph orients the reader to the origin and nature of the conflict in Bosnia by reviewing the history of the Balkans prior to the outbreak of war, during the United Nations buildup, and finally the transition to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The monograph then assesses current logistic doctrine at the operational level of war to develop a framework in identifying problems in Bosnia along with OOTW and future doctrine. The monograph then identifies the operational logistic problems in Bosnia and analyses the impact of Force XXI technologies to come to a solution of the stated problem. Finally, the monograph comes to a conclusion on the impacts of Force XXI technologies in solving the operational logistic problems associated with operations in Bosnia. The monograph shows that Force XXI technology solves the logistic problems in Bosnia by protecting support forces, increasing the ability of logisticians to execute Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) operations, manage and distribute materiel, position facilities, redeploy the force, and manage the lines of communications. Further, it allows the logistician to accomplish all of the operational logistic functions in an austere environment with extended lines of communications to dispersed forces. Force XXI technology enables the logistician to conduct support operations in OOTW in a more efficient manner enabling the accomplishment of the commander's objectives and goals. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The army's charter is to fight and win the nation's wars, however, history has shown that the most frequent operations the armed forces will be involved in fall into the realm of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Further, as the army develops the concepts, procedures, and technologies to fight future wars we must not forget that these advances in technologies, concepts, and procedures must serve as a catalyst to enhance our ability to conduct OOTW. For the logistician, OOTW means extended lines of communication, dispersion of supported units, and force protection of equipment and personnel in an environment that is austere in nature. These characteristics of OOTW require that the future advances in Force XXI enable the logistician to have situational awareness of supplies and equipment while enabling him to protect support forces from the numerous threats, sometimes ambiguous in nature, that are prevalent in OOTW. The monograph accomplishes this assessment by using Bosnia as a case study to apply the conceived logistic technologies in Force XXI. The monograph orients the reader to the origin and nature of the conflict in Bosnia by reviewing the history of the Balkans prior to the outbreak of war, during the United Nations buildup, and finally the transition to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The monograph then assesses current logistic doctrine at the operational level of war to develop a framework in identifying problems in Bosnia along with OOTW and future doctrine. The monograph then identifies the operational logistic problems in Bosnia and analyses the impact of Force XXI technologies to come to a solution of the stated problem. Finally, the monograph comes to a conclusion on the impacts of Force XXI technologies in solving the operational logistic problems associated with operations in Bosnia. The monograph shows that Force XXI technology solves the logistic problems in Bosnia by protecting support forces, increasing the ability of logisticians to execute Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) operations, manage and distribute materiel, position facilities, redeploy the force, and manage the lines of communications. Further, it allows the logistician to accomplish all of the operational logistic functions in an austere environment with extended lines of communications to dispersed forces. Force XXI technology enables the logistician to conduct support operations in OOTW in a more efficient manner enabling the accomplishment of the commander's objectives and goals. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 55 p.; 1.94 MB. Force XXI technology Operations Other than War (OOTW) Logistics Bosnia Balkans Logistic technologies Supply Combat Service Support (CSS) Military doctrine Army doctrine Reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI) Operations logistics Situational awareness Information technology Distribution management http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,798 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Army Brigade Combat Team: can it meet the Army's needs until 2010? [electronic resource]. Amold, Henry A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng This monograph addresses the effectiveness of the current Army brigade combat team structure as the Army begins to move into the 21st century. More specifically, it addresses the period between now and 2010, when the Force 21 Initiative will begin implementation. The monograph uses a set of criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the current Army brigade combat team structure. This criteria is combined arms, command and control, lethality and survivability, mobility, and flexibility. The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit is scrutinized as a possible example of how another service has organized forces for ground combat for current and near future operations. Additionally, an analysis of Army and Marine involvement in Grenada and Somalia serves as a vehicle to observe the actual performance of these units and compare it with current doctrine. The monograph argues that the Army has an effective doctrine regarding the organization and employment of its brigade combat teams, and does not require radical change to be more effective. The monograph supports this conclusion by evaluating the brigade combat team against the criteria, and by observing recent actions in Grenada and Somalia. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph addresses the effectiveness of the current Army brigade combat team structure as the Army begins to move into the 21st century. More specifically, it addresses the period between now and 2010, when the Force 21 Initiative will begin implementation. The monograph uses a set of criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the current Army brigade combat team structure. This criteria is combined arms, command and control, lethality and survivability, mobility, and flexibility. The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit is scrutinized as a possible example of how another service has organized forces for ground combat for current and near future operations. Additionally, an analysis of Army and Marine involvement in Grenada and Somalia serves as a vehicle to observe the actual performance of these units and compare it with current doctrine. The monograph argues that the Army has an effective doctrine regarding the organization and employment of its brigade combat teams, and does not require radical change to be more effective. The monograph supports this conclusion by evaluating the brigade combat team against the criteria, and by observing recent actions in Grenada and Somalia. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 67 p.; 2.14 MB. Army Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) Future force Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Ground combat Grenada Somalia Military operations Army doctrine Military capabilities Military effectiveness Force XXI http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,799 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. P.S. Bond, the Clausewitz of combat engineering: does assured mobility follow his principles? [electronic resource]. Butts, Robert M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003. eng This monograph examines Colonel Bond's writings and compares his principles of military engineering to the current Objective Force Proposals, which are centered around the concepts of "assured mobility" and "embedded capabilities". The analysis attempts to reveal whether or not "assured mobility" is based upon sound historical and doctrinal foundations. Using this limited yet proven model the monograph highlights potential risks and shortfalls with the emerging doctrine and makes recommendations to minimize or correct them. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph examines Colonel Bond's writings and compares his principles of military engineering to the current Objective Force Proposals, which are centered around the concepts of "assured mobility" and "embedded capabilities". The analysis attempts to reveal whether or not "assured mobility" is based upon sound historical and doctrinal foundations. Using this limited yet proven model the monograph highlights potential risks and shortfalls with the emerging doctrine and makes recommendations to minimize or correct them. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 52 p.; 202 KB. U.S. Army Engineers Doctrine World War I Military engineering http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,8 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Transformational logistics within the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT): solutions or shell game? [electronic resource]. Jones, Guy M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng The purpose of this monograph is to examine the logistical transportation gap in the tactical segment of the U.S. Army distribution system of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and to provide recommendations for future capabilities and requirements necessary to reduce the current logistical transportation gap. The U.S. Army has struggled with logistical distribution at all levels since the Revolutionary War. This logistical distribution problem often leads to culmination or tactical pauses of an operation. The loss of capability or freedom of action due to logistics results from the inability to distribute supplies at the far end of the logistical supply chain, the last 1,000 yards. The Army historically has overcome logistical gaps by temporarily supplementing additional capabilities or resources to solve the immediate problem ? essentially playing a shell game. As the Army transforms to a campaign quality force with an expeditionary capability, these shell games will no longer enable the desired effectiveness of the Modular Force. The methodology of this monograph consists of establishing critical components of the distribution gap through a historical lens and following these components through the transition of doctrine from the current Legacy Force to the emerging Modular Force. The identified critical components of the logistical transportation gap are transportation platforms, labor forces, and materiel handling equipment. The evaluation of these transportation pillars against the desired capabilities of the Modular Force forms the basis of the solution set required to address the logistical transportation gap. This monograph finds the IBCT?s logistical transportation gap to be expanding not contracting under the emergent design of the Modular Force?s logistical distribution system. To reverse this expansion process and bridge the logistical transportation gap, the proposed solution set incorporates changes across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel in terms of the identified transportation pillars. The solution set recommendations include providing separate transportation assets to fulfill the maneuver transportation requirement; reorganizing the existing logistical transportation assets into combat capable organizations; increasing the personnel in each organized transportation unit to supplement the requirement for a dedicated labor force; and adding commercially available materiel handling equipment to each reorganized transportation unit to eliminate the requirement for a large labor force. Additionally, this paper considers the potential risks and criticism of the solution set and the solution set?s potential integration with other emerging concepts. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the logistical transportation gap in the tactical segment of the U.S. Army distribution system of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and to provide recommendations for future capabilities and requirements necessary to reduce the current logistical transportation gap. The U.S. Army has struggled with logistical distribution at all levels since the Revolutionary War. This logistical distribution problem often leads to culmination or tactical pauses of an operation. The loss of capability or freedom of action due to logistics results from the inability to distribute supplies at the far end of the logistical supply chain, the last 1,000 yards. The Army historically has overcome logistical gaps by temporarily supplementing additional capabilities or resources to solve the immediate problem ? essentially playing a shell game. As the Army transforms to a campaign quality force with an expeditionary capability, these shell games will no longer enable the desired effectiveness of the Modular Force. The methodology of this monograph consists of establishing critical components of the distribution gap through a historical lens and following these components through the transition of doctrine from the current Legacy Force to the emerging Modular Force. The identified critical components of the logistical transportation gap are transportation platforms, labor forces, and materiel handling equipment. The evaluation of these transportation pillars against the desired capabilities of the Modular Force forms the basis of the solution set required to address the logistical transportation gap. This monograph finds the IBCT?s logistical transportation gap to be expanding not contracting under the emergent design of the Modular Force?s logistical distribution system. To reverse this expansion process and bridge the logistical transportation gap, the proposed solution set incorporates changes across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel in terms of the identified transportation pillars. The solution set recommendations include providing separate transportation assets to fulfill the maneuver transportation requirement; reorganizing the existing logistical transportation assets into combat capable organizations; increasing the personnel in each organized transportation unit to supplement the requirement for a dedicated labor force; and adding commercially available materiel handling equipment to each reorganized transportation unit to eliminate the requirement for a large labor force. Additionally, this paper considers the potential risks and criticism of the solution set and the solution set?s potential integration with other emerging concepts. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 95 p.; 986 KB. Logistics United States Army Modular Force Distribution management Logistical supply chain Transportation Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Military capabilities Material handling Material handling equipment (MHE) Labor force Logistics doctrine Combat service support (CSS) Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Forward Support Company (FSC) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,801 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Systemic Operational Design (SOD): gaining and maintaining the cognitive initiative. [electronic resource]. Davison, Ketti C. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. eng This monograph began as an investigation to determine if either Effects-Based Operations (EBO) or Systemic Operational Design (SOD) should replace the traditional Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). It soon became clear that the approaches do not accomplish the same functions, are not applicable at the same levels, and are not mutually exclusive. The Military Decision-Making Process originated as a tactical decision-making process, and remains the most appropriate of the three approaches at that level. It deals with the physical threat on the ground with a decisiveness enabled by an organization of hierarchical authority. Effects-Based Operations is suitable only at the operational level. It takes the time to model the threat as a holistic system and contemplates the desired behavior changes various actions on that system would produce. It exceeds the physical realm of the tactical and explicitly translates strategic directives into tactical effects. Systemic Operational Design is a holistic approach that introduces the discrete element of design in order to inform planning. It is abstract and conceptual. It creates a cognitive map and continually updates it by the learning that occurs through action. Fusing Systemic Operational Design with the Military Decision-Making Process might be the best way ahead for operational planning and design. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph began as an investigation to determine if either Effects-Based Operations (EBO) or Systemic Operational Design (SOD) should replace the traditional Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). It soon became clear that the approaches do not accomplish the same functions, are not applicable at the same levels, and are not mutually exclusive. The Military Decision-Making Process originated as a tactical decision-making process, and remains the most appropriate of the three approaches at that level. It deals with the physical threat on the ground with a decisiveness enabled by an organization of hierarchical authority. Effects-Based Operations is suitable only at the operational level. It takes the time to model the threat as a holistic system and contemplates the desired behavior changes various actions on that system would produce. It exceeds the physical realm of the tactical and explicitly translates strategic directives into tactical effects. Systemic Operational Design is a holistic approach that introduces the discrete element of design in order to inform planning. It is abstract and conceptual. It creates a cognitive map and continually updates it by the learning that occurs through action. Fusing Systemic Operational Design with the Military Decision-Making Process might be the best way ahead for operational planning and design. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 85 p.; 982 KB. Operational planning Effects-based operations (EBO) Systemic Operational Design (SOD) Military decision-making process (MDMP) Military planning Military doctrine Operational art Systems organization Operational design Planning models Joint Operation and Planning Execution System (JOPES) Operational level of war Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,802 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Digitized chaos: is our military decision making process ready for the information age? [electronic resource]. Charlton, John W. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng The integration of new technologies has always been important to the military. The longbow, rifled muskets, and armored fighting vehicles are all examples of technological innovations that found their way into the military. However, history has proven that new technology alone seldom has dramatic effects on battlefield effectiveness. Changes in doctrine, organization, and training must accompany the new technology in order to exploit its full capabilities. Today the Army is looking at ways to integrate information age, or digital technologies into our fighting force. In particular, the area of battle command is seen as holding great promise for digitization. Unfortunately, the Army is implementing its new battle command technology without considering changes to its planning and decision making doctrine. This monograph addresses the compatibility of the Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) with information age technology. The analysis focuses on decision making theory, current digitization concepts and projects, and performance feedback from the field. The overall conclusions of this analysis are that the Army should upgrade certain portions of its decision making process to make it more compatible with digital information systems and contemporary decision making theory. This upgraded MDMP focuses on the commander's vision and uses it as a controlling idea to guide the planning process. This controlling idea along with a modified Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) clearly defines the commander's implicit and explicit information needs and sets the conditions for staff and subordinate initiative. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The integration of new technologies has always been important to the military. The longbow, rifled muskets, and armored fighting vehicles are all examples of technological innovations that found their way into the military. However, history has proven that new technology alone seldom has dramatic effects on battlefield effectiveness. Changes in doctrine, organization, and training must accompany the new technology in order to exploit its full capabilities. Today the Army is looking at ways to integrate information age, or digital technologies into our fighting force. In particular, the area of battle command is seen as holding great promise for digitization. Unfortunately, the Army is implementing its new battle command technology without considering changes to its planning and decision making doctrine. This monograph addresses the compatibility of the Army's Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) with information age technology. The analysis focuses on decision making theory, current digitization concepts and projects, and performance feedback from the field. The overall conclusions of this analysis are that the Army should upgrade certain portions of its decision making process to make it more compatible with digital information systems and contemporary decision making theory. This upgraded MDMP focuses on the commander's vision and uses it as a controlling idea to guide the planning process. This controlling idea along with a modified Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) clearly defines the commander's implicit and explicit information needs and sets the conditions for staff and subordinate initiative. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 73 p.; 2.66 MB. Management information systems Decision making Military planning Digital systems Military doctrine Decision theory Military applications Combat vehicles Adaptive training Batttle command Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) Information age Cognitive theory Commander's critical information needs (CCIR) Force XXI http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,804 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Joint opportunity gone awry: the 1740 Siege of St. Augustine. [electronic resource]. Herson, James P., Jr. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng The 1740 strategic Siege of St. Augustine, Florida offers an excellent historical example of a flawed joint operation. Although it occurred in colonial North America over two centuries ago, the difficulties the British encountered in this joint operation can still provide germane insights for today's operational planner. Naval power played a key role in Britain's eventual decision to declare war on Spain. Britain possessed over 120 ships of the line while Spain could only assemble forty. Such an overmatch in British sea power was tempered in the knowledge that should France align with Spain, an additional fifty ships of the line and a large land army could enter into the struggle. Britain's administration realistically understood that facing Spain or France on the continent with her small army was ludicrous. However, a naval war would be an entirely different matter. Spain's New World colonies were at the end of a vulnerable line of communication (LOC) and should Britain muster sufficient military forces, then the seizure of Spain's most important ports would be possible through joint military operations. With control of the ports and markets, Britain would garner considerable commercial and military riches at Spain's expense. General James Oglethorpe, founder of the British colony of Georgia and semi-professional soldier, was able to convince the South Carolina Legislature and the Royal Navy Acting Commodore, Captain Vincent Pearce, (the on station naval commander), to assist him in capturing the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine. If the British were successful, then all of Florida might become a British possession and dramatically change the political stage of North America Oglethorpe did not succeed in taking St. Augustine for a variety of reasons. One of the causes cited for the joint force's failure was the alleged inaction or malingering of the naval arm. This monograph will examine the joint aspects of this failed campaign, analyze the methodology of the opposing commanders, provide a balanced narrative of the expedition, and finally prove that the Royal Naval squadron did a credible job in assisting the land component in attaining its campaign objective and was not the proximate cause of the expedition's failure. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The 1740 strategic Siege of St. Augustine, Florida offers an excellent historical example of a flawed joint operation. Although it occurred in colonial North America over two centuries ago, the difficulties the British encountered in this joint operation can still provide germane insights for today's operational planner. Naval power played a key role in Britain's eventual decision to declare war on Spain. Britain possessed over 120 ships of the line while Spain could only assemble forty. Such an overmatch in British sea power was tempered in the knowledge that should France align with Spain, an additional fifty ships of the line and a large land army could enter into the struggle. Britain's administration realistically understood that facing Spain or France on the continent with her small army was ludicrous. However, a naval war would be an entirely different matter. Spain's New World colonies were at the end of a vulnerable line of communication (LOC) and should Britain muster sufficient military forces, then the seizure of Spain's most important ports would be possible through joint military operations. With control of the ports and markets, Britain would garner considerable commercial and military riches at Spain's expense. General James Oglethorpe, founder of the British colony of Georgia and semi-professional soldier, was able to convince the South Carolina Legislature and the Royal Navy Acting Commodore, Captain Vincent Pearce, (the on station naval commander), to assist him in capturing the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine. If the British were successful, then all of Florida might become a British possession and dramatically change the political stage of North America Oglethorpe did not succeed in taking St. Augustine for a variety of reasons. One of the causes cited for the joint force's failure was the alleged inaction or malingering of the naval arm. This monograph will examine the joint aspects of this failed campaign, analyze the methodology of the opposing commanders, provide a balanced narrative of the expedition, and finally prove that the Royal Naval squadron did a credible job in assisting the land component in attaining its campaign objective and was not the proximate cause of the expedition's failure. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 58 p.; 2.26 MB. Joint operations Siege of St. Augustine British Royal Navy Naval campaigns Naval power Military history St. Augustine, Florida Oglethorpe, James Land forces Spanish military forces Lessons learned Failed campaigns http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,805 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Tactical dislocation: Force XXI doctrine or just another pretty theory? [electronic resource]. Funk, David E. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng The U.S. Army is smaller today than at any time since before World War Two. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Army is reducing significantly not only its size but also its forward presence, preferring instead to rely more on power projection. Notwithstanding the disappearance of the Soviets, there are still myriad contingencies around the world to which this small, power-projected force must react. As the Army continues to get smaller, it is also entering the information age through a modernization process called FORCE XXI. This monograph examines whether or not these factors make a new tactical doctrine -- specifically, a doctrine based on dislocation of enemy strengths -- possible and necessary. The monograph begins by examining what both current and emerging tactical doctrine say and do in terms of three criteria: (1) How each views and addresses enemy strengths; (2) How each views defeat of the enemy; and (3) The level of flexibility each offers for a small, technologically advanced force, given the nature of future threats. Next, the monograph examines dislocation theory and defines each of the forms of tactical dislocation. Inherent in this examination is a look at the theoretical and historical - soundness of the theory. Then, the monograph applies the three criteria to dislocation, in order to compare it with current and emerging doctrine. Finally, the monograph discusses how the Army might go about adopting a dislocation-based doctrine. This discussion involves an examination of the phenomenon of defeat, a look at the defining characteristics of the future threat and how to translate the concept of dislocation into action on the battlefield. In the end, this monograph concludes that a doctrine based on dislocation is not only necessary given a small U.S. Army and the threat it is likely to face, but it is also achievable using the capabilities of FORCE XXI technologies. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The U.S. Army is smaller today than at any time since before World War Two. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Army is reducing significantly not only its size but also its forward presence, preferring instead to rely more on power projection. Notwithstanding the disappearance of the Soviets, there are still myriad contingencies around the world to which this small, power-projected force must react. As the Army continues to get smaller, it is also entering the information age through a modernization process called FORCE XXI. This monograph examines whether or not these factors make a new tactical doctrine -- specifically, a doctrine based on dislocation of enemy strengths -- possible and necessary. The monograph begins by examining what both current and emerging tactical doctrine say and do in terms of three criteria: (1) How each views and addresses enemy strengths; (2) How each views defeat of the enemy; and (3) The level of flexibility each offers for a small, technologically advanced force, given the nature of future threats. Next, the monograph examines dislocation theory and defines each of the forms of tactical dislocation. Inherent in this examination is a look at the theoretical and historical - soundness of the theory. Then, the monograph applies the three criteria to dislocation, in order to compare it with current and emerging doctrine. Finally, the monograph discusses how the Army might go about adopting a dislocation-based doctrine. This discussion involves an examination of the phenomenon of defeat, a look at the defining characteristics of the future threat and how to translate the concept of dislocation into action on the battlefield. In the end, this monograph concludes that a doctrine based on dislocation is not only necessary given a small U.S. Army and the threat it is likely to face, but it is also achievable using the capabilities of FORCE XXI technologies. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 64 p.; 2.20 MB. Army doctrine Force XXI Force reduction Army digitization Military strength Enemy strength Defeat mechanisms Future threats Dislocation theory Modernization Battlefield environment Offensive operations Defensive operations Information systems Downsizing Defeat Manpower Organizational change http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,806 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Mine is a terrible thing to waste: the operational implications of banning anti-personnel landmines. [electronic resource]. Funk, David E. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng Approximately 25,000 people each year fall victim to the estimated 110 million anti-personnel landmines (APL) scattered throughout the world. Most of the victims are non-combatants in third-world and developing nations. Because most APL are cheap to procure, long-lasting once employed, and totally indiscriminate concerning their choice of victims, the world has begun to vilify these so-called slow motion weapon of mass destruction Thus in December of 1997 did 122 nations join with Canada in signing the provisions of the Ottawa Process -- an agreement that bans universally the use, sale, and transfer of all APL. Absent from the roll of signatories was the United States. The president was willing to end U.S. use of conventional APL, except in Korea, but was convinced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that scatterable (self-destructing) APL were critical to the Army's countermobility doctrine and did not contribute to the humanitarian problem. Nonetheless, congress passed a unilateral law requiring a one-year moratorium on U.S. use of all APL, except along internationally recognized national borders (read Korean DMZ). This monograph examines whether or not the U.S. can fulfill its current warfighting contingencies without the use of APL. The monograph begins by describing the global nature of the APL problem and examining the events that led to the Ottawa treaty and the congressional "Use Moratorium." Ban activists (including many members of congress) have gone to great lengths to show that APL do not have -- in fact have never had -- significant military utility. Therefore, the next section of this paper consists of historical analyses of the past use of APL in the PACOM (Korea), and CENTCOM (Southwest Asia/Middle East) areas of responsibility (AORs) -- the two areas that represent present-day military contingencies. Next, the paper examines modem-day mine warfare doctrine and capabilities, and overlays them on the same two AORs to determine if APL have a valid and continuing place on the battlefield. This is the most important part of the paper, because it examines whether APL have become, as some "experts" assert, irrelevant to modem war, given the so-called "changed nature of warfare." In the end, this paper concludes that US-deployed APL do not represent a humanitarian threat, and that they do indeed remain important and valid weapons that will reduce US casualties and assist regional commanders in chief (CINCs) in accomplishing operational objectives. Perhaps surprisingly, this conclusion applies to the desert environs of Southwest Asia, as well as to the more restrictive terrain in Korea. Unfortunately, this paper concludes also that none of the above matters. The US will eventually ban APL -- probably sooner than later -- either unilaterally, or as part of an international agreement. If no viable replacement for the APL is developed in time, the operational implications are serious indeed. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Approximately 25,000 people each year fall victim to the estimated 110 million anti-personnel landmines (APL) scattered throughout the world. Most of the victims are non-combatants in third-world and developing nations. Because most APL are cheap to procure, long-lasting once employed, and totally indiscriminate concerning their choice of victims, the world has begun to vilify these so-called slow motion weapon of mass destruction Thus in December of 1997 did 122 nations join with Canada in signing the provisions of the Ottawa Process -- an agreement that bans universally the use, sale, and transfer of all APL. Absent from the roll of signatories was the United States. The president was willing to end U.S. use of conventional APL, except in Korea, but was convinced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that scatterable (self-destructing) APL were critical to the Army's countermobility doctrine and did not contribute to the humanitarian problem. Nonetheless, congress passed a unilateral law requiring a one-year moratorium on U.S. use of all APL, except along internationally recognized national borders (read Korean DMZ). This monograph examines whether or not the U.S. can fulfill its current warfighting contingencies without the use of APL. The monograph begins by describing the global nature of the APL problem and examining the events that led to the Ottawa treaty and the congressional "Use Moratorium." Ban activists (including many members of congress) have gone to great lengths to show that APL do not have -- in fact have never had -- significant military utility. Therefore, the next section of this paper consists of historical analyses of the past use of APL in the PACOM (Korea), and CENTCOM (Southwest Asia/Middle East) areas of responsibility (AORs) -- the two areas that represent present-day military contingencies. Next, the paper examines modem-day mine warfare doctrine and capabilities, and overlays them on the same two AORs to determine if APL have a valid and continuing place on the battlefield. This is the most important part of the paper, because it examines whether APL have become, as some "experts" assert, irrelevant to modem war, given the so-called "changed nature of warfare." In the end, this paper concludes that US-deployed APL do not represent a humanitarian threat, and that they do indeed remain important and valid weapons that will reduce US casualties and assist regional commanders in chief (CINCs) in accomplishing operational objectives. Perhaps surprisingly, this conclusion applies to the desert environs of Southwest Asia, as well as to the more restrictive terrain in Korea. Unfortunately, this paper concludes also that none of the above matters. The US will eventually ban APL -- probably sooner than later -- either unilaterally, or as part of an international agreement. If no viable replacement for the APL is developed in time, the operational implications are serious indeed. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 58 p.; 1.89 MB. Land mines Anti-personnel landmines (APL) Mines Explosives, Munitions Ottawa Process Korea Korean War, 1950-1953 Countermobility Demilitarized zones Mine warfare Military doctrine Weapons Land warfare Canada Desert warfare Use Moratorium Arms control http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,807 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NATO enlargement - an evaluation of the security implications. [electronic resource]. Gilmore, Mark R. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This monograph evaluates the security implications for the European continent as NATO enlarges its membership to include former eastern bloc countries. Specifically, it addresses whether NATO enlargement will enhance or jeopardize European security. The evaluation is structured to address the research question by first examining the changed European security environment. This is followed with an analysis of the enlargement process and the most prominent issues raised in the enlargement debate. The evaluation concludes with a discussion of Russia's response to enlargement. Research for the paper revealed a wide variety of published material on the subject, as well as an extremely diversified range of opinion. The fundamental changes in Europe following the end of the Cold War led NATO to adopt a new Alliance Strategic Concept. This new Strategic Concept addresses the changed risks and challenges facing the Alliance as well as NATO's preparation to accept missions on its periphery if members' common interests are involved. NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty which allows other nations to become members. As a result of the security vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, central and eastern European countries have sought membership in NATO. NATO's response was its Partnership for Peace initiative in 1994, followed by extending invitations for membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at the July 1997 Madrid Summit in the first of what may become several rounds of enlargement. Critics of enlargement focus on concerns of embroiling NATO in regional ethnic conflicts, of being too costly for the U.S., and of antagonizing Russia and derailing Moscow's democratic and free market reforms. Supporters offer that the successes of NATO during the Cold War can be shared with central and eastern European countries, in essence extending a proven security umbrella further east, and in the process provide a stabilizing influence to prevent the renationalization and rearmament of national militaries. The study concludes that though NATO enlargement is not without risk, if managed properly it will enhance security on the European continent. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph evaluates the security implications for the European continent as NATO enlarges its membership to include former eastern bloc countries. Specifically, it addresses whether NATO enlargement will enhance or jeopardize European security. The evaluation is structured to address the research question by first examining the changed European security environment. This is followed with an analysis of the enlargement process and the most prominent issues raised in the enlargement debate. The evaluation concludes with a discussion of Russia's response to enlargement. Research for the paper revealed a wide variety of published material on the subject, as well as an extremely diversified range of opinion. The fundamental changes in Europe following the end of the Cold War led NATO to adopt a new Alliance Strategic Concept. This new Strategic Concept addresses the changed risks and challenges facing the Alliance as well as NATO's preparation to accept missions on its periphery if members' common interests are involved. NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty which allows other nations to become members. As a result of the security vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, central and eastern European countries have sought membership in NATO. NATO's response was its Partnership for Peace initiative in 1994, followed by extending invitations for membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at the July 1997 Madrid Summit in the first of what may become several rounds of enlargement. Critics of enlargement focus on concerns of embroiling NATO in regional ethnic conflicts, of being too costly for the U.S., and of antagonizing Russia and derailing Moscow's democratic and free market reforms. Supporters offer that the successes of NATO during the Cold War can be shared with central and eastern European countries, in essence extending a proven security umbrella further east, and in the process provide a stabilizing influence to prevent the renationalization and rearmament of national militaries. The study concludes that though NATO enlargement is not without risk, if managed properly it will enhance security on the European continent. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 64 p.; 2.02 MB. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO enlargement European security Security environment Russia Alliance Strategic Concept European economic reform Warsaw Pact Partnership for Peace (PfP) Geopolitics Foreign government Peacekeeping Post-Cold War http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,808 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. War of perceptions: integrating information operations into peacekeeping plans. [electronic resource]. Charlton, John W. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng U.S. military forces are conducting peace operations more frequently than ever before. Commanders in peace operations are faced with the dilemma of having to provide stability and security in an environment where the use of force is severely restricted. That problem, combined with potential adversaries that may not follow internationally recognized laws of warfare, could leave peace operations forces at a distinct disadvantage. Information operations provide a way for commanders of peace operations to combat this dilemma and meet mission objectives. This monograph analyzes how information operations (IO) can assist commanders and planners at the operational level of war in executing peace operations. It will answer the question, what role can IO play in a peace operation and how can planners at the operational level integrate information operations into their overall plan? In answering this research question, this monograph will first analyze peace operations as they relate to the physical, moral and cybernetic domains of conflict. Using examples from recent and ongoing peace operations, this analysis will demonstrate that commanders and staffs must consider more than just the physical domain when planning a peace operation. The analysis will then shift to how the elements of operational design relate to peace operations. Finally, this monograph will address the specific requirements for integrating IO into the overall plan by analyzing staff organization requirements and IO functions in a peace operation. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. U.S. military forces are conducting peace operations more frequently than ever before. Commanders in peace operations are faced with the dilemma of having to provide stability and security in an environment where the use of force is severely restricted. That problem, combined with potential adversaries that may not follow internationally recognized laws of warfare, could leave peace operations forces at a distinct disadvantage. Information operations provide a way for commanders of peace operations to combat this dilemma and meet mission objectives. This monograph analyzes how information operations (IO) can assist commanders and planners at the operational level of war in executing peace operations. It will answer the question, what role can IO play in a peace operation and how can planners at the operational level integrate information operations into their overall plan? In answering this research question, this monograph will first analyze peace operations as they relate to the physical, moral and cybernetic domains of conflict. Using examples from recent and ongoing peace operations, this analysis will demonstrate that commanders and staffs must consider more than just the physical domain when planning a peace operation. The analysis will then shift to how the elements of operational design relate to peace operations. Finally, this monograph will address the specific requirements for integrating IO into the overall plan by analyzing staff organization requirements and IO functions in a peace operation. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 73 p.; 2.48 MB. Military strategy Military doctrine Peacekeeping Military capabilities Threat evaluation Military planning Information warfare Information operations (IO) Operational art Operation Restore Democracy http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,809 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Heavy brigade offensive reconnaissance operations: a systems perspective. [electronic resource]. Hickey, Christopher M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng The U. S. Army over the past ten years, has enhanced the ability of heavy brigades to conduct offensive reconnaissance operations, yet brigades have not significantly attained a higher rate of success. Success is defined as the commander receiving the intelligence he requires in time to make and execute operational decisions. Systems theorists have developed a technique called 'systems thinking' to gain perspective on such difficult problems. This monograph will determine if systems thinking can identify the source of the reconnaissance problem. The Army began to recognize the reconnaissance problem at the National Training Center (NTC) when it began training rotations in the early 1980s. This monograph will examine four studies that examined this reconnaissance problem at the NTC. The first three studies observed training rotations in the mid-1980s. Their conclusions and recommendations were largely implemented by the Army by the early l99Os. Unfortunately, the fourth study, published in 1996, determined that the heavy brigades still had significant problems conducting reconnaissance operations. Using a theoretical systems model based on the physical and moral environment of war, the monograph examined the mental model of the reconnaissance studies and found that the true problem is not seen. The cybernetic feedback process in the complex-adaptive command system acts as a stabilizing force. In the NTC mental model, this stabilizing force does not exist. A solution to recognize this system feedback is to educate leaders and soldiers in the moral aspects of war and its enabling and disabling effects. The training scenario should incorporate these effects as much as possible and discuss them in after action reviews. Additionally, commanders need to combine the synergistic effects of all the ground, air, and technical reconnaissance assets. Commanders need to understand what combinations of these reconnaissance assets work, when, and how. The critical variable in the system is the commander. Success is largely determined on his intuitive ability to anticipate and adapt to the situation as it is, in the environment that it exists. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The U. S. Army over the past ten years, has enhanced the ability of heavy brigades to conduct offensive reconnaissance operations, yet brigades have not significantly attained a higher rate of success. Success is defined as the commander receiving the intelligence he requires in time to make and execute operational decisions. Systems theorists have developed a technique called 'systems thinking' to gain perspective on such difficult problems. This monograph will determine if systems thinking can identify the source of the reconnaissance problem. The Army began to recognize the reconnaissance problem at the National Training Center (NTC) when it began training rotations in the early 1980s. This monograph will examine four studies that examined this reconnaissance problem at the NTC. The first three studies observed training rotations in the mid-1980s. Their conclusions and recommendations were largely implemented by the Army by the early l99Os. Unfortunately, the fourth study, published in 1996, determined that the heavy brigades still had significant problems conducting reconnaissance operations. Using a theoretical systems model based on the physical and moral environment of war, the monograph examined the mental model of the reconnaissance studies and found that the true problem is not seen. The cybernetic feedback process in the complex-adaptive command system acts as a stabilizing force. In the NTC mental model, this stabilizing force does not exist. A solution to recognize this system feedback is to educate leaders and soldiers in the moral aspects of war and its enabling and disabling effects. The training scenario should incorporate these effects as much as possible and discuss them in after action reviews. Additionally, commanders need to combine the synergistic effects of all the ground, air, and technical reconnaissance assets. Commanders need to understand what combinations of these reconnaissance assets work, when, and how. The critical variable in the system is the commander. Success is largely determined on his intuitive ability to anticipate and adapt to the situation as it is, in the environment that it exists. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 60 p.; 1.94 MB. Reconnaissance Military intelligence National Training Center (NTC) Case Studies Military training Heavy brigade organization Systems theory Environment of war Command and control Complex adaptive systems Synergism Military commanders Decision making Offensive reconnaissance operations Military doctrine Cybernetics Military ethics United States Army http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,810 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Counterterrorism and operational art. [electronic resource]. Hickey, Christopher M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action. In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use the resources to accomplish the strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish the strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism. The United States' counterterrorism effort was examined to determine if operational art applies to this form of asymmetric conflict. First, the historical development and fundamentals of operational art are described to highlight the differences of a system based on unity of effort instead of unity of command. With these procedures in mind, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the nation's counterterrorist strategy, is explained to describe current interagency counterterrorist operations. Finally, operational art is used to analyze Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) to determine if it is as applicable to a terrorist asymmetrical threat as it is to a conventional threat. Specifically, PDD-39 was analyzed to see if the ends, ways, and means methodology and campaign design are feasible in linking strategic objectives to tactical action. This monograph concludes that operational art is useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism. PDD-39 has identified the interagency conditions, the ends, to accomplish the nation's strategic counterterrorist objectives. It used campaign design, the ways, to accomplish the ends, through the means of the various government departments and agencies. Therefore, PDD-39 linked the strategic objectives into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action. Although countering terrorism is a much different environment then conventional conflict, the cognitive process of linking action on the ground to the strategic objectives are similar in purpose. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action. In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use the resources to accomplish the strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish the strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism. The United States' counterterrorism effort was examined to determine if operational art applies to this form of asymmetric conflict. First, the historical development and fundamentals of operational art are described to highlight the differences of a system based on unity of effort instead of unity of command. With these procedures in mind, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the nation's counterterrorist strategy, is explained to describe current interagency counterterrorist operations. Finally, operational art is used to analyze Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) to determine if it is as applicable to a terrorist asymmetrical threat as it is to a conventional threat. Specifically, PDD-39 was analyzed to see if the ends, ways, and means methodology and campaign design are feasible in linking strategic objectives to tactical action. This monograph concludes that operational art is useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism. PDD-39 has identified the interagency conditions, the ends, to accomplish the nation's strategic counterterrorist objectives. It used campaign design, the ways, to accomplish the ends, through the means of the various government departments and agencies. Therefore, PDD-39 linked the strategic objectives into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action. Although countering terrorism is a much different environment then conventional conflict, the cognitive process of linking action on the ground to the strategic objectives are similar in purpose. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 63 p.; 1.98 MB. Counterterrorism Operational art Asymmetrical warfare Campaign design Interagency coordination Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) Strategic planning United States national strategy Terrorism Ends, ways, means methodology Vicksburg Campaign Civil War, 1861-1865 http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,811 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. ?Betting on the come' - the People's Liberation Army combined arms gamble for the 21st century. [electronic resource]. Hendricks, Michael L. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng China's growing military capabilities serve its ambition to become the greatest power in Asia. Correspondingly, the PLA continues to modernize its forces. Established American economic and military relationships in Asia dictate national strategies of either engagement or containment of Chinese influence. A potential for Sino ? American conflict exists. The monograph defines China's current security environment from engagement and containment perspectives. Recent assessments of the PLA's growing force projection capabilities are reviewed to provide the background for an examination of the PLA's combined arms capabilities. The monograph illustrates the PLA's attempts to modernize its force through improvements in combined arms capabilities. Using the 1979 Sino - Vietnamese Conflict as a measurement of combat effectiveness, the PLA initiated doctrinal, organizational, educational and training reforms with varying degrees of success. The monograph discusses each of these four areas and determines that major impediments to the PLA's modernization are competing doctrinal requirements, austere defense budgets and continued political reliance on the primacy of a "people's war." Unwilling and incapable of rapidly modernizing the entire force, the PLA believes that it can continue to leverage non-equipment aspects of modernization to overcome technological shortfalls and military incompetence. The monograph concludes by acknowledging improvements in PLA combined arms capabilities, but indicates that the Chinese remain well behind the U.S. in achieving military superpower status. The PLA is a growing military power. It is rapidly developing the capability to serve China's regional and global ambitions. The U.S. Army will incur greater requirements to develop military to military ties with the PLA as part of a national engagement program. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. China's growing military capabilities serve its ambition to become the greatest power in Asia. Correspondingly, the PLA continues to modernize its forces. Established American economic and military relationships in Asia dictate national strategies of either engagement or containment of Chinese influence. A potential for Sino ? American conflict exists. The monograph defines China's current security environment from engagement and containment perspectives. Recent assessments of the PLA's growing force projection capabilities are reviewed to provide the background for an examination of the PLA's combined arms capabilities. The monograph illustrates the PLA's attempts to modernize its force through improvements in combined arms capabilities. Using the 1979 Sino - Vietnamese Conflict as a measurement of combat effectiveness, the PLA initiated doctrinal, organizational, educational and training reforms with varying degrees of success. The monograph discusses each of these four areas and determines that major impediments to the PLA's modernization are competing doctrinal requirements, austere defense budgets and continued political reliance on the primacy of a "people's war." Unwilling and incapable of rapidly modernizing the entire force, the PLA believes that it can continue to leverage non-equipment aspects of modernization to overcome technological shortfalls and military incompetence. The monograph concludes by acknowledging improvements in PLA combined arms capabilities, but indicates that the Chinese remain well behind the U.S. in achieving military superpower status. The PLA is a growing military power. It is rapidly developing the capability to serve China's regional and global ambitions. The U.S. Army will incur greater requirements to develop military to military ties with the PLA as part of a national engagement program. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 74 p.; 2.50 MB. China Chinese military forces People?s Liberation Army (PLA) 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Combined arms warfare Military capabilities Force structure Combat effectiveness Military doctrine Military training Military education Military organization Asian security http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,812 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Second center of peninsular gravity: Wellington?s logistical rescue of Cadiz in 1810. [electronic resource]. Herson, James P., Jr. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Napoleon Bonaparte lost over 300,000 men in the Therian Peninsula combating the British Army and Navy, along with their Spanish and Portuguese allies, in the savage conventional and unconventional Peninsular War. This very important sub-theater of the Napoleonic Wars set the pre-conditions for the eventual defeat of the First French Empire. The Peninsular War served as a source of strategic consumption for the Grande Armee. Many scholars consider this significant loss of irreplaceable French combat power as an important contributing factor in Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812. It is my opinion that the successful allied defense of Cadiz served as a focal point for rising Spanish nationalism and exacerbated the effects of the 'Spanish ulcer' whose passionate resistance so debilitated the French Army. This rebuilding of recognized Spanish resistance against the French gave the Duke of Wellington a complementary center of gravity for allied civil and military resistance outside of Lisbon within the Therian Peninsula. This joint and combined military operation is unique in the annals of the Peninsular War. Outside of the British Isles, Cadiz was the only belligerent national capital city, stretching from frigid Moscow to semi-tropical Lisbon, that did not fall at some point to the Grande Armee. The age old rhetorical question, how does a shark which is supreme within its element of water, fight a tiger, which is conversely supreme on land? When using this analogy of comparing the combative prowess of the British Navy against the Grande Armee, the principal geographical forum which enabled the two military predators to pit their respective strengths against one another was the Spanish revolutionary capital of Cadiz on the Island of Leon. This struggle, which lasted some thirty months, saw the considerable sea power of Britain used against the formidable land power of France. Success in the Peninsular War proved crucial to the allied cause, and disastrous in turn, for the land locked French and their overextended Emperor. Britain's sole peninsular ally, Portugal, depended entirely upon Britain for her defense and gradual rebuilding of a credible military establishment. With the establishment of Cadiz as the new revolutionary capital of Spain in February 1810, the British government recognized the diplomatic, propaganda, and military value of having Spain as a second active ally in the war against Napoleon in the Peninsula. Wellington correctly deduced his government's reaction and so spearheaded the logistical and military rescue of Cadiz before receiving British government approval. Although Wellington's military position was almost desperate, he recognized the importance of protecting the 'potential value' of Cadiz. Taking a risk, Wellington diverted badly needed supplies, specie, manpower, and sea power to Cadiz to enable the fledging Spanish government to survive. This logistical rescue provided the infant Spanish government immediate military protection and necessary means for survival with the collapse of the regular Spanish armies in Andalusia. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Napoleon Bonaparte lost over 300,000 men in the Therian Peninsula combating the British Army and Navy, along with their Spanish and Portuguese allies, in the savage conventional and unconventional Peninsular War. This very important sub-theater of the Napoleonic Wars set the pre-conditions for the eventual defeat of the First French Empire. The Peninsular War served as a source of strategic consumption for the Grande Armee. Many scholars consider this significant loss of irreplaceable French combat power as an important contributing factor in Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812. It is my opinion that the successful allied defense of Cadiz served as a focal point for rising Spanish nationalism and exacerbated the effects of the 'Spanish ulcer' whose passionate resistance so debilitated the French Army. This rebuilding of recognized Spanish resistance against the French gave the Duke of Wellington a complementary center of gravity for allied civil and military resistance outside of Lisbon within the Therian Peninsula. This joint and combined military operation is unique in the annals of the Peninsular War. Outside of the British Isles, Cadiz was the only belligerent national capital city, stretching from frigid Moscow to semi-tropical Lisbon, that did not fall at some point to the Grande Armee. The age old rhetorical question, how does a shark which is supreme within its element of water, fight a tiger, which is conversely supreme on land? When using this analogy of comparing the combative prowess of the British Navy against the Grande Armee, the principal geographical forum which enabled the two military predators to pit their respective strengths against one another was the Spanish revolutionary capital of Cadiz on the Island of Leon. This struggle, which lasted some thirty months, saw the considerable sea power of Britain used against the formidable land power of France. Success in the Peninsular War proved crucial to the allied cause, and disastrous in turn, for the land locked French and their overextended Emperor. Britain's sole peninsular ally, Portugal, depended entirely upon Britain for her defense and gradual rebuilding of a credible military establishment. With the establishment of Cadiz as the new revolutionary capital of Spain in February 1810, the British government recognized the diplomatic, propaganda, and military value of having Spain as a second active ally in the war against Napoleon in the Peninsula. Wellington correctly deduced his government's reaction and so spearheaded the logistical and military rescue of Cadiz before receiving British government approval. Although Wellington's military position was almost desperate, he recognized the importance of protecting the 'potential value' of Cadiz. Taking a risk, Wellington diverted badly needed supplies, specie, manpower, and sea power to Cadiz to enable the fledging Spanish government to survive. This logistical rescue provided the infant Spanish government immediate military protection and necessary means for survival with the collapse of the regular Spanish armies in Andalusia. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 70 p.; 2.70 MB. Peninsular War, 1807-1814 Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Napoleon, Bonaparte Spain Cadiz Island of Leon Iberian Peninsula Center of gravity (COG) Logistics British Army Portugal Combat effectiveness French Army Military operations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,813 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Further tactical nuclear weapons reductions in Europe: the next challenge for arms control. [electronic resource]. Headen, Thomas Y. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union has removed the traditional Cold War logic and security rationale for the forward deployment of theater nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe. Moreover, with a reduction of almost 90 percent of U.S. TNWs from NATOs soil, the debate continues on whether or not there still exists such a requirement, as well as making it more difficult for key decisionmakers to clearly articulate their future relevance. Based on theses conditions, the research question for this monograph is to determine what creative steps, proposals or measures would merit consideration and help jump start dialogue between the U.S. and Russia for deeper reductions in their TNW stockpiles, as well as to define the associated issues, obstacles and challenges. Both the U.S. and Russia's histories are replete with successful arms control examples. So surely both sides can look to their past to find prescriptions of how to deal with the development of disarmament measures that can be undertaken to generate the needed debate necessary to lead to the institution of new arms control measures and agreements, as well as preserve a credible, effective deterrent in the face of growing challenges to maintaining a stable European security environment and strategic relationship in the years to come. The monograph begins with an historical review on the evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy, focusing almost exclusively on the conditions that warranted the introduction and employment of TNWs into Europe. Additionally, it will highlight some of the economic and national security influences that led to changes in NATO's nuclear strategy and the development of policies that carefully linked TNWs to strategic nuclear weapons to reassure a U.S. commitment to Europe and provide decisionmakers greater flexibility through multiple options to respond to any aggression. It will also describe the geopolitical landscape subsequent to announced 1991 and 1992, US and Russian arms reduction declarations. Next, the monograph carefully examines NATO's threat environment and possible responses. Considerations will concentrate on two principal threats-Russia and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Specifically, it will address how domestic politics in the US, Russia, and the expansion of NATO European States remain a serious obstacle. Moreover, if these domestic conditions continue to degrade, it could very well jeopardize the nuclear control regime in Russia, as well as increase Russia's reliance on TNWs for ensuring the country's security in the wake of NATO's continued expansion. Additionally, this section will highlight NATO's response to the dramatically changed European landscape and identify how it will implement the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and Counterproliferation policy to meet and deter the WMD threat along NATO's periphery. After review of the threat environment, the monograph will then explore, develop. and evaluate creative steps/proposals and measures for consideration in the further reduction of TNWs in Europe. These steps/proposals fall into four general areas to include: formalization of the 1991 unilateral declarations; establishing a reduction and verification regime; alternative assurances through reconstitution and substitution; and deployment limitations and nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs). We should use these findings as a vehicle to determine the viability or negligibility of existing deterrence policy and strategy. The monograph concludes by reaffirming our need to retain a TNW warfighting capability as a prominent feature in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept to deter regional threats armed with NBC; however, alternative force options to include the withdrawal of remaining US TNW warheads warrant further consideration as NATO's nuclear strategy continues to evolve. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union has removed the traditional Cold War logic and security rationale for the forward deployment of theater nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe. Moreover, with a reduction of almost 90 percent of U.S. TNWs from NATOs soil, the debate continues on whether or not there still exists such a requirement, as well as making it more difficult for key decisionmakers to clearly articulate their future relevance. Based on theses conditions, the research question for this monograph is to determine what creative steps, proposals or measures would merit consideration and help jump start dialogue between the U.S. and Russia for deeper reductions in their TNW stockpiles, as well as to define the associated issues, obstacles and challenges. Both the U.S. and Russia's histories are replete with successful arms control examples. So surely both sides can look to their past to find prescriptions of how to deal with the development of disarmament measures that can be undertaken to generate the needed debate necessary to lead to the institution of new arms control measures and agreements, as well as preserve a credible, effective deterrent in the face of growing challenges to maintaining a stable European security environment and strategic relationship in the years to come. The monograph begins with an historical review on the evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy, focusing almost exclusively on the conditions that warranted the introduction and employment of TNWs into Europe. Additionally, it will highlight some of the economic and national security influences that led to changes in NATO's nuclear strategy and the development of policies that carefully linked TNWs to strategic nuclear weapons to reassure a U.S. commitment to Europe and provide decisionmakers greater flexibility through multiple options to respond to any aggression. It will also describe the geopolitical landscape subsequent to announced 1991 and 1992, US and Russian arms reduction declarations. Next, the monograph carefully examines NATO's threat environment and possible responses. Considerations will concentrate on two principal threats-Russia and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Specifically, it will address how domestic politics in the US, Russia, and the expansion of NATO European States remain a serious obstacle. Moreover, if these domestic conditions continue to degrade, it could very well jeopardize the nuclear control regime in Russia, as well as increase Russia's reliance on TNWs for ensuring the country's security in the wake of NATO's continued expansion. Additionally, this section will highlight NATO's response to the dramatically changed European landscape and identify how it will implement the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and Counterproliferation policy to meet and deter the WMD threat along NATO's periphery. After review of the threat environment, the monograph will then explore, develop. and evaluate creative steps/proposals and measures for consideration in the further reduction of TNWs in Europe. These steps/proposals fall into four general areas to include: formalization of the 1991 unilateral declarations; establishing a reduction and verification regime; alternative assurances through reconstitution and substitution; and deployment limitations and nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs). We should use these findings as a vehicle to determine the viability or negligibility of existing deterrence policy and strategy. The monograph concludes by reaffirming our need to retain a TNW warfighting capability as a prominent feature in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept to deter regional threats armed with NBC; however, alternative force options to include the withdrawal of remaining US TNW warheads warrant further consideration as NATO's nuclear strategy continues to evolve. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 71 p.; 2.69 MB. Nuclear warfare Nuclear weapons Theater nuclear weapons (TNW) Arms control Disarmament National security Cold War Russia Foreign relations North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nuclear strategy Deterrence Geopolitics Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Arms reduction Counterproliferation http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,814 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Employment of light infantry in contingency operations. What do we do without light armor? [electronic resource]. Hagen, Marshall A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Cancellation of the Armored Gun System (AGS) and the deactivation of the 3-73rd Armor Battalion has left the US. Army force structure without air droppable light armor to support contingency operations. Because of this, the contingency force commander and planner must address the question of ?What do we do now?? This monograph examines this question and attempts to fill the void left by light armor with technology and the efforts of a joint/combined arms team. In understanding the extent of the void left by light armor this monograph addresses light infantry and light armor to analyze what, specifically, each brings to a contingency operation (strengths and limitations). Operation Just Cause and lessons learned from Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are examined to review how light armor has been used effectively, and to identify current trends in the employment of light infantry and armor as a combined arms team. The U.S. Army expects to fill the immediate void left by light armor through the fielding of the Javelin anti-armor weapon system, employment of the AH-64 Apache, and with the strategic airlift of the Immediate Ready Company (IRC) from the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). Future contingency operations will be supported with theRAH-66 Comanche attack helicopter, the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM), and possibly the Line of Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) weapon systems. Additionally examined in this monograph is the use of USMC LAV-25s to augment a US Army contingency force. This monograph concludes that the U.S. Army's cancellation of the AGS and the deactivation of the 3-73rd Armor Battalion has not reduced our ability to conduct contingency operations. Employment of our technological advantage in anti-armor weapons, attack aviation, and strategic airlift can set the conditions for the use of light forces in any contingency scenario. If light armor is required for forced/early entry operations, the USMC LAV-25 is appropriate for the mission. It is air droppable, provides ample firepower and protection, and proved to work effectively with US. Army light infantry forces during Operation Just Cause. The challenge to the commander is our ability to operate as a heavy/light combined arms team and to understand and employ our technological advantage. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Cancellation of the Armored Gun System (AGS) and the deactivation of the 3-73rd Armor Battalion has left the US. Army force structure without air droppable light armor to support contingency operations. Because of this, the contingency force commander and planner must address the question of ?What do we do now?? This monograph examines this question and attempts to fill the void left by light armor with technology and the efforts of a joint/combined arms team. In understanding the extent of the void left by light armor this monograph addresses light infantry and light armor to analyze what, specifically, each brings to a contingency operation (strengths and limitations). Operation Just Cause and lessons learned from Combat Training Centers (CTCs) are examined to review how light armor has been used effectively, and to identify current trends in the employment of light infantry and armor as a combined arms team. The U.S. Army expects to fill the immediate void left by light armor through the fielding of the Javelin anti-armor weapon system, employment of the AH-64 Apache, and with the strategic airlift of the Immediate Ready Company (IRC) from the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). Future contingency operations will be supported with theRAH-66 Comanche attack helicopter, the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM), and possibly the Line of Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) weapon systems. Additionally examined in this monograph is the use of USMC LAV-25s to augment a US Army contingency force. This monograph concludes that the U.S. Army's cancellation of the AGS and the deactivation of the 3-73rd Armor Battalion has not reduced our ability to conduct contingency operations. Employment of our technological advantage in anti-armor weapons, attack aviation, and strategic airlift can set the conditions for the use of light forces in any contingency scenario. If light armor is required for forced/early entry operations, the USMC LAV-25 is appropriate for the mission. It is air droppable, provides ample firepower and protection, and proved to work effectively with US. Army light infantry forces during Operation Just Cause. The challenge to the commander is our ability to operate as a heavy/light combined arms team and to understand and employ our technological advantage. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 61 p.; 1.75 MB. Light infantry Contingency operations Light armor Operation Just Cause Panama Lessons learned Combat Training Center (CTC) Combined arms Attack helicopters Military technology AH-64 Apache RAH-66 Comanche Javelin weapon system Armored Gun System (AGS) Line of Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT) Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM) LAV-25 Strategic airlift Anti-armor Attack aviation http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,815 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Too light? Too heavy? Too medium? The 2d Infantry Division as a platform for decisive operations on the Korean Peninsula. [electronic resource]. Hendrick, J. Kevin. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng The purpose of this paper is to determine the utility of the 2d Infantry Division as a platform for decisive operations on the Korean Peninsula. Based on an unclassified North Korean campaign plan, a model CFC campaign plan was constructed that placed the 2ID into a role as the theater reserve. Using the doctrinal definition and purpose of an operational reserve, three missions were developed as likely. These missions were then quantified as decisive in nature, using both theory and U.S. doctrine. A force structure, based on J.F.C. Fuller's model of combat effects, is suggested as appropriate for conduct of these missions. Three case studies from the Korean war were then conducted. These case studies all involved division sized operations that were similar in nature to the ones suggested for the 2ID. The vignettes were analyzed and used to quantify the linkage between tactical decisiveness, force structure, and the ability to generate combat effects. Each analysis yielded a slightly different model of decisive force structure. Once complete, the 21 D's force structure could be compared to the models developed. Before final analysis, a rationale is presented as to the suitability of the heavy light division vice a standard heavy or light division to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. The conclusion is that the standard heavy or light division lacks either firepower or sufficient infantry to adequately deal with the Korean terrain and enemy. A heavy light mix seems to be the best compromise. The current force structure of the 2ID is then compared to the combat effects shown to be necessary by the historical case studies. It is concluded that the structure of the 2ID is adequate to generate the effects necessary to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. Due to heavy dependence on rotary wing aircraft, it is recognized that good flying weather is a must if the division is to maximally exploit it's mobility. The 21D is also hampered by the lack of sufficient rotary wing aircraft to move both air-assault battalions simultaneously and the inability of the Main Support Battalion to conduct self movement in one lift. Recommendations are made to address these limitations. The monograph ends with a statement that the organization of the 21D is predicated upon the particular situation in Korea, it may not translate well to other parts of the world. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this paper is to determine the utility of the 2d Infantry Division as a platform for decisive operations on the Korean Peninsula. Based on an unclassified North Korean campaign plan, a model CFC campaign plan was constructed that placed the 2ID into a role as the theater reserve. Using the doctrinal definition and purpose of an operational reserve, three missions were developed as likely. These missions were then quantified as decisive in nature, using both theory and U.S. doctrine. A force structure, based on J.F.C. Fuller's model of combat effects, is suggested as appropriate for conduct of these missions. Three case studies from the Korean war were then conducted. These case studies all involved division sized operations that were similar in nature to the ones suggested for the 2ID. The vignettes were analyzed and used to quantify the linkage between tactical decisiveness, force structure, and the ability to generate combat effects. Each analysis yielded a slightly different model of decisive force structure. Once complete, the 21 D's force structure could be compared to the models developed. Before final analysis, a rationale is presented as to the suitability of the heavy light division vice a standard heavy or light division to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. The conclusion is that the standard heavy or light division lacks either firepower or sufficient infantry to adequately deal with the Korean terrain and enemy. A heavy light mix seems to be the best compromise. The current force structure of the 2ID is then compared to the combat effects shown to be necessary by the historical case studies. It is concluded that the structure of the 2ID is adequate to generate the effects necessary to conduct decisive operations in the Korean theater. Due to heavy dependence on rotary wing aircraft, it is recognized that good flying weather is a must if the division is to maximally exploit it's mobility. The 21D is also hampered by the lack of sufficient rotary wing aircraft to move both air-assault battalions simultaneously and the inability of the Main Support Battalion to conduct self movement in one lift. Recommendations are made to address these limitations. The monograph ends with a statement that the organization of the 21D is predicated upon the particular situation in Korea, it may not translate well to other parts of the world. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 65 p.; 2.08 MB. 2nd Infantry Division Korean War, 1950-1953 Korean Peninsula Decisive operations Infantry force structure Military doctrine Case studies Heavy forces Light forces Rotary wing aircraft Military capabilities http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,816 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Campaign of ropes. An analysis of the Duke of Wellington's practice of military art during the Peninsular War, 1808 to 1814. [electronic resource]. Hendrick, J. Kevin. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The purpose of this paper was to study the practice of military art at the operational level of war. The story of Wellington's ultimate success against Napoleon's Marshals was selected as a case study as it seemed rich in the application of mental agility to achieve an asymmetrical military advantage in a theater of war. As military theory recognizes two general types of military art, classical strategy and operational art, the research question was constructed to determine if Wellington practiced pure classic strategy, or an early/transitional form of operational art. In order to provide a basis of analysis, the essential elements of both classic strategy and operational art are next defined. The history of classic strategy is outlined, then the theory of Clausewitz and Jomini used to define its four basic elements. The practice of operational art is then traced, from its inception by U.S. Grant during the American Civil War, to Soviet operational theory developed in the 1920's. The theory of Dr. James Schneider, a primary interpreter of both Grant and the Soviets, provides the eight essential elements of operational art. To round out the section on military art, U.S. operational doctrine is outlined and discussed. Like most military officers, Wellington was a creature of his own experience, therefore a chapter is dedicated to the lessons he learned as a young officer in India. The following chapter is dedicated to a study of the Peninsular War. As the research question deals with both the operational and strategic levels of war, Wellington's tactics are neglected in favor of his campaign concepts and execution. Analysis determines that in, three out of five campaigns, Wellington practiced a pure form of classic strategy. Unfortunately, these campaigns all ended in failure. In his two successful campaigns, Wellington was able to gain an asymmetrical advantage over the French by the incorporation of four of the eight elements of operational art into his operational concept. Although he lacked the technological necessities required to practice full-fledged operational art, it is concluded that Wellington practiced a transitional style of warfare that can be termed an early form of operational art. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The purpose of this paper was to study the practice of military art at the operational level of war. The story of Wellington's ultimate success against Napoleon's Marshals was selected as a case study as it seemed rich in the application of mental agility to achieve an asymmetrical military advantage in a theater of war. As military theory recognizes two general types of military art, classical strategy and operational art, the research question was constructed to determine if Wellington practiced pure classic strategy, or an early/transitional form of operational art. In order to provide a basis of analysis, the essential elements of both classic strategy and operational art are next defined. The history of classic strategy is outlined, then the theory of Clausewitz and Jomini used to define its four basic elements. The practice of operational art is then traced, from its inception by U.S. Grant during the American Civil War, to Soviet operational theory developed in the 1920's. The theory of Dr. James Schneider, a primary interpreter of both Grant and the Soviets, provides the eight essential elements of operational art. To round out the section on military art, U.S. operational doctrine is outlined and discussed. Like most military officers, Wellington was a creature of his own experience, therefore a chapter is dedicated to the lessons he learned as a young officer in India. The following chapter is dedicated to a study of the Peninsular War. As the research question deals with both the operational and strategic levels of war, Wellington's tactics are neglected in favor of his campaign concepts and execution. Analysis determines that in, three out of five campaigns, Wellington practiced a pure form of classic strategy. Unfortunately, these campaigns all ended in failure. In his two successful campaigns, Wellington was able to gain an asymmetrical advantage over the French by the incorporation of four of the eight elements of operational art into his operational concept. Although he lacked the technological necessities required to practice full-fledged operational art, it is concluded that Wellington practiced a transitional style of warfare that can be termed an early form of operational art. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 64 p.; 1.91 MB. Operational art Operational level of war Military theory Military operational doctrine Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Napoleon Peninsular War, 1807-1814 Military art Classical strategy Schneider, James Military leadership Military operations Lessons learned http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,817 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Leadership vacuum: U.S. actions in the South China Sea dispute. [electronic resource]. Eikmeier, Dale C. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This monograph is a case study examining the substitution of the Cold War strategy of large forward deployed military forces and nuclear deterrence for the Post Cold War strategy of global engagement and leadership and the implications of that substitution on the attainment of U.S. security objectives. Post Cold War realities and domestic political pressures forced the United States to reduce the size of American forward deployed military forces and to remove them as a cornerstone of the security strategy. To fill the gap thus created the Clinton administration embraced a new security strategy that substituted active leadership and engagement for large forward deployed military forces. Whether engagement and active leadership can be as effective in preserving and advancing U.S. interests as large forward deployed forces is yet to be determined. However, the circumstances surrounding territorial and resource claims in the South China Sea and the actions the United States and those of the parties directly involved in the South China Sea dispute constitute a significant test case of the United States' strategy of leadership and engagement. Many of the broader U.S. policy objectives in Asia and the Pacific cannot be achieved without a satisfactory resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea. By examining U.S. actions in the South China Sea dispute and the actions and perceptions of Asian leaders we can measure the effectiveness of the American strategy of leadership and engagement. If the United States has moved the parties in the dispute to act in a manner that promotes U.S. interests, then it will be possible to conclude that the Clinton Administration's strategy has been effective and that the strategy is valid. On the other hand, if events seem to largely ignore the actions of the United States, then either the United States is not engaged and exercising leadership, or its chosen actions have been inappropriate and ineffective. The examination reveals that events in the region largely ignore U.S. actions. The conclusion is that the Administration's strategy of leadership and engagement has been ineffectively applied in Southeast Asia and that the attainment of U.S. policy objectives is becoming more difficult as a result of the strategy's ineffectiveness. What the case study also shows is in the absence of an effective response by the United States events in a critical region will unfold in directions that does not benefit U.S. interests. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This monograph is a case study examining the substitution of the Cold War strategy of large forward deployed military forces and nuclear deterrence for the Post Cold War strategy of global engagement and leadership and the implications of that substitution on the attainment of U.S. security objectives. Post Cold War realities and domestic political pressures forced the United States to reduce the size of American forward deployed military forces and to remove them as a cornerstone of the security strategy. To fill the gap thus created the Clinton administration embraced a new security strategy that substituted active leadership and engagement for large forward deployed military forces. Whether engagement and active leadership can be as effective in preserving and advancing U.S. interests as large forward deployed forces is yet to be determined. However, the circumstances surrounding territorial and resource claims in the South China Sea and the actions the United States and those of the parties directly involved in the South China Sea dispute constitute a significant test case of the United States' strategy of leadership and engagement. Many of the broader U.S. policy objectives in Asia and the Pacific cannot be achieved without a satisfactory resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea. By examining U.S. actions in the South China Sea dispute and the actions and perceptions of Asian leaders we can measure the effectiveness of the American strategy of leadership and engagement. If the United States has moved the parties in the dispute to act in a manner that promotes U.S. interests, then it will be possible to conclude that the Clinton Administration's strategy has been effective and that the strategy is valid. On the other hand, if events seem to largely ignore the actions of the United States, then either the United States is not engaged and exercising leadership, or its chosen actions have been inappropriate and ineffective. The examination reveals that events in the region largely ignore U.S. actions. The conclusion is that the Administration's strategy of leadership and engagement has been ineffectively applied in Southeast Asia and that the attainment of U.S. policy objectives is becoming more difficult as a result of the strategy's ineffectiveness. What the case study also shows is in the absence of an effective response by the United States events in a critical region will unfold in directions that does not benefit U.S. interests. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 61 p.; 1.93 MB. National security Security strategy Foreign policy South China Sea Southeast Asia Forward deployment Deterrence United States China Global engagement Spratly Islands International security http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,818 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Air Assault Division. Is it a viable strategic contingency force for the twenty-first century? [electronic resource]. Hagen, Marshall A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The post Cold-War era has opened the door for the United States to become involved in a myriad of military operations in the execution of our National Security Strategy. As U.S. Army forces continue to conduct a variety of peace support operations and prepare to fight major regional contingency operations, our contingency force must evolve into a fighting force that is operationally capable, strategically deployable, and sustainable. This monograph examines the validity of the air assault division as a strategic contingency force in the year 2010. To analyze the air assault division as a strategic contingency force, this monograph addresses the role of the air assault division, specifically, its mission/purpose, strengths and limitations. It examines the division's operational capabilities, strategic deployability, and the logistics required to conduct contingency operations. All analyses reflect the enhancements of force modernization and projected strategic lift inventories of the year 2010. This monograph concludes that the air assault division will be a viable contingency force in the year 2010. It has the operational reach to strike deep targets to shape operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. It has a rapid deployment capability that is task organized with sufficient firepower and mobility, so that from an ISB it can conduct forced entry operations or exploit tactical success. It is not a force limited by terrain or obstacles, and has the versatility and lethality to provide a credible SASO force capable of rapid transition into combat operations should deterrence efforts fail. It is a force limited by its ability to strategically deploy, mass combat power, and sustainment of class III, V, and IX supplies. However, these limitations are continuing to decline in significance as the U.S. military continues to improve the strategic deployment capabilities of the C-17, C-5, and FSS fleets, continued modernization of the helicopter fleet, and by incorporating the RML innovations in the logistics system. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The post Cold-War era has opened the door for the United States to become involved in a myriad of military operations in the execution of our National Security Strategy. As U.S. Army forces continue to conduct a variety of peace support operations and prepare to fight major regional contingency operations, our contingency force must evolve into a fighting force that is operationally capable, strategically deployable, and sustainable. This monograph examines the validity of the air assault division as a strategic contingency force in the year 2010. To analyze the air assault division as a strategic contingency force, this monograph addresses the role of the air assault division, specifically, its mission/purpose, strengths and limitations. It examines the division's operational capabilities, strategic deployability, and the logistics required to conduct contingency operations. All analyses reflect the enhancements of force modernization and projected strategic lift inventories of the year 2010. This monograph concludes that the air assault division will be a viable contingency force in the year 2010. It has the operational reach to strike deep targets to shape operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. It has a rapid deployment capability that is task organized with sufficient firepower and mobility, so that from an ISB it can conduct forced entry operations or exploit tactical success. It is not a force limited by terrain or obstacles, and has the versatility and lethality to provide a credible SASO force capable of rapid transition into combat operations should deterrence efforts fail. It is a force limited by its ability to strategically deploy, mass combat power, and sustainment of class III, V, and IX supplies. However, these limitations are continuing to decline in significance as the U.S. military continues to improve the strategic deployment capabilities of the C-17, C-5, and FSS fleets, continued modernization of the helicopter fleet, and by incorporating the RML innovations in the logistics system. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 62 p.; 1.82 MB. Contingency force Deployability Sustainability Readiness Air Assault Division Military capabilities Combat effectiveness Combat assessment Strategic warfare Attack helicopters Logistics Military planning http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,819 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Operational art in operations other than war. [electronic resource]. Cabrey, Richard M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng Since the end of the Cold War the United States Army has found itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of "Military Operations Other Than War? (MOOTW). Additionally, our National Security Strategy states that these operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. As these operations usually entail diverse tactical actions directed towards achieving strategic objectives, the operational commander is forced to conduct this linkage with joint and multinational forces. The operational commander may also be forced to operate within less than desirable command structures often dictated by the United Nations or other multinational agencies. The focus of this study is on the potential challenges the operational or joint force commander might face when directing military actions in MOOTW. The U.S. involvement and contemporary definitions of MOOTW establishes the background for the case study of the UNOSOM I1 mission in Somalia. A discussion of the evolution and concept of operational art provides the framework to analyze the UNSOM I1 operation with respect to the eight elements of operational art identified by Dr. James Schneider. Finally, the study concludes that the U.S. military demonstrated operational art with some shortfalls. In the areas of command and control, unity of command, and operational vision, decisions made at the strategic level often impact negatively on the operational commander's ability to link the tactical actions to strategic objectives. Additionally, although Dr. Schneider defines his theory of operational art within the context of total war, his theory can be functionally applied to MOOTW as well. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Since the end of the Cold War the United States Army has found itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of "Military Operations Other Than War? (MOOTW). Additionally, our National Security Strategy states that these operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. As these operations usually entail diverse tactical actions directed towards achieving strategic objectives, the operational commander is forced to conduct this linkage with joint and multinational forces. The operational commander may also be forced to operate within less than desirable command structures often dictated by the United Nations or other multinational agencies. The focus of this study is on the potential challenges the operational or joint force commander might face when directing military actions in MOOTW. The U.S. involvement and contemporary definitions of MOOTW establishes the background for the case study of the UNOSOM I1 mission in Somalia. A discussion of the evolution and concept of operational art provides the framework to analyze the UNSOM I1 operation with respect to the eight elements of operational art identified by Dr. James Schneider. Finally, the study concludes that the U.S. military demonstrated operational art with some shortfalls. In the areas of command and control, unity of command, and operational vision, decisions made at the strategic level often impact negatively on the operational commander's ability to link the tactical actions to strategic objectives. Additionally, although Dr. Schneider defines his theory of operational art within the context of total war, his theory can be functionally applied to MOOTW as well. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 54 p.; 1.52 MB. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) National Security Strategy United Nations United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) Somalia Schneider, James Operational art Command and control Military operations Military art Military commanders http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,820 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Peacekeeping tasks in the METL: the dilemma of a direct support artillery battalion. [electronic resource]. Cabrey, Richard M. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the United States Army is finding itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of peace operations or stability operations. Additionally our National Security Strategy states that these types of operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. Although these missions are not new to the Army they do entail conducting certain tasks that are not usually trained for by the units deploying on these missions. This dilemma appears to be a result of our current training doctrine. The cornerstone manuals for Army training reflect a warfighting focus based on a pre 1990 environment. By strict doctrine, units are not permitted to place peacekeeping tasks on their METL. This monograph examines the logic of excluding peacekeeping from a unit's METL using a case study from Bosnia. The monograph defines peacekeeping in terms of the environment and roles of the military in peace operations. Current Army training doctrine is addressed to identify the limitations that current doctrine places on units identified to conduct peacekeeping missions. The case study focuses on the direct support artillery battalions from 1st Armored Division who were part of the IFOR in Bosnia. By looking at predeployment training and the conduct of peacekeeping tasks, several shortfalls are identified which can be traced back to possible problems with current training doctrine. Finally, the monograph concludes that the training philosophy in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 is sound but there should be allowances made for units to place peacekeeping tasks on the METL. Local Handbooks and other unit developed materials may be necessary to define tasks not covered in war planning or MTPs. Using this strategy a unit could conduct required peace training while still being prepared for combat. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the United States Army is finding itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of peace operations or stability operations. Additionally our National Security Strategy states that these types of operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. Although these missions are not new to the Army they do entail conducting certain tasks that are not usually trained for by the units deploying on these missions. This dilemma appears to be a result of our current training doctrine. The cornerstone manuals for Army training reflect a warfighting focus based on a pre 1990 environment. By strict doctrine, units are not permitted to place peacekeeping tasks on their METL. This monograph examines the logic of excluding peacekeeping from a unit's METL using a case study from Bosnia. The monograph defines peacekeeping in terms of the environment and roles of the military in peace operations. Current Army training doctrine is addressed to identify the limitations that current doctrine places on units identified to conduct peacekeeping missions. The case study focuses on the direct support artillery battalions from 1st Armored Division who were part of the IFOR in Bosnia. By looking at predeployment training and the conduct of peacekeeping tasks, several shortfalls are identified which can be traced back to possible problems with current training doctrine. Finally, the monograph concludes that the training philosophy in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 is sound but there should be allowances made for units to place peacekeeping tasks on the METL. Local Handbooks and other unit developed materials may be necessary to define tasks not covered in war planning or MTPs. Using this strategy a unit could conduct required peace training while still being prepared for combat. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 50 p.; 1.43 MB. Peacekeeping Mission Essential Task List (METL) Field artillery Bosnia Stability operations 1st Armored Division Mission Training Program (MTP) International Force (IFOR) Military training Military doctrine Task Force Eagle Peace operations http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,821 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Seeing the enemy: have we got it right? [electronic resource]. Crawford, Anthony K. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfighters to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and the commander's role. Accentuating the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy is important to mission execution and the development of Commander's Critical Information Requirements. This monograph examines the evolution and execution of Army doctrine during both combat and simulated combat operations to establish that there is a difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The author uses the 24th Infantry Division's Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Division's performance during the Korean War to demonstrate how seeing and understanding the enemy impacts on massing combat power at the decisive point. The monograph presents the argument that reoccurring training issues experienced at the Combat Training Centers are linked to the warfighter's inability to acknowledge the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. Finally, the monograph analyzes technology's impact on the Army's ability to see and understand the enemy. Realizing that modern technology improves the commander's ability to see the enemy, the author then focuses on determining whether seeing the enemy is enough. Deployment demands and a wide variety of potential threats require the warfighter to recognize the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The difference is vital to mission accomplishment. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. An unstable global environment where the threat is ambiguous requires warfighters to recognize the difference and interrelationship between seeing and understanding the enemy. This monograph provides an alternative definition which emphasizes the difference between seeing and understanding the enemy and the commander's role. Accentuating the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy is important to mission execution and the development of Commander's Critical Information Requirements. This monograph examines the evolution and execution of Army doctrine during both combat and simulated combat operations to establish that there is a difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The author uses the 24th Infantry Division's Task Force Smith and the 1st Marine Division's performance during the Korean War to demonstrate how seeing and understanding the enemy impacts on massing combat power at the decisive point. The monograph presents the argument that reoccurring training issues experienced at the Combat Training Centers are linked to the warfighter's inability to acknowledge the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. Finally, the monograph analyzes technology's impact on the Army's ability to see and understand the enemy. Realizing that modern technology improves the commander's ability to see the enemy, the author then focuses on determining whether seeing the enemy is enough. Deployment demands and a wide variety of potential threats require the warfighter to recognize the difference and linkage between seeing and understanding the enemy. The difference is vital to mission accomplishment. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 55 p.; 2.43 MB. Military operations Enemy Warfare Combat effectiveness Military doctrine Missions Military training Military commanders Information processing Korean War, 1950-1953 Combat Training Centers Readiness Military Strategy Military Intelligence Commander's Critical Information Requirment http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,822 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Search for stability in Sub-Saharan Africa an American perspective. [electronic resource]. Crawford, Anthony K. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment. It created an international environment plagued by wide spread human rights violations, the proliferation of violence, and an increase in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in the increased involvement of the U.S. in the region. U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa has consisted of humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, security assistance, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Combined Medical Exercises, international Military Education and Training (IMET), and Exercise-related Construction projects. This monograph measures the effectiveness of these programs against the degree to which they promote and develop stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. IMET programs must be linked to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Failure to do so will result in a waste of Department of Defense resources. This monograph (1) defines the geographical area and its challenges to the U.S. military; (2) identifies and discusses the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa to include the identification of U.S. interest in the area; (3) provides a legislative overview of IMET programs; (4) identifies the combatant commands responsible for the region and what IMET programs they conduct; and (5) assesses the effectiveness of IMET programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment. It created an international environment plagued by wide spread human rights violations, the proliferation of violence, and an increase in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in the increased involvement of the U.S. in the region. U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa has consisted of humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, security assistance, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Combined Medical Exercises, international Military Education and Training (IMET), and Exercise-related Construction projects. This monograph measures the effectiveness of these programs against the degree to which they promote and develop stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. IMET programs must be linked to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Failure to do so will result in a waste of Department of Defense resources. This monograph (1) defines the geographical area and its challenges to the U.S. military; (2) identifies and discusses the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa to include the identification of U.S. interest in the area; (3) provides a legislative overview of IMET programs; (4) identifies the combatant commands responsible for the region and what IMET programs they conduct; and (5) assesses the effectiveness of IMET programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 70 p.; 1.71 MB. Peacekeeping Military strategy National security Sub-Saharan Africa Foreign aid Stability Defense systems Education Weapons of mass destruction Military training Medical services International relations International Military Education and Training (IMET) Foreign policy National Security Strategy (NSS) National Military Strategy (NMS) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,823 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Round 15, and the winner is? The ongoing debate on who should manage medical supply. [electronic resource]. D'Amato, Mark A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng This study attempts to disprove the paradigm that medical supply requires separate management under the control of the Army's medical community. Disproving this paradigm can result in immediate economies for the Army. In an era of shrinking resources these potential economies become more and more important as the Army strives to maintain readiness for future employment. Understanding how the Army's medical supply system evolved is central to understanding the medical supply paradigm and eventually disproving it. Therefore, the study - begins by reviewing its history since World War II and highlights both current and future medical supply doctrine. With the system's foundation firmly established, arguments for and against it are thoroughly discussed, followed by a short description of its key components. These chapters provide the reader an understanding of the current system and set the stage for testing the assumptions underlying it. With this in mind, the last chapter, using historical as well as current literature, analyses the arguments and disproves the paradigm. The study ends by concluding that there are no substantial reasons; historical, organizational, or technical, for the separation of medical supply from the general supply system. The potential for integration Into the general supply system was recognized as early as World War II and the time is ripe for change. A shrinking budget, coupled with improvements in information management systems and high quality soldiers, is the recipe for change. It is no longer necessary nor cost effective to have a separate medical supply system. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This study attempts to disprove the paradigm that medical supply requires separate management under the control of the Army's medical community. Disproving this paradigm can result in immediate economies for the Army. In an era of shrinking resources these potential economies become more and more important as the Army strives to maintain readiness for future employment. Understanding how the Army's medical supply system evolved is central to understanding the medical supply paradigm and eventually disproving it. Therefore, the study - begins by reviewing its history since World War II and highlights both current and future medical supply doctrine. With the system's foundation firmly established, arguments for and against it are thoroughly discussed, followed by a short description of its key components. These chapters provide the reader an understanding of the current system and set the stage for testing the assumptions underlying it. With this in mind, the last chapter, using historical as well as current literature, analyses the arguments and disproves the paradigm. The study ends by concluding that there are no substantial reasons; historical, organizational, or technical, for the separation of medical supply from the general supply system. The potential for integration Into the general supply system was recognized as early as World War II and the time is ripe for change. A shrinking budget, coupled with improvements in information management systems and high quality soldiers, is the recipe for change. It is no longer necessary nor cost effective to have a separate medical supply system. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 64 p.; 3.05 MB. Medical supplies Information management systems Military medicine Medical services Data management Army personnel Medical personnel Military doctrine Logistics Supply operations Efficiency Inventory http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,824 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RSOI: Force deployment bottleneck. [electronic resource]. D'Amato, Mark A. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng This study uses The Theory Of Constraints (TOC) management methodology and recent military missions to show that RSOI operations are generally the limiting constraint to force deployment operations. This runs counter to the popular belief that strategic lift is the limiting constraint. The study begins by highlighting the genesis of the military's current force projection strategy and the resulting importance of rapid force deployments. This is followed by a discussion on the force deployment pipeline and on Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) operations. The focus of Chapter 2 is explaining the TOC methodology and its application to force deployments. This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the five step process and uses military examples to help the reader understand its use as an analytical tool for planners and operators. The bulk of the analysis is conducted in Chapter 3. Using TOC methodology, the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) simulation, and some historical examples the study demonstrates that RSOI operations generally constrain force deployments. The chapter also discusses initiatives to break the constraint and improve flow through the system. The study concludes with the following findings: (1) RSOI operations are the critical vulnerability to force deployment operations, (2) efforts to reduce flow should generally take priority over efforts to increase capacity at the constraint, (3) more strategic lift is not the answer, (4) improved planning and tracking tools are required, (4) a permanent and tailorable RSOI organization is needed to achieve unity of command and unity of effort, and (5) institutionalizing the process of continual improvement is required. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. This study uses The Theory Of Constraints (TOC) management methodology and recent military missions to show that RSOI operations are generally the limiting constraint to force deployment operations. This runs counter to the popular belief that strategic lift is the limiting constraint. The study begins by highlighting the genesis of the military's current force projection strategy and the resulting importance of rapid force deployments. This is followed by a discussion on the force deployment pipeline and on Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) operations. The focus of Chapter 2 is explaining the TOC methodology and its application to force deployments. This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the five step process and uses military examples to help the reader understand its use as an analytical tool for planners and operators. The bulk of the analysis is conducted in Chapter 3. Using TOC methodology, the Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) simulation, and some historical examples the study demonstrates that RSOI operations generally constrain force deployments. The chapter also discusses initiatives to break the constraint and improve flow through the system. The study concludes with the following findings: (1) RSOI operations are the critical vulnerability to force deployment operations, (2) efforts to reduce flow should generally take priority over efforts to increase capacity at the constraint, (3) more strategic lift is not the answer, (4) improved planning and tracking tools are required, (4) a permanent and tailorable RSOI organization is needed to achieve unity of command and unity of effort, and (5) institutionalizing the process of continual improvement is required. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 83 p.; 2.97 MB. Reception, staging, onward, movement and integration (RSOI) Military operations Deployment Military strategy Management planning and control Tracking Simulation National security Vulnerability Missions Theory of constraints (TOC) Force deployment Personnel management Force projection Logistics Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,825 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Operational art in the conduct of Naval operations. [electronic resource]. Durham, Richard W. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Using the Joint definition of operational art, and in the context of the historical development of operational art, evaluation criteria are developed to examine an historical naval operation of sufficient extent and scope to have required some approximation of operational artistry. Using the suggested evaluation criteria, this paper explores the use of operational art in naval operations in the Pacific Campaign of World War II. This paper also seeks to investigate the impact of the experience of using operational art on subsequent naval thinking, as expressed in post-World War II naval strategy and operations. The impact of doctrine and the linkage between planning and operational art are also reviewed within the context of post-Cold War naval operations. Finally, this paper suggests possible benefits that the Navy could derive from the study application of operational art. The practice of operational art was evident in the planning and execution of naval operations in the Pacific Theater during WWII. Admirals Nimitz and King clearly linked ends, ways and means to ensure that operations were only undertaken with adequate resources, and the operations undertaken clearly supported the allied wartime strategy. The operations of all services combined to provide simultaneous attacks in breadth, as well as depth, and resulted in the destruction of the offensive military capability of the Japanese, as well as the destruction of their will to continue to fight. Naval operational art, as expressed in the context of naval doctrine, may be a vehicle to reinvigorate the deliberate planning process within the Navy. Naval doctrine can also guide Joint and naval commanders in the optimum use of naval forces in future Joint operations. The increased emphasis on developing more specific doctrine, and refining the planning function for naval forces, can only serve to increase the relevance of naval force in future Joint operations. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Using the Joint definition of operational art, and in the context of the historical development of operational art, evaluation criteria are developed to examine an historical naval operation of sufficient extent and scope to have required some approximation of operational artistry. Using the suggested evaluation criteria, this paper explores the use of operational art in naval operations in the Pacific Campaign of World War II. This paper also seeks to investigate the impact of the experience of using operational art on subsequent naval thinking, as expressed in post-World War II naval strategy and operations. The impact of doctrine and the linkage between planning and operational art are also reviewed within the context of post-Cold War naval operations. Finally, this paper suggests possible benefits that the Navy could derive from the study application of operational art. The practice of operational art was evident in the planning and execution of naval operations in the Pacific Theater during WWII. Admirals Nimitz and King clearly linked ends, ways and means to ensure that operations were only undertaken with adequate resources, and the operations undertaken clearly supported the allied wartime strategy. The operations of all services combined to provide simultaneous attacks in breadth, as well as depth, and resulted in the destruction of the offensive military capability of the Japanese, as well as the destruction of their will to continue to fight. Naval operational art, as expressed in the context of naval doctrine, may be a vehicle to reinvigorate the deliberate planning process within the Navy. Naval doctrine can also guide Joint and naval commanders in the optimum use of naval forces in future Joint operations. The increased emphasis on developing more specific doctrine, and refining the planning function for naval forces, can only serve to increase the relevance of naval force in future Joint operations. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 60 p.; 1.98 MB. Operational art World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Military history Theater level operations Naval operations Military art Optimization Military doctrine Naval personnel Planning Military capabilities Synergy Pacific campaign Military commanders Operational design National strategy Logistics http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,826 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Building a Tactical Intelligence Model for the Information-Based Force. [electronic resource]. Felts, Thomas H. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Force development trends since the end of the Cold War have dictated a smaller, more lethal force that is capable of rapidly responding to a multitude of contingencies from a CONUS base - force projection. The tremendous growth in information and precision technologies has established the technological conditions for this force development - information based. These requirements call into question the adequacy of current organizational structures and their ability to allow for the optimization of these capabilities to meet the needs of a force projection, information based Army. This paper examines the division level military intelligence model in particular. The division continues to be the major tactical formation with the capability to tailor for specific missions. Military intelligence, by definition, provides at least half of the information equation that the commander uses to make decisions. The monograph will begin by charting the historical development of the current tactical MI organizational model based on the requirements for military intelligence contained in historical documentation and doctrinal developments since World War II. The monograph develops historical trends in the use of military intelligence. It then applies these trends as the baseline for developing and validating the criteria for evaluating the acceptability and suitability of the current model. These criteria also provide a template of requirements for consideration of alternative organizational structures. The monograph will then focus on two alternative organizational models for tactical military intelligence. The first of these, the Division Intelligence Command, will be built on the historical Division Artillery evolutionary example of building centralized command and control mechanisms to optimize the use of emerging technological capabilities. The second organizational construct is the Soviet model for the Chief of Reconnaissance Troops, and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Tactical Operations Center. The monograph will conclude by evaluating the alternative models for tactical intelligence using the aforementioned criteria to determine the most suitable organizational model. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Force development trends since the end of the Cold War have dictated a smaller, more lethal force that is capable of rapidly responding to a multitude of contingencies from a CONUS base - force projection. The tremendous growth in information and precision technologies has established the technological conditions for this force development - information based. These requirements call into question the adequacy of current organizational structures and their ability to allow for the optimization of these capabilities to meet the needs of a force projection, information based Army. This paper examines the division level military intelligence model in particular. The division continues to be the major tactical formation with the capability to tailor for specific missions. Military intelligence, by definition, provides at least half of the information equation that the commander uses to make decisions. The monograph will begin by charting the historical development of the current tactical MI organizational model based on the requirements for military intelligence contained in historical documentation and doctrinal developments since World War II. The monograph develops historical trends in the use of military intelligence. It then applies these trends as the baseline for developing and validating the criteria for evaluating the acceptability and suitability of the current model. These criteria also provide a template of requirements for consideration of alternative organizational structures. The monograph will then focus on two alternative organizational models for tactical military intelligence. The first of these, the Division Intelligence Command, will be built on the historical Division Artillery evolutionary example of building centralized command and control mechanisms to optimize the use of emerging technological capabilities. The second organizational construct is the Soviet model for the Chief of Reconnaissance Troops, and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Tactical Operations Center. The monograph will conclude by evaluating the alternative models for tactical intelligence using the aforementioned criteria to determine the most suitable organizational model. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 82 p.; 3.98 MB. Military intelligence Optimization Division level intelligence Military forces Military requirements Missions Tactical intelligence Military doctrine http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,827 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Defining nature: Evolving intelligence preparation of the battlefield to build a theoretical construct for the multi-media operational environment. [electronic resource]. Felts, Thomas H. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng Future operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010 and the accompanying service level concepts emphasizes full spectrum, full dimensional dominance, allowing the application of force in time and space that cannot be equaled by a potential adversary. A campaign planner must take into account all of the factors that shape the very nature of this form of conflict based primarily on the operational environment and its effects on potential adversaries, both enemy and friendly. The campaign planning model contained in JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as described in FM 34-130 are the prescriptive tools for achieving this end. Joint doctrine writers are attempting to expand on this doctrine by pursuing the development of a methodology for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. This monograph is a compliment to this particular effort, and attempts to detail a singular, simple construct for synthesizing the available data that defines a theater of operation and how a given set of belligerents will operate in the given operational environment of the theater. This monograph will attempt to develop and evaluate a singular environmental theoretical construct for operational planning, based on lines of communication. The construct will specifically expand this context to a discussion of the interaction of operational media (the multi-media operational environment). The monograph will develop the theoretical construct, and will apply it to future operational concepts to determine its flexibility and utility in establishing full spectrum, full dimensional dominance. The monograph will begin the construct by establishing the theoretical terms for lines of communication and the operational media. A clear definition of operational media as they pertain to operations and campaigns will be the necessary start point. The definition of the individual operational media, their characteristics, and their bearing on operations in a theoretical sense -specifically, the conveyance of combat power - will be the next step. The next focus will be the discussion of the basic "physics" of the various operational media. This discussion will examine the interaction of the individual media, providing the basic terms for the theoretical construct of the multi-media operational environment. The construct will provide a means to apply the characteristics of theater and operational design based on the operational environment defined by the terms of the construct. The construct will introduce the concepts of key points of media interaction and decisive operational media in this context. The final focus will be the application of the construct to future operational concepts that will prescriptively allow for full spectrum, full dimensional dominance. This section will end with an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the total construct as compared to these future concepts. The monograph will conclude by outlining the implications of the construct on future operational planning and the development of joint doctrine. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Future operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010 and the accompanying service level concepts emphasizes full spectrum, full dimensional dominance, allowing the application of force in time and space that cannot be equaled by a potential adversary. A campaign planner must take into account all of the factors that shape the very nature of this form of conflict based primarily on the operational environment and its effects on potential adversaries, both enemy and friendly. The campaign planning model contained in JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as described in FM 34-130 are the prescriptive tools for achieving this end. Joint doctrine writers are attempting to expand on this doctrine by pursuing the development of a methodology for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. This monograph is a compliment to this particular effort, and attempts to detail a singular, simple construct for synthesizing the available data that defines a theater of operation and how a given set of belligerents will operate in the given operational environment of the theater. This monograph will attempt to develop and evaluate a singular environmental theoretical construct for operational planning, based on lines of communication. The construct will specifically expand this context to a discussion of the interaction of operational media (the multi-media operational environment). The monograph will develop the theoretical construct, and will apply it to future operational concepts to determine its flexibility and utility in establishing full spectrum, full dimensional dominance. The monograph will begin the construct by establishing the theoretical terms for lines of communication and the operational media. A clear definition of operational media as they pertain to operations and campaigns will be the necessary start point. The definition of the individual operational media, their characteristics, and their bearing on operations in a theoretical sense -specifically, the conveyance of combat power - will be the next step. The next focus will be the discussion of the basic "physics" of the various operational media. This discussion will examine the interaction of the individual media, providing the basic terms for the theoretical construct of the multi-media operational environment. The construct will provide a means to apply the characteristics of theater and operational design based on the operational environment defined by the terms of the construct. The construct will introduce the concepts of key points of media interaction and decisive operational media in this context. The final focus will be the application of the construct to future operational concepts that will prescriptively allow for full spectrum, full dimensional dominance. This section will end with an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the total construct as compared to these future concepts. The monograph will conclude by outlining the implications of the construct on future operational planning and the development of joint doctrine. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 57 p.; 2.34 MB. Military planning Theater level operations Military doctrine Joint military activities Military strategy Military capabilities Tactical intelligence Operational planning Operational media Campaign planning Joint Vision 2010 http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,828 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Special forces integration with multinational division-north in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [electronic resource]. Findlay, Michael L. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng The American people expect the military to win future engagements with greater efficiency to reduce costs. Our National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010, and other keystone joint publications seek to answer their expectation by espousing 'jointness' - fighting as a fully interoperable and seamlessly integrated joint force. These publications envision achieving increased effectiveness by creating the best fit of available component forces to harmonize the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services. This monograph examines how well Special Forces and U.S. conventional ground forces in Bosnia satisfied the vision of 'jointness' during both Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. It adopts a methodology of examining these operations using two criteria that research revealed were common to the documents: service provision of effective component forces and efficient joint employment by the responsible commander. The corresponding measures of merit used to analyze operations are: presence of competent components, fit of forces, command relationships, mission direction, and mutual trust. After describing the joint and multinational environment in Bosnia, and Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector, the monograph systematically assesses the 'jointness' of Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector relative to the measures of merit. Research reveals overall success in operations but significant shortcomings in command relationships and mutual trust that improved only after months of turmoil. The monograph concludes that complicated and unclear command relationships caused poor mutual trust between Special Forces and conventional forces and degraded overall effectiveness. It questions the utility of the Tactical Control (TACON) command relationship for long term operations, proposing rather an Operational Control (OPCON) or Direct support relationship based on the requirements of the joint force commander. It also asserts the necessity for special operations expertise imbedded in the joint force commander's staff rather than allowing a subordinate special operations headquarters to provide potentially biased staff recommendations on how special operations forces can assist in the accomplishment of the joint force mission. Finally, the paper makes recommendations to improve current doctrine and future operations. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. The American people expect the military to win future engagements with greater efficiency to reduce costs. Our National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010, and other keystone joint publications seek to answer their expectation by espousing 'jointness' - fighting as a fully interoperable and seamlessly integrated joint force. These publications envision achieving increased effectiveness by creating the best fit of available component forces to harmonize the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services. This monograph examines how well Special Forces and U.S. conventional ground forces in Bosnia satisfied the vision of 'jointness' during both Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. It adopts a methodology of examining these operations using two criteria that research revealed were common to the documents: service provision of effective component forces and efficient joint employment by the responsible commander. The corresponding measures of merit used to analyze operations are: presence of competent components, fit of forces, command relationships, mission direction, and mutual trust. After describing the joint and multinational environment in Bosnia, and Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector, the monograph systematically assesses the 'jointness' of Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector relative to the measures of merit. Research reveals overall success in operations but significant shortcomings in command relationships and mutual trust that improved only after months of turmoil. The monograph concludes that complicated and unclear command relationships caused poor mutual trust between Special Forces and conventional forces and degraded overall effectiveness. It questions the utility of the Tactical Control (TACON) command relationship for long term operations, proposing rather an Operational Control (OPCON) or Direct support relationship based on the requirements of the joint force commander. It also asserts the necessity for special operations expertise imbedded in the joint force commander's staff rather than allowing a subordinate special operations headquarters to provide potentially biased staff recommendations on how special operations forces can assist in the accomplishment of the joint force mission. Finally, the paper makes recommendations to improve current doctrine and future operations. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 82 p.; 2.98 MB. Joint military activities Special Forces Conventional Forces Military strategy Cost analysis Missions Vision Civilian population Bosnia-Herzegovina Joint Vision 2010 Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint Guard Tactical Control (TACON) Military doctrine Multinational Division-North http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,829 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Digitization of the heavy maneuver brigade: Increased situational awareness and decreased decision making. [electronic resource]. Flowers, Jack D. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997. eng Doctrine and theory suggest that greater technologies in Army information systems will allow the capability to gain increased situational awareness and thereby reduce battlefield uncertainty. Information based operations allow the Army to answer the questions "where am I; where are my buddies; and where is the enemy." The premise is that if we know these answers we can increase situational awareness. While this knowledge may contribute to increased situational awareness, does it focus on the real issue of what situational awareness really is? The purpose of the monograph is to answer the research question: Will digitization of the heavy maneuver brigade increase situational awareness and allow the maneuver brigade commander to quickly solve problems in the conduct of decisive operations? To answer the research question, the monograph reviews the current doctrine and theory of situational awareness and decisionmaking processes that identify criteria for an evaluation of the current AWE. When compared to current theory and doctrine the AWE may not exploit technology and enhance situational awareness as expected by the Army. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. Doctrine and theory suggest that greater technologies in Army information systems will allow the capability to gain increased situational awareness and thereby reduce battlefield uncertainty. Information based operations allow the Army to answer the questions "where am I; where are my buddies; and where is the enemy." The premise is that if we know these answers we can increase situational awareness. While this knowledge may contribute to increased situational awareness, does it focus on the real issue of what situational awareness really is? The purpose of the monograph is to answer the research question: Will digitization of the heavy maneuver brigade increase situational awareness and allow the maneuver brigade commander to quickly solve problems in the conduct of decisive operations? To answer the research question, the monograph reviews the current doctrine and theory of situational awareness and decisionmaking processes that identify criteria for an evaluation of the current AWE. When compared to current theory and doctrine the AWE may not exploit technology and enhance situational awareness as expected by the Army. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 48 p.; 1.81 MB. Military operations Information systems Combat effectiveness Decision making Military doctrine Combat support Brigade level organizations Situational awareness Heavy Maneuver Brigade Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) Military training http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,830 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Patton, Third Army and operational maneuver. [electronic resource]. Flowers, Jack D. text Textual. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. eng On 16 December 1944, the German Army launched an offensive in the Ardennes to split Allied forces and retake the ports of Antwerp and Liege. The German advance split the XII Army forces and left the 101st Airborne Division surrounded at Bastonge. To relieve the encircled units in the Ardennes and defeat the German offensive, Third Army conducted an impressive counterattack into the flank of the Germans. The flexibility to turn ninety degrees during the worst winter in thirty-eight years and relieve the encircled forces stands out as one of the greatest operational maneuvers in history. While this operation is unique, the actions of the commander and staff that planned and executed it deserve closer analysis to determine what enabled them to orchestrate this maneuver. It is especially remarkable, when taken in context, how rapidly the Army changed during the previous four years. The U.S. Army anticipating eventual war in Europe began a transformation which included drastic changes in force structure and doctrine. The primary transformation in doctrine was the revision of Field Service Regulation 100-5. The 1941 edition of 100-5 superseded a tentative version published in 1939 which was the first major revision of warfighting doctrine since 1923. It was with this manual that the Army went to war. It was also the manual used to train and teach new and reserve officers who had little experience in the study and practice of war. How important and to what extent did Patton's Third Army apply the doctrine in conducting the Battle of the Bulge? Particularly relevant to serving officers today is to analyze the operations of Third Army in terms of doctrine that existed in 1944 and today's current doctrine. An examination of similarities and differences between the doctrines may allow development of possible conclusions on the ability of future forces to conduct decisive maneuver in compressed time and space. This monograph sought to answer the question does current operational doctrine place enough emphasis on the art of command to ensure flexibility in the execution of operational warfare? The findings of this monograph suggests that the Army should consider refining the emphasis placed on the art of command in the current doctrinal manuals FMs 100-5 and 101-5. Additionally, more doctrinal emphasis should be placed on fulfilling commander's information needs. More controversial would be to allow increased latitude by commanders in selection of their staff officers. While some will argue this is cronyism, it exist at some levels in certain sub-communities of the Army already. If commanders could pick subordinates that are familiar with and understand how the commander thinks this has the potential to increase the effectiveness of unit operations. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. On 16 December 1944, the German Army launched an offensive in the Ardennes to split Allied forces and retake the ports of Antwerp and Liege. The German advance split the XII Army forces and left the 101st Airborne Division surrounded at Bastonge. To relieve the encircled units in the Ardennes and defeat the German offensive, Third Army conducted an impressive counterattack into the flank of the Germans. The flexibility to turn ninety degrees during the worst winter in thirty-eight years and relieve the encircled forces stands out as one of the greatest operational maneuvers in history. While this operation is unique, the actions of the commander and staff that planned and executed it deserve closer analysis to determine what enabled them to orchestrate this maneuver. It is especially remarkable, when taken in context, how rapidly the Army changed during the previous four years. The U.S. Army anticipating eventual war in Europe began a transformation which included drastic changes in force structure and doctrine. The primary transformation in doctrine was the revision of Field Service Regulation 100-5. The 1941 edition of 100-5 superseded a tentative version published in 1939 which was the first major revision of warfighting doctrine since 1923. It was with this manual that the Army went to war. It was also the manual used to train and teach new and reserve officers who had little experience in the study and practice of war. How important and to what extent did Patton's Third Army apply the doctrine in conducting the Battle of the Bulge? Particularly relevant to serving officers today is to analyze the operations of Third Army in terms of doctrine that existed in 1944 and today's current doctrine. An examination of similarities and differences between the doctrines may allow development of possible conclusions on the ability of future forces to conduct decisive maneuver in compressed time and space. This monograph sought to answer the question does current operational doctrine place enough emphasis on the art of command to ensure flexibility in the execution of operational warfare? The findings of this monograph suggests that the Army should consider refining the emphasis placed on the art of command in the current doctrinal manuals FMs 100-5 and 101-5. Additionally, more doctrinal emphasis should be placed on fulfilling commander's information needs. More controversial would be to allow increased latitude by commanders in selection of their staff officers. While some will argue this is cronyism, it exist at some levels in certain sub-communities of the Army already. If commanders could pick subordinates that are familiar with and understand how the commander thinks this has the potential to increase the effectiveness of unit operations. PDF; Adobe Acrobat Reader required; 53 p.; 1.99 MB. Army operations Decision making Military doctrine Military exercises Military planning Third Army Allied Forces German Armed Forces Battle of the Bulge Battle of the Ardennes Patton, George S. (George Smith) FM 100-5 FM 101-5 World War, 1939-1945 World War II WWII Art of command Military intelligence http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll3,831 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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